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Abstract 
 
A successful transition into the knowledge economy is said to depend upon higher level 
skills, creating unprecedented pressure on university systems – as they expand across 
countries – to provide knowledge-based labour markets with the skills needed. But what 
are the political economy dynamics underlying national patterns of high skill formation? 
This thesis argues that existing theoretical approaches are not well-suited to answer the 
question: ideational and structuralist frameworks downplay persistent national 
differences, while institutionalist accounts assume that national differences rest upon the 
very lack of higher education expansion in some countries, downplaying the cross-
national trend of higher education expansion. The thesis proposes a framework that 
accounts for distinct national trajectories of high skill formation within the convergent 
trend of higher education expansion. In particular, two crucial variables are identified to 
theorise the relationship between higher education systems and knowledge-based labour 
markets: (i) the predominant type of knowledge economy in a given country; and (ii) the 
degree of inter-university competition across different higher education systems. It is 
argued that the former explains what type of higher level skills will be sought by 
employers and cultivated by governments, while the latter helps understanding of why 
some higher education systems are more open at the outset to satisfy labour market 
demands compared to others, determining whether institutional change in a given higher 
education system is likely to be encompassing or marginal. Cross-national descriptive 
statistics and systematic process analysis across a set of diverse country case studies 
(Britain, Germany and South Korea) are used to test the theory. By highlighting the 
agency of universities, governments and businesses and by linking higher education 
policy with knowledge-based growth strategies, this thesis provides a theoretical and 
empirical contribution on processes of institutional change in higher education and on 
broader trajectories of institutional change across advanced capitalist countries. 
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1 Introduction  
 
Most advanced capitalist countries in the mid-1990s started transitioning towards 
knowledge-based economies, denoting “greater dependence on knowledge, information 
and high skill levels, and the increasing need for ready access to all of these by the 
business and public sectors” (OECD 2005, 28). Such transitions prompted significant 
processes of institutional change and realignment across major spheres of the advanced 
political economies (Thelen forthcoming, Ibsen and Thelen 2017, Thelen 2014, Hassel 
and Palier 2017, Iversen and Soskice 2015, Hall 2015, Baccaro and Howell 2017, Baccaro 
and Pontusson 2016). Institutions and policies that used to be central at times of 
industrial expansion, such as the industrial relations arena or consumption-oriented 
‘passive’ social policies have been increasingly challenged by policy-makers (Baccaro and 
Howell 2017, Baccaro and Benassi 2017, Baccaro and Howell 2011, Iversen and Soskice 
2015, Fleckenstein and Lee 2017, Culpepper and Regan 2014), who rather stressed the 
need for human capital formation over the life-course and, more broadly, investment-
oriented ‘active’ social policies (Bonoli 2012, Bonoli 2006, Fleckenstein and Lee 2014, 
Fleckenstein, Saunders, and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011, Fleckenstein and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011, 
Morel, Palier, and Palme 2012, Hemerijck 2017, 2015, Esping-Andersen et al. 2001, 
Nikolai 2012, Ibsen and Thelen 2017).  
One of the chief motivations behind policy-makers’ attempts to shift public and 
social policies ‘from consumption to investment’ has been to support the pursuit of the 
two following socio-economic objectives: “to cultivate the skills required for non-routine 
positions” and “to shift production toward high value-added links in the global supply 
chain” (Hall 2015, 26). Higher education has been identified across countries belonging 
to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and beyond 
as a crucial policy area to achieve these objectives (OECD 2012a, 2008, Hall 2015, 
Schulze-Cleven and Olson 2017, Schulze-Cleven 2015, Regini 2011b). In this context, 
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governments and employers alike have been vocal advocates of an ever-closer alignment 
between higher education provision and labour market needs of knowledge-based sectors 
(Kottmann and De Weert 2013, De Weert 2011, Regini 2011b, OECD 2008). Yet, on 
both theoretical and empirical grounds, the relationship between higher education 
systems and knowledge-based labour markets remains for significant parts underspecified 
(Jakobi, Martens, and Wolf 2009) , leaving open a number of questions: how do policy-
makers and business stir higher education systems to provide the high skills needed for 
countries to succeed in the knowledge economy? Why are national trajectories of high 
skill formation systematically different across advanced capitalist countries? And what 
analytical tools can be employed to understand the relationship between higher education 
systems and knowledge-based labour markets? 
 This introductory chapter sets out why these questions are important in the 
comparative analysis of contemporary advanced capitalist countries (section 1.1); it 
reviews existing literature theorising the dynamics underpinning the alignment between 
higher education systems and labour markets (section 1.2); it then moves on to show 
how existing theories – confronted with a set of empirical observations that cannot be 
easily accounted for – leave open a number of theoretical and empirical puzzles that this 
thesis seeks to address (section 1.3); finally, section 1.4 concludes the chapter by 
presenting the plan of the thesis. 
 
1.1 Setting the socio-economic scene  
Researchers on higher education policy have pointed to a number of prominent changes 
that have been taking place across university systems in the OECD world over the last 
two decades. One of the issues that in particular caught researchers’ attention has been a 
shift in the balance of power between internal and external stakeholders in the higher 
education sector, whereby the latter have increasingly gained power vis-à-vis the former 
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(Regini 2011b, Amaral and Magalhaes 2002, Amaral, Jones, and Karseth 2002, Jongbloed, 
Enders, and Salerno 2008, Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 
Slaughter and Cantwell 2012, Schulze-Cleven 2015). Internal stakeholders have been 
identified in the literature as those involved in the daily life of universities, namely: 
(academic and non-academic) staff and students (Amaral and Magalhaes 2002). External 
stakeholders, on the other hand, are actors that have an interest in higher education 
without being directly part of the higher education community, most prominently: 
governments, employers, tax-payers, and international organisations (Amaral and 
Magalhaes 2002). The role of governments has been particularly crucial in tipping the 
balance of power away from internal to external stakeholders. In the traditional 
Humboldtian and Newmanian1 models of higher education that developed in 19th 
century Western Europe (Neave and Van Vught 1994, Bleiklie 1998, Neave and Rhoades 
1987), the government acted as a guarantor of university autonomy from external 
stakeholders – de facto empowering internal stakeholders (Amaral and Magalhaes 2002). In 
contemporary higher education systems, governments take a decisively different role. 
They no longer seek to preserve universities’ autonomy from external social and 
economic demands, but they are rather pro-actively incentivising university systems to 
respond to such demands (Amaral and Magalhaes 2002), and better aligning higher 
education provision with labour market needs has been a crucial demand that two 
powerful external stakeholders – governments and employers – have made on 
contemporary higher education systems across advanced capitalist countries and beyond 
                                                
 
1 These are commonly identified in the higher education literature as the historical 
models upon which Western European universities developed. Cardinal Newman, 
inspiring the British model of higher education, argued that the university was supposed 
to form a well-rounded person through a broad-based education, while the Humboldtian 
model, underpinning German higher education, aimed primarily at advancing scholarship 
and science (see e.g. Neave 1995, Zgaga 2009). Despite the differences underpinning the 
principles of the two models, both cases conform to a view of higher education as 
heavily geared towards ‘internal’ stakeholders. 
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(Sharma 2013a, b, 2014, 2012, Tolentino Frederiksen and Vuksanovi  2013, MacGregor 
2013, Humburg and van der Velden 2013, OECD 2012a, 2004, Dale 2005).  
This trend started in the late 1960s and 1970s, when a first significant wave of 
expansion of higher education prompted fears of disconnect between higher education 
provision and labour market needs to which governments responded through the 
creation of a vocational and professionally-oriented sub-set of the higher education 
sector catering for labour market needs (e.g. polytechnics in the UK, universities of 
applied sciences in Germany and the Netherlands; see section 1.2 for details on this 
development). However, it was not until the late 1990s that systematic attempts to 
further universities’ responsiveness to external socio-economic demands amounted to a 
‘change of paradigm’ in higher education policy (Amaral and Magalhaes 2002, 11). 
The growth of interest of external stakeholders in higher education in macro 
socio-economic terms is hardly surprising, given the steep expansion of university 
enrolments that all OECD countries have experienced over the last two decades, leading 
to a surge in interest from governments and employers on ‘what’ higher education 
systems deliver. On the side of governments, the massive expansion of higher education 
means that policy-makers “are expected to ensure that increasing public investment in 
higher education is justified in terms of the benefits accruing to the domestic workforce” 
(Tavoletti 2010, 361) and governments across OECD countries have promoted reforms 
to better align higher education provision with labour market needs (OECD 2008, Regini 
2011b, Ballarino 2011, Kottmann and De Weert 2013, De Weert 2011).  
Equally, employers have manifested a growing concern with the skills and 
competencies that graduates possess as higher education has rapidly become the locus 
where a majority of young people receive their initial education and training before 
entering the labour market (Warhurst 2008, OECD 2008). This holds true today even for 
those countries, such as Austria or Germany, where the bulk of initial training has 
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traditionally taken place in the domain of vocational education and training (e.g. the dual 
apprenticeship system) and the higher education system has historically accommodated a 
minority of each cohort of secondary school-leavers. Indeed, Continental European 
countries have been referred to in the literature as elite higher education systems (Ansell 
and Gingrich 2013, Ansell 2010, see also Baethge and Wolter 2015,  and Powell and 
Solga 2011 on recent expansion and constraints to expansion respectively). In recent 
years, however, initial education and training, i.e. the last segment of education that 
young people receive before entering the labour market, has increasingly ‘moved up’ 
from the (post-) secondary to the tertiary level and skill formation in higher education has 
been gradually replacing skill formation in (post-) secondary vocational training.   
To clear a key definitional issue at the outset, it is instructive to spell out what is 
meant by skill formation and what is meant, specifically, by skill formation in higher education 
or high skill formation. The term skill formation, as used in the comparative political 
economy (CPE) literature, refers to the “institutional set-up of education and training systems at 
the post-secondary educational level and its connections to labor market institutions such as collective wage 
bargaining and labor market policies” (Busemeyer and Vossiek 2016, 151).  
Yet, this definition has usually been employed to understand the relationship 
between the organisation of vocational training systems and labour market institutions, 
i.e. it focuses on intermediate skill formation. Narrowing down or, rather, transferring the 
concept of skill formation to the higher education sector, which is the phenomenon that 
this thesis is concerned about, I propose a re-interpretation of the above definition 
focused on skill formation in higher education as the institutional set-up of a higher education 
system and its connection to the labour market, in particular those segments of the labour market that are 
reliant on high skills, such as high-tech manufacturing and high-end service. In simpler terms, skill 
formation in higher education can be thought of as the alignment (or lack thereof) 
between the skills produced by higher education systems and the labour market. This 
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thesis is particularly interested in this phenomenon at the level of public-policy making 
and the ensuing patterns of institutional change, i.e. the chief focus of the thesis is on 
how governments, employers and universities interact to promote (or hamper) this 
alignment. The thesis does not focus on the individual-level transitions of graduates from 
higher education to the labour market, which is a topic that has been investigated at 
length elsewhere (see e.g. Leuze 2011, 2010, Schomburg and Teichler 2007, Kivinen and 
Nurmi 2003).  
Figure 1.1 shows the spectacular rise in university enrolments that took place 
across most OECD countries highlighting how higher education, and therefore ‘high skill 
formation’, has become a defining feature of contemporary advanced capitalist countries.  
 
Figure 1.1. Gross enrolment ratio in tertiary education2 in selected OECD countries 
 
Source: UNESCO (2017) 
 
                                                
 
2 The UNESCO defines gross enrolment rate (GER) as: “Total enrolment  in  a  specific  
level  of  education, regardless  of  age,  expressed  as  a  percentage  of  the eligible 
official school-age population corresponding to the same level of education in a given 
school year” (UNESCO 2009, 9). GER is a measure subject to several criticisms, as aptly 
explained for instance in Ansell and Gingrich (2013, 209-210), but it is at the same time 
the only measure with wide cross-country availability that can provide reliable 
information on the ‘popularity’ of higher education in a given country, and as such it is 
also the measure that most comparative studies of higher education have used. 
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In the context of significant expansion, scholars and commentators noted that 
higher education has progressively shifted from an “idealistic position focused on the 
creation of knowledge” to “an increasingly instrumentalist position” (Charles 2003, 9) in 
which universities were asked to make an ever-growing contribution to national 
economic competitiveness (Schulze-Cleven and Olson 2017, Schulze-Cleven 2015, 
Reichert 2010, Prokou 2008, Capano and Piattoni 2011, Regini 2011b, Slaughter and 
Rhoades 2004, Slaughter and Leslie 1997).  
Unsurprisingly, business associations have been strong advocates of a 
repositioning of higher education along these lines in Europe and beyond (Regini 2011b, 
van Santen 2014, Toens 2009, Witte 2006). Governments’ agendas have often been 
overlapping with those of businesses. Comparative accounts of policy initiatives and 
reforms aimed at bringing higher education closer to labour market needs show that 
governments have actively promoted the alignment of higher education provision with 
labour market needs, without substantive partisan distinctions (De Weert 2011, 
Kottmann and De Weert 2013, OECD 2008, Ballarino 2011).  
Government orientation towards a more ‘practice-oriented’ higher education 
sector that sustains the supply of skills needed in the labour market has been intimately 
linked with the belief that success in knowledge-economies rests upon the availability of 
the optimal quantity and quality of high skills. Indeed, a defining feature of knowledge-
based societies is to be found in the “greater dependence on knowledge, information and 
high skills levels” (OECD 2005, 28 emphasis added). In particular, the decline of 
employment in the traditional manufacturing sector and the rapid development of high-
tech manufacturing and high-end services (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003, Oesch 2013) 
have placed education and skills policy high on the agenda of national and supra-national 
policy-makers (Olssen and Peters 2005, Marginson 2009, Marginson and Wende 2007, 
De Weert 1999). A knowledge-based labour market has been described as being in high 
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demand of analytical and generic skills (Mayer and Solga 2008), typically best delivered 
through higher education (Müller and Jacob 2008), which “has as its dominant goal the 
development of personality […] and autonomy” as opposed to vocational training’s 
focus on “individual vocational competence and agency to carry out specific tasks” 
(Powell et al. 2012, 412). In this context, the vocational-specific skills that served well the 
purposes of industrial societies suffer from ‘inescapable weaknesses’ (Grubb and 
Lazerson 2006, 297) and are considered at major risk of becoming obsolete and losing 
importance vis-à-vis higher skills and social and cognitive skills (Morel, Palier, and Palme 
2012). The intertwined development between ‘knowledge’ as an increasingly important 
ingredient of economic success and higher education as an increasingly important policy 
area is spelled out clearly in Ellen Hazelkorn’s analysis, where she notes that:  
 
the positioning of knowledge as the foundation of economic, social and 
political power has driven the transformation of economies and the basis 
of wealth production from those based on productivity and efficiency to 
those based on higher valued goods and services innovated by talent. 
[…] This has placed higher education – a provider of human capital 
through education and training, a primary source of new knowledge and 
knowledge/technology transfer, and a beacon for international 
investment and talent – at the centre of policymaking. (Hazelkorn 2015, 
9) 
 
Hazelkorn’s assessment captures neatly what has been a prominent view in policy-
making circles. For example, commenting on the changes in tasks and occupations 
triggered by an increasing use of ICT, the OECD Observer argues that:  
 
the new jobs enabled by digital technologies require different skills. Some 
of these skills are technical, such as software development, web 
management, etc., but others have little to do with technology. For 
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instance, higher frequency of digital information in firms calls for better 
planning and quicker responses, more cooperation across teams as well 
as stronger leadership. Marketing and selling over a social network 
require different skills than those involved in face-to-face sales. (Spiezia 
2016)  
 
In short, as put it by senior OECD analysts: “higher education […] trains the highly-
skilled workers and contributes to the research base and capacity for innovation that 
determines competitiveness in the knowledge-based global economy” (Vincent-Lancrin 
and Kärkkäinen 2009, 13). 
In a systematic analysis of the interconnections between different growth regimes 
and the policies and institutions supporting them across advanced capitalist countries, 
Peter Hall shows, starting from the mid-1990s, parallel moves towards a knowledge-
based growth regime in which governments showed growing concerns for education and 
skills policies which were seen as crucial ingredients to successfully compete in high-end 
sectors in the global supply chain (Hall 2015, 26). Consistently with the trend illustrated 
in figure 1.1, Hall further argues that in pursuing knowledge-based growth “many 
governments have devoted more resources to education; and rates of tertiary education 
have increased substantially across the OECD since 1990” (Hall 2015, 29). The parallel 
moves across countries towards knowledge-based growth regimes is exemplified by the 
trend reported in figure 1.2, which takes Germany and the UK, two countries commonly 
referred to in the literature as most different, and shows that both countries have 
experienced significant growth in employment in knowledge-intensive (manufacturing 
and service) sectors. A breakdown by educational attainment further highlights that in 
both countries employment in knowledge-intensive sectors of those with tertiary 
education (the two top lines) has significantly outpaced the growth of employment across 
all educational levels (the two bottom lines).  
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Figure 1.2. Increase in employment in high technology sectors3 by educational attainment in 
Germany and the United Kingdom (1995 = 100) 
 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat (2013) 
 
But how do governments cultivate the high skills required to thrive in 
knowledge-based economies and ensure that the supply of high skills is in line with the 
demands of knowledge-based labour markets? As we turn to this question, we come 
across a curious misalignment between, on one hand, the significant emphasis placed on 
this issue by policy-makers as well as the vivid scholarly attention to the transition of 
advanced capitalist countries into the knowledge economy and, on the other hand, a lack 
of theorisation and empirical investigation of the dynamics behind the relationship 
between higher education systems and labour markets (Jakobi, Martens, and Wolf 2009) . 
The next section reviews the existing literature on the topic. It outlines why it comes up 
short of convincing explanatory frameworks to understand the alignment between higher 
education and knowledge-based labour markets, leading up to the theoretical and 
empirical puzzles that this thesis seeks to address. 
 
                                                
 
3 These include high-technology manufacturing and knowledge-intensive high-technology 
services according to the classification detailed in Eurostat (2016).  
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1.2 A review of the literature 
This section reviews existing theories that seek to explain the alignment between higher 
education and the labour market. Borrowing Craig Parsons’ taxonomy (2007) as an 
organising principle, explanations based on structural, ideational and institutional factors 
will be reviewed in turn. 
 
Structuralist explanations: higher education expansion and horizontal 
differentiation 
The issue of how higher education systems align with labour market needs was first 
tackled by the educational literature of the 1970s. Structuralist explanations were 
prominent in this period. A particularly useful starting point in this respect is the seminal 
work by Martin Trow (1976, 1972, 1974), who analysed the process of ‘expansion and 
differentiation’ that was taking place in the 1970s across North American and Western 
European university systems. He focused in particular on the critical threshold of 15% of 
the relevant age cohort entering higher education, which he identified as the upper-
bound of elite higher education systems (Trow 1976, 1974). As enrolments grew above 
the 15% threshold and therefore university systems were no longer elite systems, Trow 
theorised that two mechanisms of transformation of higher education systems would be 
set in motion:  
 
One of these is the expansion of the élite universities – the growth of 
traditional university functions in traditional, if somewhat modified, 
forms of universities. The other is the transformation of élite university 
systems into systems of mass higher education, performing a great 
variety of new functions (at least new to universities) for a much larger 
proportion of the university age group. Up to the present, in Britain as 
on the Continent, growth has mainly been by expanding the élite 
university system. But the old institutions cannot expand indefinitely; 
 21 
they are limited by their traditions, organization, functions and finance. 
In European countries, it is likely that an increase in enrollment in higher 
education beyond about 15% of the age grade requires not merely the 
further expansion of the élite university systems, but the development of 
mass higher education through the growth of popular non-élite 
institutions. (Trow 1972, 63-64) 
 
In creating the conditions for a higher education system that was becoming more and 
more sizeable, labour market considerations played a prominent role. The policy 
translation of what Trow predicted as developing higher education beyond elite 
institutions was the establishment of vocationally-oriented universities in the 1960s and 
1970s across a number of advance capitalist countries, such as the Polytechnics in 
Britain, the Fachhochschulen in Germany, the hogescholen in the Netherlands (Teichler 1998, 
Kyvik 2004). Research on the Dutch case, for instance, showed that the rationale for the 
establishment of vocationally-oriented universities in the context of expansion was that 
this type of institution “provided the kind of orientation perceived as beneficial to the 
growth of the Dutch economy” (Goedegebuure 1992, 59). Similarly, in the case of the 
establishment of the British Polytechnics, the then Minister responsible for higher 
education policy highlighted that “we live in a highly competitive world in which the 
accent is more and more on professional and technical expertise” which called for “a first 
class professional training” (Pratt 1992, 33-34). The British government, as expected by a 
theory of expansion and differentiation, explicitly linked higher education expansion with 
the establishment of vocationally-oriented higher education institutions as they 
committed “to an even greater expansion of higher education […]” to be met by 
“developing ‘a distinctive sector of higher education’ to ‘complement’ the universities 
and colleges of education” (Pratt 1992, 33-34). The establishment of Fachhochschulen in 
Germany, later renamed universities of applied science, also fitted this model. This 
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development has been interpreted precisely “as an indicator of the value which 
politicians and employers place on a vocational emphasis” for higher education (Kehm 
and Teichler 1995, 408).  
 The broader theoretical point emerging from the structuralist stream of literature 
is captured by Norton Grubb, who identified what he calls ‘vocationalism’ as a crucial 
feature of convergence among university systems. Specifically, he notes in the process of 
expansion of education systems that:  
 
There has been a substantial convergence in the educational systems of 
many countries. Starting with different educational backgrounds, political 
systems, and economies, both advanced and developing countries have 
developed similar educational ideologies, institutions, and curricula. One 
link among some common developments is vocationalism – the orientation of education 
around preparation for labor markets. (Grubb 1985, 526 emphasis added)  
 
The main thrust of this stream of literature, therefore, was that as enrolments in higher 
education expanded above the critical 15% threshold identified by Trow (1972), 
governments would seek to include an increasingly diversified student body into the 
university system by differentiating the system itself. Establishing a vocational tier was 
the chief strategy in this respect as it allowed governments to pursue two goals 
simultaneously: firstly, they could create additional study places for a growing proportion 
of secondary school-leavers seeking a tertiary education; secondly, they could counter the 
fears of academic drift that an expansion of higher education located exclusively in 
research universities would lead to and therefore meet the growing demand for highly 
qualified personnel (Trow 1972, Teichler 2006, Grubb 1985). Because the higher 
education system was differentiated by means of creating a sub-system of institutions 
with a different function and pursuing different objectives compared to the research-
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focused universities, the wave of higher education expansion through vocationally-
oriented universities has been defined in the literature as ‘horizontal’ differentiation 
(Goglio and Regini 2017). Thus, in a structuralist framework, the dependent variable – 
namely the vocationalisation of higher education through the establishment of a tier of 
labour-market oriented higher education institutions – was seen as a function of the 
secular trend of higher education expansion, which was identified as the key independent 
variable by authors writing from this perspective. 
What would the observable implications of the structuralist line of argumentation 
be? Crucially, if the alignment between higher education and labour markets were to be 
driven by structural developments and functional pressures, we should expect higher 
education across advanced capitalist countries to move towards a model of horizontal 
differentiation whereby the vocational sub-system accommodates the majority of the 
student population. However, these theoretical predictions do not travel well across time 
and space as empirical scrutiny only lends limited support to them. Indeed, as university 
systems kept expanding (recall figure 1), horizontal differentiation did not manifest as the 
univocal policy response. Rather, we observe a variety of disjointed developments. Some 
countries, e.g. the UK, abolished horizontal differentiation in the 1990s by granting the 
same status to polytechnics and universities (Pratt 2008, 1992). In this instance, therefore, 
horizontal differentiation based primarily on the function and objectives that different 
types of institutions were expected to perform, gave way to a purely vertical 
differentiation, where individual universities (as opposed to groups of universities) differ 
from each other primarily by virtue of their status, prestige and ranking (as opposed to 
their function or mission) (Goglio and Regini 2017). Yet, while the UK was abolishing 
the vocational tier, other countries, such as Austria, introduced it (Pratt 2004). Yet other 
countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands, maintained it (Kyvik 2004). 
Furthermore, even in countries where the binary system was maintained, we notice 
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importance differences. For instance, research universities have traditionally received the 
lion’s share of students in Germany, while the opposite is true in the Netherlands where 
a majority of students (currently almost 70%) are enrolled in the vocational sub-set of 
institutions in higher education. Thus, a functional model of expansion and (horizontal) 
differentiation does not help us understand the dynamics of alignment between higher 
education and the labour market. While we do observe universal expansion of higher 
education, this is not coupled with a process of horizontal differentiation, but rather with 
non-linear patterns of simultaneous horizontal and vertical differentiation as well as de-
differentiation (cf. Guri-Rosenblit, Šebková, and Teichler 2007, Teichler 2006, 1998, 
Goglio and Regini 2017). 
 
Ideational explanations: neoliberal ideas and higher education policy 
Following a decade in which structuralist explanations of institutional change in higher 
education were prominent, the 1980s saw a surge of interest in the role of ideas in 
explaining institutional continuity and change, which gained traction in the (higher) 
education literature in particular from the 1990s. Starting from Peter Hall’s pioneering 
work on the political power of economic ideas (Hall 1989), ideational theories have now 
spanned three decades of social science research and they have been providing an ever 
more nuanced toolkit that links ideas to institutional continuity and change (Schmidt and 
Radaelli 2004, Schmidt 2008b, a, 2010, Blyth 2001, 2002, Béland 2007, 2009, Béland and 
Cox 2016, Campbell 2002, Hall 1993, Béland and Cox 2010, Goldstein and Keohane 
1993). Béland provides a systematic assessment of the ideational literature and identifies 
the mechanisms by which ideas impact policies and institutional arrangements, namely: (i) 
they constrain the problems that enter the policy agenda; (ii) they shape the assumptions 
guiding policy-makers’ proposals; and (iii) they are ‘discursive weapons’ used to (de-) 
legitimise some policy options over others (Béland 2009). Policy-makers and interest 
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groups at national and international level have been particularly successful at enacting 
these mechanisms to reframe policy issues in correspondence with ‘critical’ junctures, i.e. 
at times when existing institutional arrangements become delegitimised opening up 
significant windows of opportunity to propose alternative policy solutions based on new 
ideas (Blyth 2002, Hall 1993).  
Higher education in the mid-1990s found itself in the ‘ideal’ position for an 
ideational reframing. Not only had the rise of knowledge economies made national and 
international policy-makers devote significant attention to this policy arena, but also a 
widespread perception that university systems were in crisis (see Blackmore (2001) for a 
review of the reasons behind this university crisis) made higher education highly 
susceptible to ideational contestation. At a broad level, scholars writing specifically on 
higher education from an ideational perspective have identified the advent of 
neoliberalism, understood as “a politically imposed discourse, which […] constitutes the 
hegemonic discourse of western nation states” (Olssen and Peters 2005, 314), as a crucial 
driver of policy change. At the heart of this hegemonic discourse lies the idea of 
governments actively promoting the organisation of the public sector according to 
market principles. Scholars writing from an ideational perspective note that “current 
transformation of higher education forms part of a larger complex of neoliberal 
hegemony which asserts that public institutions are best operated on market principles” 
(Carroll and Beaton 2000, 72) and employ concepts like ‘new public management’ or 
‘marketisation’ to make sense of the transformation of higher education systems (Peters 
2003, Olssen and Peters 2005, Lynch 2006, Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, Slaughter and 
Leslie 1997). Zooming into this stream of literature in closer detail we discern two inter-
related claims on the consequences for higher education of the hegemonic neoliberal 
discourse: the first one is that higher education systems have been redefined to serve the 
skills needs of knowledge-based labour markets (Olssen and Peters 2005, Prokou 2008, 
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Doyle 2003, Boden and Nedeva 2010, Moore 2010); the second one is that higher 
education systems have been themselves reshaped through market mechanisms in their 
internal workings, by fostering market-like interactions among universities, between 
universities and their faculties, or between universities and students, underpinning a 
secular convergence towards what the literature has labelled ‘academic capitalism’ 
(Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, Slaughter and Leslie 1997, Slaughter and Cantwell 2012). 
Here, we focus primarily on the former, as it directly speaks to the core topic of this 
research, namely the issue of skill formation in higher education. Olssen and Peters note 
in this respect that: 
 
Universities are seen as a key driver in the knowledge economy and as a 
consequence higher education institutions have been encouraged to 
develop links with industry and business in a series of new venture 
partnerships. The recognition of economic importance of higher 
education and the necessity for economic viability has seen initiatives to 
promote greater entrepreneurial skills as well as the development of new 
performative measures to enhance output and to establish and achieve 
targets. (Olssen and Peters 2005, 313) 
 
Radice makes a similar point in his analysis of the trajectory of British higher education 
since the 1970s when he highlights that by embracing a “new public management” 
approach: 
 
the values, structures and processes of private sector management are 
imposed upon the public sector; key elements include a shift from 
professional to executive power, a focus on ‘performance’ as measured 
by quantitative targets, and the widespread use of financial incentives. 
Meanwhile, the purpose of the university has changed from the 
education of the elites in business, politics, culture and the professions to 
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the provision of marketable skills and research outputs to the “knowledge economy”. 
(Radice 2013, 408, emphasis added)  
 
Thus, one of the crucial differences between the ‘liberal university’ and its ‘neoliberal 
descendant’ is that in the former, pedagogy and teaching were primarily associated with 
the notion of ‘knowledge for its own sake’, while in the latter they are subordinated to 
the needs of the labour market and they take a strong vocational orientation (Olssen and 
Peters 2005, 229).  
The literature identifies how national governments and international 
organisations (e.g. European Commission, OECD, World Bank) strategically used 
neoliberal ideas and discourse to frame, justify and promote the reform of higher 
education systems. For example, Doyle provides a constructivist account of education 
policy under New Labour by highlighting how the then Minister responsible for higher 
education policy, David Blunkett, put forward a “vision of higher education […] 
rationalised and justified as a necessary response to globalisation and the knowledge 
economy” which was required “to be ‘innovative’ for the purposes of economic 
prosperity” (Doyle 2003, 283). He further points out that the “language of [Blunkett’s] 
speech in outlining the role and responsibility of higher education in equipping Britain to 
compete in a global economy is replete with the discourse of managerialism, 
modernisation […] and ‘competitiveness’” (Doyle 2003, 283). Similar assessments of a 
firmly neoliberal framing on the side of policy-makers have been said to hold true across 
the OECD world. Case studies from countries as diverse as Australia, the Netherlands, 
Germany and South Korea among others show how governments promoted the 
marketisation of national higher education systems by embracing ‘new public 
management’ norms as guiding principles of their reform efforts (Marginson 1997, 
Karsten 1999, Chae and Hong 2009, Pritchard 2011).  
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When the analysis moves up from national governments to international 
organisations, a convergent discourse linking higher education, skill formation and the 
knowledge economy appears even more clearly. Although different organisations 
elaborated their policy prescriptions with slight variations on the theme, the central 
underlying argument that supranational actors such as European institutions, OECD and 
World Bank put forward is that there is a crucial link between human capital and success 
in the knowledge economy, and between higher education and human capital formation 
(Olssen and Peters 2005, Capano and Piattoni 2011).  
The OECD, in particular, has been an early advocate of the importance of higher 
education for the knowledge economy. Since the late 1980s it put universities under the 
spotlight and prompted policy-makers to ensure that they provided the skills needed in 
the labour market (see e.g. OECD 1987). Several researchers noted how the OECD not 
only consistently provided a framing of higher education as a source of national 
competitiveness in the knowledge economy (Robertson 2005, Olssen and Peters 2005, 
van der Wende 2011), but also how it deployed several tools of soft power to stir 
national higher education systems in this direction. These include the publication of 
comparative educational indicators (e.g. the Education at a Glance series), thematic 
reviews of tertiary education and forecasting of the future of higher education – all these 
various publications have been seen as providing mechanisms of ‘naming and shaming’ 
that bear an impact on national higher education reforms (van der Wende 2011). 
European Union institutions – and the European Commission in particular – 
went beyond soft power as they also kick started a prescriptive reform process 
undertaken through the Bologna Process since 1999 (Witte 2006, Corbett 2005). As part 
of Bologna, member states (and later also a number of non-European neighbouring 
countries) committed to the harmonisation of their higher education systems in terms of, 
initially, degree structure (namely: transitioning to a tiered structure composed of a three-
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year undergraduate degree followed by a one- or two-year master programme) and easing 
the recognition of qualifications and study periods undertaken in different European 
countries. Yet, the harmonisation of degrees has not been the only focus of Bologna. Its 
focus on skills, in particular, stands out since 2007, when “the notion of employability 
[became] central to the problematique of the Bologna Process” (Prokou 2008, 387) together 
with a strong emphasis on the more general notion that higher education systems should 
serve knowledge-based labour markets. The stance taken by the Commission and 
embodied politically in Bologna led scholars to interpret it as a process fundamentally 
inspired by the neoliberal idea of a ‘market-oriented university’ altering the very role of 
universities in European societies (Prokou 2008, Slaughter and Cantwell 2012) along the 
lines of a transition from the liberal to the neoliberal university (Olssen and Peters 2005).  
More recently, it has been noted that European higher education policy has 
‘moved out’ of Bologna to be subsumed under the broader ‘Lisbon Strategy’, a package 
of policies and strategic objectives aimed at making Europe “the most dynamic and 
competitive knowledge-based economy in the world” (Capano and Piattoni 2011). In this 
respect, a set of ‘ideational components’ have been identified as part of the 
‘Lisbonization of higher education’, such as the notions of competitiveness, institutional 
autonomy and accountability, which have been used as strategic framing by national 
policy-makers to drive institutional change in their higher education systems. This has 
been seen as a ‘discursive strategy’ that could help overcome entrenched interests that 
would be otherwise preventing change, and ultimately attuning higher education systems 
to the needs of the knowledge economy (Capano and Piattoni 2011). Thus, in line with 
the structuralist approach outlined earlier, scholars writing from this perspective are also 
interested in explaining the increasing links between higher education and the labour 
market but, differently from a structuralist perspective, their explanations bring to the 
fore as the crucial independent variable the role of ideas and the use that policy-makers at 
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national and international level have made of them to frame higher education as a 
component of national economic competitiveness.  
But to what extent has the spread of neoliberal ideas, often heralded through 
national or supranational processes (as in the case of the Bologna process), actually led to 
policy change? As we turn to this question, the ideational literature becomes somewhat 
weaker. The literature just presented makes a strong case for a convergent ideational and 
discursive trend across advanced capitalist countries. However, when the analysis moves 
from the level of discourse to that of policy change, the convergent ideational trend does 
not seem to translate into a clearly convergent pattern of policy change. As Christine 
Musselin puts it, this literature convincingly shows convergence in what policy-makers 
think a higher education system ought to be but not necessarily on what a higher education 
system is (Musselin 2011, 461-466). Indeed, recent research shows that while higher 
education systems have been subject cross-nationally to ‘marketising pressures’, both the 
policies by which this has occurred and the responses of higher education systems to 
these demands have varied significantly. It could be argued that the degree of change can 
still be explained in ideational terms, for instance by tracking a ‘stronger’ or ‘weaker’ 
adoption of neoliberal ideas leading to more or less profound institutional change. 
However, this perspective is not corroborated by significant empirical support. Several 
scholars writing on comparative (higher) education from an ideational perspective have 
indeed grappled with the question of sustained policy divergence in the context of 
common neoliberal ideas, and they unanimously turned to domestic institutions to explain 
the persistent variation across higher education systems even when these are subject to 
similar (or – as in the case of countries engaged with the Bologna Process – the same) 
ideational pressures (Schweisfurth 2012, Dobbins 2011, Takayama 2012, Deem 2001, 
Halpin and Troyna 1995, Alexiadou and van de Bunt-Kokhuis 2013, Schulze-Cleven et 
al. 2017, Schulze-Cleven and Olson 2017). 
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The wide-ranging set of Western European country case studies collected in an 
edited book by Marino Regini is particularly instructive in this respect as they show that 
the relationship between universities and labour market actors – a core feature of the 
‘neoliberal’ university (Olssen and Peters 2005) – varies widely across countries (cf. 
Regini 2011b). Regini and colleagues show that a closer relationship between universities 
and business – often directly inspired by government policy – has been a common 
feature across higher education systems over the last two decades. But they also point to 
a mix of top down and bottom up cooperation; they show that employers have a more or 
less strong role in higher education policy-making across countries; and they argue that 
different types of higher education systems mediate the relationship between universities 
and labour market actors (Ballarino 2011, Colombo 2011, Regini 2011c, a). Along the 
same lines, two reviews of policy initiatives aimed at aligning higher education and the 
labour market carried out by researchers at the Center for Higher Education Policy 
Studies (CHEPS) also return a significant degree of variety mirroring the evidence 
presented in Regini (2011b). In particular, they show how governments have taken a 
more or less hands-on approach across different countries and how in some countries 
the emphasis has been on general employability skills while in others on increasing the 
supply of Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) skills (cf. De 
Weert 2011, Kottmann and De Weert 2013).  
The following example helps illuminate further the problematic assumption of 
convergence that underpins ideational explanations. In 2012, a parliamentary inquiry in 
Britain on the supply of STEM skills, focusing in particular on the perceived under-
supply of these skills, illustrated the government’s faith in market mechanisms to address 
the problem. The then Minister in charge of higher education policy declared that: 
“employers should  send  out  a  clear  signal  about  how  much  they  value people with 
these skills” and said that “in the time that I have been in Government alongside the 
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Secretary of State, I do not think that I have ever tried to specify what should or should 
not be a strategically important and vulnerable subject” (House of Lords 2012, 36-37). 
He highlighted, in other words, that the government believed the chief principle 
underpinning the allocation of STEM skills should be a market-based one: “In an open 
market for graduates and postgraduates, the onus is on employers to ensure that they pay 
the market rate, or provide other means of attracting STEM graduates to stay in STEM 
sectors” (House of Lords 2012, 36).  
Only three years apart from this inquiry, a similar debate in the South Korean 
context led to radically different conclusions and policy prescriptions. Namely, the 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance, in the debate around the supply of STEM skills, 
introduced an upcoming reform that put the government firmly in the driving seat to 
shape the supply of STEM skills through the “release [of] 5 and 10 year labor force 
supply and demand outlooks by university major, in order for universities to refer to the 
outlooks when restructuring their programs” (MOSF 2015b, 2). Why did two ostensibly 
most similar higher education systems – both organised through a strong vertical 
hierarchy of universities and among the mostly strongly reliant on private finance in the 
world – pursue such different routes to align the supply of STEM skills with labour 
market demand? This example clearly shows that similar concerns – certainly influenced 
by a similar market-oriented frame – led to radically different policy prescriptions and 
trajectories of change. In Britain, a market-based allocation of skills was deemed the best 
option to mediate the relationship between higher education and labour markets; in the 
Korean case, the government seized the mediating role between higher education and the 
labour market to ensure that a certain supply of skills was guaranteed. What explains this 
variation? As it has been demonstrated that structural and ideational explanations have 
trouble accounting for persistent diversity across higher education systems, we now turn 
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to institutionalist frameworks in search of theories that might help us make sense of the 
observed variation. 
 
Institutionalist explanations: the (mostly) lack of higher education in CPE 
Looking for lenses through which to theorise ‘variation’ across advanced capitalist 
countries, the obvious starting point is the CPE literature and the varieties of capitalism 
(VoC) scholarship in particular. The VoC theory provided a paradigmatic change in the 
academic debate around the issue of divergence or convergence across advanced 
capitalism countries in the context of economic globalisation. Taking issue with the 
widely held view, particularly in the 1990s, that globalisation would necessarily lead to a 
convergence towards an Anglo-American model of capitalism, VoC scholars turned the 
convergence thesis on its head. They highlighted how distinct national institutional 
arrangements underpin systematic variation and they further submitted that divergence 
between (groups of) countries would increase – not disappear – in the face of profound 
and common structural changes as countries build on their respective and radically 
different institutional comparative advantages (Hall and Soskice 2001, Hall and Gingerich 
2009, Soskice 1999). Stripped to the essential, the VoC approach assumes that “the 
political economy is actor-centred” and that actors (e.g. firms, governments) interact in 
different ways across political economies (Hall and Soskice 2001, 6). In particular, 
interactions are analysed and classified according to the degree of coordination among 
actors, with a particular focus on employers. Firms in Coordinated Market Economies 
(CMEs, exemplified by Germany but extending to most Continental Europe, 
Scandinavian countries as well as to East Asia) rely to a large extent on non-market 
relationships among actors (e.g. collective bargaining, labour-management cooperation), 
while in Liberal Market Economies (LMEs, exemplified by the US and broadly 
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encompassing the Anglo-Saxon countries) the market is the primary instrument to 
coordinate interactions among firms and other actors (Hall and Soskice 2001, 8).  
Different modes of coordination lead to different types of comparative 
advantage: CMEs develop their comparative advantage in labour markets with specific 
skills with limited portability, largely in manufacturing sectors, producing high quality and 
high added value products (Streeck 1991)  and characterised by incremental innovation in 
a framework of stable employment relationships and high employment protection (e.g. 
the German automotive industry). Conversely, LMEs build their strength on workers 
having general transferable skills, employed in service sectors, either characterised by 
radically innovative products (e.g. the IT sector) or by low quality and low added-value 
(e.g. the retail industry). In the VoC framework, both models are viable precisely because 
they lead to different types of comparative advantage, which in turn are based on a set of 
institutional spheres that complement each other and function effectively (institutional 
complementarities) (Hall and Soskice 2001, Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice 2001, Hall 
and Gingerich 2009). 
The VoC approach has been crucial in bringing skill formation to the forefront 
of CPE. Skill formation has been identified as one of the sub-spheres of the political 
economy upon which CMEs and LMEs build their respective comparative advantages 
(Culpepper 2001, Culpepper and Finegold 1999, Busemeyer 2009a, Busemeyer and 
Trampusch 2012, Busemeyer 2015, Culpepper 2003). In particular, the VoC literature 
draws a key distinction between specific and general skills: the former are valuable either 
within a firm or within an industry and as such their portability is limited, while the latter 
have a value independent of the particular firm or industry and are as such more portable 
(Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice 2001, 148). Specific skills are predominant in CMEs, 
while general skills are chiefly found in LMEs. It is argued that the different institutional 
environment between CMEs and LMEs is conducive to different skill distributions 
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across countries. Specific skill formation requires a set of institutions that incentivises 
firms to provide training, and individuals to be willing to acquire specific skills. Such 
incentives are present in CMEs, but not in LMEs. The argument for investing in specific 
skills is twofold: first, firms will invest in training only if they know that poaching is 
unlikely to happen (e.g. through a collectively-set wage distribution guaranteed by 
collective bargaining) and if they know that other firms will participate in the training 
system as well (e.g. through an employer organisation that can sanction defecting firms) 
(Culpepper 2001, 2003); secondly, individuals will be willing to acquire specific skills if 
they know that these skills – that are of little value outside individual firms or sectors – 
are ‘protected’ against the risk of unemployment, through either employment or 
unemployment protection, or both (Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice 2001, Busemeyer 
2009a). More specifically, in Western European CMEs, employers coordinate through 
strong sectoral associations leading to ‘dual’ training taking place both in schools and in 
firms and contributing to the creation of firm and sector specific skills (Busemeyer 
2009a, Culpepper 2001). In the East Asian CMEs of Japan and South Korea, instead, the 
lack of sectoral coordination in favour of ‘group coordination’ (Soskice 1999) organised 
around individual large industrial conglomerates led to a predominance of in-firm 
training and, therefore, to firm-specific skill formation. Although, in both groups of 
CMEs, employers (individually and/or through their associations) play a key role in the 
organisation and delivery of vocational training, it has been noted that in East Asian 
CMEs, governments also played a critical role in setting the incentives for firms to train – 
notably through the extensive use of training levies (Green et al. 1999, Green 1999a, b). 
Thus, in CMEs we find a set of institutions, complementary to specific skill formation, 
insuring firms against poaching and individuals against skill obsolescence. As a 
consequence, vocational training systems providing specific skills have been thriving 
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(Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice 2001, Culpepper 2001, Soskice 1994, Busemeyer 
2009a).  
Conversely, deregulated labour markets and meagre welfare states in LMEs do 
not offer such insurance. Employers therefore prefer not to invest in the formation of 
specific skills (apart from narrow on-the-job training) because of the risk of poaching, 
and individuals will rather acquire general skills because they are not insured against the 
potential of losing their job and, if they possess general skills, they might have higher 
chances of landing a new job. This set of preferences translated into a traditionally larger 
reliance of LMEs in the higher education sector, which has been identified in the 
literature as providing general skills (Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice 2001, Finegold 
and Soskice 1988, Soskice 1993, Thelen 2014). Thus, the VoC literature predicts that skill 
formation would take place primarily in vocational training in CMEs and in higher 
education in LMEs and identifies these configurations as path-dependant, self-
reinforcing equilibria (Pierson 1993, 1995).  
Other researchers in the political economy and economic sociology fields have 
implicitly questioned the key role of education and skills policy identified by the VoC 
literature and they more broadly questioned the assumption that – to paraphrase the title 
of a book authored by Colin Crouch and colleagues – ‘skills are the answer’ to growth 
and prosperity in knowledge-based economies (Crouch, Finegold, and Sako 1999, see 
also Brown, Green, and Lauder 2001, Brown, Hesketh, and Wiliams 2003, Brown, 
Hesketh, and Williams 2004). These accounts in particular place education and skills 
policy in the broader context of employment creation in high-end sectors and they 
suggest that the potential for employment creation is limited unless education and skills 
policies are firmly coupled with industrial policies (see also Keep and Mayhew 1996, 
Keep 1999, Gleeson and Keep 2004, Keep and Mayhew 2010). Yet, while stressing the 
joint importance of and mutually-reinforcing relationship between supply and demand 
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side policies, these analyses do not challenge VoC’s central tenets in terms of national 
models of skill formation for two main reasons. Firstly, they also focus empirically mainly 
on vocational education and training (rather than higher education); and, secondly, they 
also identify as a key source of cross-national variation the dominance of vocational 
training in some countries (broadly corresponding with CMEs) and of higher education 
in others (again, broadly corresponding with LMEs) (Ashton and Green 1996, Green 
1999b, Green and Sakamoto 2001, Crouch, Finegold, and Sako 1999, Brown, Green, and 
Lauder 2001). Thus, taking into account both the VoC scholarship and its critical 
extensions, the majority of analyses of skill formation mostly treated higher education as 
a residual category (Jong 2012) , while focusing empirically on the historical institutional 
roots and contemporary dynamics of change of vocational training systems (Trampusch 
2010, Thelen and Busemeyer 2012, Culpepper 2007, Busemeyer 2009a, Thelen 2004, 
2007, Green and Sakamoto 2001). 
Noting the lack of explicit theorisation on higher education, Ben Ansell first 
provided a full theoretical and empirical analysis of higher education in the CPE literature 
(Ansell 2010, 2008). However, Ansell’s early research did not engage directly with the 
issue of complementarity between higher education and other spheres of the political 
economy. Rather, his initial work on higher education has been focusing on the partisan 
politics and redistributive implications of higher education across countries (see also 
Garritzmann 2015, 2016, Busemeyer 2009b). While these analyses have been enlightening 
with respect to (previously neglected) party preferences towards the desirable degree of 
expansion and private/public funding of higher education, a partisan political angle does 
not offer solid ground to theorise variation in the trajectories of high skill formation. 
Specifically, even if we assumed that right and left parties have systematically different 
preferences for labour market outcomes (e.g. if we assumed that the left was 
systematically more concerned about promoting employment than the right) (cf. Hibbs 
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1977), we would still expect both left and right parties to favour the alignment between 
higher education and labour market needs. For the former this could be seen as a way to 
avoid skill mismatches and favour higher employment rates, while for the latter it would 
be a way to satisfy business’ skills needs and ensure that firms have the skillset needed to 
thrive. 
Yet, following the logic of a partisan politics perspective, we could indirectly infer 
some insights that would conform to a ‘VoC scenario’, in particular as far as LMEs and 
Continental European CMEs are concerned. Indeed, Ansell showed that governments 
are faced with a ‘trilemma’ when it comes to the expansion of higher education, whereby 
only two of the three following objectives can be simultaneously achieved: keeping public 
cost low; increasing enrolments; and keeping private costs low. He notes how partisan 
politics played out differently across countries, leading to different equilibria. Nordic and 
Anglo-Saxon countries4 display a pattern of mass enrolment with high public/low private 
and low public/high private cost respectively; the Continental European model kept 
private and public costs low while also limiting enrolments (Ansell 2010, 2012, 2008). 
That is, he identified the Continental European countries as featuring an elite system of 
higher education, which was expected to stay as such due to political reasons.  
Germany has been scrutinised at length as the archetypical elite higher education 
system. The failed attempt to introduce tuition fees in the early 2000s, together with the 
difficulties of reforming a policy area shared between the national level and the Lander 
level, hence particularly susceptible to veto points, seemed to sustain an equilibrium 
centred on elite higher education (Ansell 2012, Hüther and Krücken 2014). Critically, to 
the extent that the higher education system is limited in size, the apprenticeship system is 
                                                
 
4 Although Ansell’s work did not cover East Asian higher education systems, Japan and 
South Korea conform closely to the LME pattern, with mass enrolments and a very high 
share of funding coming from private sources. 
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expected to keep performing the role of ‘main’ supplier of skills into the labour market, 
thus indirectly bringing support to the VoC expectation of countries like Germany or 
Austria relying on vocational training primarily (Ansell 2012, Powell and Solga 2011). 
More recently, CPE analyses focusing on the transition to the knowledge 
economy have started explicitly embedding higher education as part of national 
production (or growth) regimes. But the shift from a partisan politics to a production 
regime angle did not substantively change the findings. In particular, it has identified, on 
one hand, a symbiotic relationship between large service sectors and mass higher 
education systems, and, on the other hand, between large manufacturing sectors and 
limited higher education systems. More specifically, in countries with partially private 
mass higher education, high-end dynamic services (e.g. finance, insurance) are expected 
to thrive, while public services are expected to develop significantly in the context of 
mass public higher education (Anderson and Hassel 2013, Ansell and Gingrich 2013, 
Hassel and Palier 2017). Conversely, where the dominant economic sector lies in the 
manufacturing industry, countries are thought to pursue an export-led growth in which 
there will be little expansion of higher education (Hassel and Palier 2017, 36, see also 
Anderson and Hassel 2013). A “manufacturing based export-led growth strategy”, 
leading to limited enrolments in higher education, has been identified as the “economic 
strategy” pursued primarily in Germany, Austria, Japan and Korea (Hassel and Palier 
2017, 38). 
But does the initial VoC dichotomy between higher education in LMEs and 
vocational training in CMEs – and the subsequent explicit CPE analyses of higher 
education – hold water today? Empirical evidence provides a rather different picture 
compared to the hypothesised ‘suppression’ of higher education in CMEs, and in 
particular in those CMEs pursuing an export-led growth strategy. Let us recall figure 1 
and focus on the critical case of Germany, i.e. the country where the expansion of higher 
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education would be least expected, while the dual apprenticeship system is expected to 
dominate the skill formation system (Powell and Solga 2011, Ansell 2008, Soskice 1994). 
Figure 1 showed that Germany featured in 2014 a GER in tertiary education of above 
65%, which is higher than two archetypical ‘mass’ systems, Sweden and the UK, where 
GER stood at just above 62% and 56% respectively. Indeed, the relative weight of higher 
education and the dual apprenticeship system was fundamentally altered in recent years 
(Baethge and Wolter 2015). The expansion of higher education, in particular, has been 
massive over the course of just fifteen years. It has outpaced the apprenticeship system in 
terms of ‘new entrants’ and has significantly outgrown it in size, as captured in figure 1.3. 
 
Figure 1.3. New entrants and total number of students in the dual system and in higher education 
in Germany 
 
 
 
Dual system 
 Higher education 
New entrants Total number 
  
Source: own calculations based on Statistisches Bundesamt 
 
The cases of Korea and Japan are equally – if not more – telling: the East-Asian pattern 
returns a picture of spectacular expansion of higher education (GER stood at 95% in 
Korea in 2013) despite being included in the literature in the set of countries where 
higher education is not expected to expand. Thus, the existing CPE literature does not 
offer solid grounds to theorise variation in high skill formation across countries because 
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one of its central tenets underpinning variation is precisely that skill formation in higher 
education should not develop to a significant extent in those countries pursuing an 
export-led growth strategy, where vocational training is expected to dominate instead. 
Yet, it is in some of these countries that the expansion of higher education has been the 
steepest over the last two decades. 
 
1.3 Beyond convergence and divergence: the puzzle of persistent differences 
within the convergent trend of high skill formation  
Sections 1.1 and 1.2 identified the following stylised facts:  
• Higher education has expanded enormously across all advanced capitalist 
countries over the last two decades;  
• Governments and employers across the OECD world have been vocal advocates 
of the alignment of their higher education systems with labour market needs, in 
particular with respect to the high skills needed in knowledge-based labour 
markets;  
• Existing explanations of this phenomenon suggest a convergent trend driven by 
either structural (functional) pressures stemming from higher education 
expansion or by an ideational re-framing of the goals and purposes of higher 
education rooted in neoliberal ideology; yet, we observe empirically large 
variation in the types of policies pursued across countries, as well as in the 
responses of the higher education sector to such policies, that a functional or 
ideational explanation runs into problems accounting for;  
• CPE approaches that highlight divergence over convergence, however, are 
predicated on the very notion that variation in skill formation across countries is 
driven by the lack of higher education expansion in a sub-set of countries which 
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runs counter to the first empirical observation highlighted at the beginning of this 
section.  
Piecing together these stylised facts leads us to the empirical puzzle, and chief research 
question, that this thesis aims to address, namely: Why do national patterns of skill formation in 
higher education exist, despite the convergent trend of skill formation ‘moving up’ to higher education? 
What explains the different national trajectories of skill formation in higher education?  
More broadly, this empirical puzzle also lends itself as a case study to address a 
theoretical puzzle that the higher education literature has only recently started to tackle 
(cf. Schulze-Cleven 2015, 2016, Schulze-Cleven and Olson 2017), namely: how can we 
theoretically account for divergent patterns within a convergent trend? Indeed, recent literature on 
institutional change in higher education has come to the somewhat ambivalent 
conclusion that supranational convergent trends and country-specific patterns of 
institutional change coexist (Regini 2011b, Dobbins and Knill 2014, Musselin 2011). The 
lack of an explicit theorisation as to why we observe distinct national trajectories within 
supra-national convergent trends has led scholars to start theorising the emergence of 
‘varieties of academic capitalism’ as opposed to a convergence towards ‘academic 
capitalism’ (Schulze-Cleven and Olson 2017). The theoretical challenge is therefore to 
devise a framework through which we can theorise and explain both convergent trends (i.e. 
higher education becoming the main locus of skill formation across advanced capitalist 
countries, which the CPE literature cannot fully explain) and country-specific patterns (i.e. 
distinct patterns of skill formation in higher education and distinct trajectories of change 
in national higher education systems, which structuralist and ideational approaches cannot fully 
explain).   
This thesis seeks to provide an answer to these questions. In tackling these 
empirical and theoretical puzzles, the thesis puts forward an argument inspired by the 
emergence over the last 20 years of knowledge-based growth regimes across advanced 
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capitalist countries in which the role of higher education featured prominently in 
government policy on one hand (cf. Hall 2015, Hope and Soskice 2016) and by recent 
theoretical advancements on institutional change on the other hand (cf. Mahoney and 
Thelen 2009, Streeck and Thelen 2005). More specifically, I argue that the convergent 
trends of closer alignment between higher education and the labour market is the 
outcome of governments considering the skills produced by higher education systems as 
crucial to succeed in a knowledge economy. Up to this point, an ideational or structuralist 
approach could be equally plausible. However, as will be discussed extensively in chapter 
2, I further specify this statement in two important ways. Firstly, knowledge economies 
are not the same across countries, to the extent that some are more heavily geared 
towards (advanced or high-tech) manufacturing while others are geared towards 
(dynamic or high-end) services: I suggest that this difference has implications for skill 
formation in higher education, in particular in terms of the type of high skills that 
employers demand and the extent to which governments need to intervene directly in 
shaping the supply of such skills. Secondly, I argue that universities across countries have 
different incentive structures towards ‘opening up’ to the demands of ‘external 
stakeholders’. This is identified as a crucial mediating factor in the patterns of 
institutional change that we observe across countries, namely determining whether 
institutional change is marginal (i.e. affecting specific segments of the higher education 
system) or encompassing (i.e. affecting the higher education system at large). Thus, while 
it has been discussed in section 1.2 that political cleavages along party lines are unlikely to 
play a major role, it is suggested that a major line of political conflict when it comes to 
high skill formation is between the higher education sector on one hand and 
governments and the business community on the other. 
By introducing these two dimensions (type of knowledge economy and incentive 
structure of universities to open up to external stakeholders’ demands), it is argued that 
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we can provide theoretical predictions as to why we detect significant differences within 
this common pattern, while accommodating the convergent trends across countries in 
terms of shifting skill formation onto the higher education sector. My argument, 
therefore, advances our understanding of skill formation in knowledge-based economies 
as well as theories of institutional change in higher education. It also adds to the broader 
literature on the comparative political economy of advanced capitalist countries by 
offering an analysis of a policy field – higher education – that despite its growing 
importance has been somewhat overshadowed in this literature by the nearly exclusive 
focus on vocational training as far as skill formation is concerned.  
 
1.4 Plan of the thesis 
The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 outlines the proposed theoretical framework 
employed to understand the variation in national patterns of high skill formation. 
Chapter 3 provides details of the methodology and the research design, focusing in 
particular on how data has been collected and how case studies have been selected. 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 constitute the bulk of the empirical work, testing the theoretical 
framework outlined in chapter 2 through case studies of institutional change in the higher 
education systems of the UK, Germany and South Korea. Chapter 7 brings together the 
conclusions, contribution and limitations, wider implications and potential avenues of 
future research. 
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2 Towards an alternative theoretical framework: varieties of high 
skill formation 
This chapter puts forward the case for explaining the dynamics of skill formation in 
higher education through an approach that combines (i) the emergent literature on 
growth models and growth regimes (cf. Hall 2015, Hope and Soskice 2016, Baccaro and 
Pontusson 2016), and in particular the stream focusing on growth strategies, understood as 
sets of public and social policies underpinning given growth models and regimes (Hassel 
and Palier 2017); and (ii) the comparative political economy literature on (gradual) 
institutional change (cf. Mahoney and Thelen 2009, Streeck and Thelen 2005, Hall and 
Thelen 2009). The goal of this chapter is therefore to provide a theoretical framework 
that allows us to make sense – theoretically and, subsequently, empirically – of the 
relationship between higher education systems and knowledge-based labour markets 
(Ansell and Gingrich 2013). Indeed, while it is clear that symbiotic relationships between 
the two exist, the previous section highlighted how it has been thus far problematic to 
theorise such relationships, leading to empirical observations either disproving or only 
partly confirming existing theories. The chief theoretical challenge that this chapter 
engages with is therefore to elaborate a framework through which we may be able to 
theorise why national patterns of high skill formation persist in the context of a common 
cross-national trend, shifting skill formation on to the higher education sector.  
More specifically the chapter develops as follows. It begins with a detailed 
illustration of the two main analytical dimensions proposed and the core theoretical 
propositions that stem from these dimensions (sections 2.1 and 2.2). In particular, 
evidence of significant variation across knowledge-economies is presented. It is argued 
that different knowledge economy profiles have distinct implications for the type of skills 
that the labour market needs and that, therefore, will be sought by employers and 
cultivated by governments (the first dimension). Subsequently, I will discuss the 
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institutional context of university agency, i.e. the incentive set that universities have (or 
do not have) to satisfy the demands of governments and business (the second 
dimension). For both theoretical dimensions, a preliminary empirical test is also offered 
by making use of descriptive statistics and bivariate analysis. The objective of these 
preliminary tests is to demonstrate that the patterns implied theoretically are also 
empirically plausible, before moving on to the country case studies in the second part of 
the thesis. Furthermore, building on the two theoretical dimensions, the chapter suggests 
a bi-dimensional categorisation of countries, and it develops hypotheses in terms of what 
patterns of institutional change we might expect according to where countries fall in the 
proposed categorisation (section 2.3). Section 2.4 provides some preliminary 
considerations on the universe of cases captured by the proposed bi-dimensional 
categorisation and, finally, in section 2.5 I present and contrast a set of observable 
implications and underlying mechanisms of change suggested by the proposed theoretical 
framework and by the main existing theories introduced in section 1.2.  
 
2.1 The demand for high skills: varieties of knowledge economies and the 
theoretical implications for high skill formation5 
The first dimension specifies the broad trend that is already outlined in figure 1.2 with 
reference to two most different countries, Germany and the UK. Figure 1.2 showed that 
both countries featured parallel and very similar developments in terms of (i) significant 
expansion of employment in knowledge-based activities (encompassing both the 
manufacturing and service sectors) and (ii) above average expansion of highly skilled – 
i.e. tertiary educated – workers within the general trend of expansion of employment in 
                                                
 
5 I am grateful to David Hope for making available to me the dataset on GVA used in 
this section. He should not be implicated in how the data has been elaborated upon 
and/or presented. 
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knowledge-based sectors. This section focuses on the ‘nature’ of knowledge-based 
economies across countries. It suggests that national (knowledge-based) economic 
profiles differ markedly, although the academic literature and – even more – policy-
makers have often treated the ‘knowledge economy’ as a rather uniform concept glossing 
over sectoral differences. According to the OECD glossary, a knowledge-based economy 
indicates “trends in advanced economies towards greater dependence on knowledge, 
information and high skill levels, and the increasing need for ready access to all of these 
by the business and public sectors” (OECD 2005). Yet, disaggregating the data, ‘varieties’ 
of knowledge economies emerge, each displaying a very different relative weight of 
specific economic sectors. Taking the observed variety of knowledge economies as its 
starting point, this section puts forward the argument that different types of knowledge 
economies have implications for the type of high skills that will be sought by employers and 
cultivated by governments.  
The literature on the transition to a post-industrial society usually organises 
economic activities into four major sectoral groups: manufacturing; dynamic services; 
non-dynamic services; and welfare services (Wren 2013, Ansell and Gingrich 2013), each 
containing a distinct set of economic activities, as summarised in table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1. Industry composition of major sectors 
Sector NACE industries 
Manufacturing D: Total manufacturing 
Dynamic services 
64: Post and telecommunications 
J: Financial intermediation 
71t74: Renting of m&eq and other business activities 
Non-dynamic services 
G: Wholesale and retail trade 
H: Hotels and restaurants 
60t63: Transport and storage 
70: Real estate activities 
O: Other community, social and personal services 
Welfare services 
L: Public admin and defence; compulsory social security 
M: Education 
N: Health and social work 
 Source: own elaboration 
 
In this section, we focus on the first two, which are more closely aligned with a 
knowledge-based economy as articulated by the OECD definition reported earlier in this 
section. Indeed, non-dynamic services and welfare services are certainly important 
features of the transition to a post-industrial society but they are not (directly) part of its 
knowledge-based component. The former have been expanding enormously in particular 
in LMEs, supporting high-levels of employment, although often in precarious and poorly 
paid positions – that is, they kept unemployment low at the cost of relatively high levels 
of inequality (Iversen and Wren 1998). Conversely, the latter have supported 
employment and relatively more egalitarian outcomes in Nordic European countries 
(Martin and Thelen 2007). Yet, neither are key components of the emergent knowledge 
economy, which is rather associated with dynamic services and (particularly high and 
medium-high technology) manufacturing – two sectors where a highly-skilled workforce 
is required to cope with technological advancements and/or the increasing importance of 
 49 
inter-personal skills. As this section is primarily concerned with identifying the 
configuration of national knowledge economies, it therefore focuses on the relative weight 
of manufacturing vis-à-vis the dynamic service sectors, leaving out non-dynamic and 
welfare services. Table 2.2 ranks a sample of OECD countries according to the 
percentage contribution to Gross Value Added (GVA) of, respectively, manufacturing 
and dynamic services.  
 
Table 2.2. Major sectors as a % of GVA in 2011 (countries ranked in descending order) 
Country Manufacturing Country Dynamic services 
South Korea 31.1% UK 28.1% 
Ireland 26.8% US 25.5% 
Germany 22.4% Ireland 23.8% 
Finland 18.6% Netherlands 22.8% 
Japan 18.6% Belgium 22.6% 
Austria 18.5% France 21.4% 
Canada 16.7% Australia 20.9% 
Sweden 16.7% Germany 19.5% 
Italy 16.6% Sweden 18.5% 
Belgium 14.5% Denmark 17.6% 
Netherlands 14.1% Italy 16.9% 
US 12.3% Austria 16.4% 
UK 11.7% South Korea 15.7% 
Denmark 11.5% Japan 15.4% 
France 10.1% Canada 15.2% 
Australia 8.5% Finland 14.5% 
Average 16.8% Average 19.7% 
St Dev 5.8% St Dev 3.9% 
Source: World Input–Output Database (WIOD) Socio-Economic Accounts July 2014 
Note: bold indicates above average countries/values 
 
The data presented in table 2.2 prompts several observations. First, there is significant 
variation across countries in the internal composition of their respective knowledge 
economies; secondly, variation appears to be particularly stark in the weight of 
manufacturing, which ranges from over 30% in South Korea to 8.5% in Australia; 
conversely, differences are more modest when it comes to dynamic services, as shown by 
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more limited standard deviation from the mean value; thirdly, countries do appear to 
cluster according to familiar categorisations in the CPE literature (Hope and Soskice 
2016, Hall and Soskice 2001). 
In particular, we notice three basic configurations. Apart from the Irish case, 
whose growth model has been picked out in the literature as rather sui generis and 
particularly reliant on attracting ‘business and skills’ in high-tech sectors from abroad 
(Regan and Brazys 2017), the Continental European and East Asian CMEs come firmly 
at the top of the manufacturing ranking, as we would expect from countries pursuing an 
export-led manufacturing-based growth model (Hassel and Palier 2017, Baccaro and 
Pontusson 2016). LMEs plus the Netherlands tend to have above average contributions 
of dynamic services to their national GVA, as expected in countries that pursued – 
actively and heavily – de-industrialisation. The Scandinavian countries take an 
intermediate position and display a rather mixed pattern of manufacturing and dynamic 
services (Hope and Soskice 2016, Hope 2016).  
It is crucial to note here that different knowledge economy profiles have been 
actively sustained (or contested) and shaped by governments and other organised actors, 
notably employers and unions. Thus, these configurations are neither randomly assigned 
nor are they the exclusive outcome of path dependency – even in those cases where 
continuity in national economic profiles prevailed over change (Thelen forthcoming, 
Baccaro and Pontusson 2016, Hassel and Palier 2017). In particular, Kathleen Thelen 
shows that differences in the organisation of capital and labour and in their interactions 
with the state shaped different national trajectories to the knowledge economy (Thelen 
forthcoming). A pattern of continuity prevailed in Continental European and East Asian 
CMEs that have moved ‘up-market’ within their traditional core sector of strength 
(namely, manufacturing), and in LMEs, which have fostered a growth path centred on 
high-end services. On the other hand, a pattern of change best describes the Dutch 
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trajectory, where organised actors favoured a shift away from manufacturing towards 
high-end services (leading to an economic profile that closely resembles that of LMEs), 
and the Scandinavian countries that have branched out to areas, such as ICT, that were 
previously not at the core of their production strategies, without, however, completely 
turning their back on the manufacturing sector (Thelen forthcoming, Baccaro and 
Pontusson 2016, Hassel and Palier 2017).  The different patterns of knowledge-based 
growth are captured by figure 2.1 that contrasts the development of GVA over time in 
manufacturing and in high-end services across a sample of OECD countries. Because the 
chief focus of this section is to identify variation in knowledge economies, figure 2.1 
focuses on those countries that the literature has considered as pursuing a knowledge-
based growth – i.e. it does not display a set of countries – the Southern European 
countries commonly referred to as Mixed Market Economies (MMEs) (Hancké, Rhodes, 
and Thatcher 2007) – that have been defined as pursuing a strategy of “competitive 
impoverishment” (Hassel and Palier 2017). Hence, in this set of countries, higher 
education (and high skill formation) is not expected to play a central role compared to 
countries that convincingly embraced a knowledge-based growth path (but see section 
7.2 for some additional reflections on MMEs in the context of high skill formation). 
 
Figure 2.1. GVA share by sector in selected countries 
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Having established the existence of significant variation across national economic 
profiles, we can proceed to pose the following question: what are the implications for 
high skill formation? We should first start by reiterating – and challenging – one of the 
main tenets of the CPE literature with respect to ‘high skill formation’, namely: that 
countries pursuing export-led manufacturing-based growth will suppress the expansion 
of higher education to favour intermediate skill formation in the vocational training 
system (Hassel and Palier 2017, Anderson and Hassel 2013). This assumption proves 
problematic. Plotting the GER in tertiary education against the share of GVA coming 
from manufacturing, we do not see any particular relationship between the two measures, 
as suggested by a very low R-squared (0.0296) – and if anything, the slope is positive (see 
figure 2.2).  
 
Figure 2.2. Relationship between GVA share of manufacturing and GER in tertiary education 
(2011) 
 
Source: own elaboration based on UNESCO and WIOD 
 
Yet, it is equally implausible to argue that the expansion of higher education is 
symptomatic of a secular convergence towards an LME model (van Santen 2014, see e.g. 
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becomes the key component of the knowledge economy. Not only have we seen that 
manufacturing is an important (and relatively stable) source of growth in a number of 
countries, but this growth path centred on manufacturing is also actively sustained by policy-makers and 
social partners (e.g. business organisations) in these countries (Hassel and Palier 2017, Thelen 
forthcoming). As an example, we can think of Industry 4.0 in Germany, which has been 
defined as “a national strategic initiative from the German government through the 
Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) and the Ministry for Economic Affairs and 
Energy (BMWI)” which “aims to drive digital manufacturing forward by increasing 
digitalisation and the interconnection of products, value chains and business models” 
(European Commission 2017). The wide political support granted to this project by 
powerful collective actors is one of its key features. Thelen notes in this respect that 
“what is as striking as the futuristic ambitions of this project is the cast of characters 
charged with implementing it, which reads like a who’s who of the oldest and most 
influential actors in German economic history”, including the “Trade Association for 
Mechanical Engineering (VDMA), the Federation of German Industry (BDI), the 
Manufacturers’ Association for the Electrical Industry (ZVEI), the German Association 
of the Automotive Industry (VDA), and of course the IG Metall” (Thelen forthcoming). 
 How, then, should the cross-national trend of expansion of higher education be 
understood in the context of persistently different knowledge economies? It is suggested 
in this respect that disentangling theoretically the convergent trend of higher education 
expansion in the context of persistent differences in national economic structures is crucial to 
explain the emergence of national patterns of skill formation in higher education. In 
particular, it is necessary to understand how different ‘families’ of academic disciplines 
are complementary to different economic sectors, and to what extent different economic 
sectors have more or less specific requirements in terms of high skills needed. In other 
words, the type of high skills cultivated by governments and sought by employers differs 
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according to the knowledge economy that actors actively sustain and that, therefore, 
countries rely upon.  
To understand why there may be different types of ‘high skills’ requirements, it is 
necessary to go back to some of the basic concepts employed in the literature on skill 
formation. In particular, the CPE literature has often equated higher education with 
general skills. However, this claim needs some further specification (see Streeck 2012 for 
a broader discussion on the limits of a binary distinction between specific and general 
skills). Higher education provides skills that tend to be general on the side of the individual 
who acquires such skills. That is, with a few exceptions (think for instance of medicine), the 
skills conferred by most higher education degrees do not constrain individuals to one 
specific job or sector. Rather, they allow working across more than one job or sector: 
they have, in other words, a significant degree of portability.  
But if we turn to the demand-side, i.e. the skills needed by knowledge-based 
sectors, the picture is quite different. A short example illustrates this point: let us assume 
a knowledge economy that is based on advanced manufacturing (e.g. industry 4.0) vis-à-
vis a knowledge economy relying on high-end services (e.g. the financial sector). The 
high skill implications are rather different: while both types of knowledge economy will 
require high inter-personal and cognitive skills (e.g. problem solving or analytical skills, 
which potentially come with a university education regardless of the specific discipline), 
high-end manufacturing will have a greater need for a specific set of skills on top of 
general skills. Thus, knowledge economies based on high-end services will be less 
constrained by the type of skills that the higher education system supplies, as long as high 
‘general’ skills are present. In more practical terms: while both STEM and social science 
graduates might successfully find employment in, say, the financial industry, it is much 
more likely that the manufacturing industry needs exclusively STEM graduates for a 
significant number of key positions. This line of reasoning helps explaining why a 
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shortage in STEM graduates is often part of the discourse, while there are no comparable 
concerns about, for instance, shortages in social scientists: STEM graduates are, on one 
hand, sought by employers in ‘non-STEM-related’ occupations, and, on the other, 
employers in ‘STEM-related’ occupations necessarily need STEM graduates (see e.g. 
BusinessEurope 2011, Cedefop 2016). To put this simply: a knowledge economy based on high-
tech manufacturing cannot thrive without highly skilled individuals trained in STEM subjects, i.e. they 
rely on a relatively specific set of high skills. Conversely, a knowledge economy based on dynamic services 
is faced with this constraint to a much lesser extent. This is not say that STEM skills are 
considered irrelevant for knowledge economies based on high-end services. Indeed, it 
has been noted that STEM graduates are likely to be sought across all knowledge-based 
sectors, hence initiatives in support of STEM skills might appear across most countries. 
However, it is suggested that such initiatives will be more significant and prescriptive in 
those countries where the lack of STEM skills might directly endanger the skill base of 
strategic sectors, such as high-tech manufacturing.  
 To what extent does this line of reasoning hold empirically? Table 2.2 and figure 
2.3 capture the idea of sectoral differences in the type of high skills required by making 
use of the data collected in ‘Flash Eurobarometer 304’ which asks employers recruiting 
higher education graduates across Europe a set of questions, including the following: 
“From which educational fields do you mostly recruit higher education graduates?”. Employers that 
responded to the survey could choose among the following fields: 
• Engineering;  
• Business and economic studies;  
• Languages; Law;  
• Teacher training and education;  
• Medical Studies; Humanities;  
• Art and design;  
• Communication and Information 
Sciences;  
• Other social and behavioural 
sciences;  
• Other natural sciences;  
• Other.    
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 I compare the concentration in Western European countries for employers in 
the ‘industry’ sector and in ‘non-public services’. The categories ‘industry’ and ‘non-
public services’ were already constructed in the Eurobarometer data and they come 
closest to the categories of ‘manufacturing’ and ‘dynamic services’ outlined in table 2.1. It 
should be noted in particular that the category ‘non-public services’ in the 
Eurobarometer survey excludes non-dynamic services (which are grouped under a separate 
category named ‘Trade, accommodation and food services’), making it therefore highly 
compatible with the dynamic service category introduced in table 2.1.   
 If the reasoning developed in this sub-section thus far is correct, we expect 
employers in the non-public services to be less concerned with the discipline of their 
graduates and to therefore have a higher dispersion in the answers provided. I show this 
by calculating an index of concentration6 for employers’ responses in industry and in the 
non-public services. The index takes value 1 if employers all recruited from one discipline 
and it takes value 0 if employers recruited equally from all disciplines. 
  
                                                
 
6 The index has been calculated using the formula of the GINI coefficient. Hence if 
employers responded that they recruited only from, say, law, the index would take value 
1. If employers responded that they recruited equally from each of the disciplines listed, 
the index would take value 0. 
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Table 2.2. Employers’ concentration of recruitment of higher education graduates in industry and 
non-public services 
Country Recruitment 
concentration index in 
industry 
Recruitment 
concentration index in 
non-public services 
∆ 7 
Austria 0.73 0.48 0.25 
Belgium 0.51 0.41 0.10 
Denmark 0.63 0.37 0.26 
Finland 0.75 0.40 0.35 
France 0.63 0.40 0.23 
Germany 0.65 0.44 0.21 
Ireland 0.63 0.31 0.32 
Italy 0.66 0.49 0.17 
Netherlands 0.69 0.57 0.12 
Sweden 0.73 0.47 0.36 
Spain 0.66 0.38 0.28 
United Kingdom 0.48 0.28 0.20 
Average 0.65 0.42 0.23 
Source: own calculations based on Gallup (2010) 
 
Figure 2.3. Comparing employers’ concentration of recruitment of higher education graduates in 
industry and non-public services  
 
Source: own calculations based on Gallup (2010) 
 
Table 2.2 and figure 2.3 confirm that – in every country – recruitment in the service sectors 
is less constrained by the discipline background of candidates, making it a sector with 
rather general high skill requirements, while employers in industry seem to have more 
specific requirements in terms of background, given that their recruitment patterns are 
                                                
 
7 Calculated as [Recruitment concentration index in industry] minus [Recruitment 
concentration index in non-public services] 
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more concentrated. However, this piece of information does not tell us whether the 
higher concentration in recruitment of employers in industry is mostly around STEM 
disciplines, as hypothesised. To this end, figure 2.4 shows the distribution of responses 
that employers provided across countries. It shows that indeed employers in industry 
display much stricter preferences for recruitment around STEM, with a particularly 
skewed distribution of responses towards the ‘engineering’ category, as opposed to the 
less constrained recruitment pattern of employers in services. As illustrated in figure 2.4, 
the hypothesised pattern, notwithstanding some cross-country variation, holds across all 
Western European countries. 
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Figure 2.4. Recruitment by discipline and economic sector in Western Europe 
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Source: own calculations based on Gallup (2010) 
 
The implication of this argument in terms of higher education policy is the following: 
governments in those countries where strategic economic sectors rely on a specific set of skills (hence, 
countries relying strategically on advanced manufacturing) are more likely to step in to directly shape the 
supply of skills (i.e. by prioritising some disciplines over others), compared to countries where key economic 
sectors are relatively indifferent to the type of skills that the higher education system provides (hence, 
countries relying on dynamic services). Indeed, even though higher education is a policy area 
where information asymmetries are less pervasive than most other social policies (Barr 
2004), evidence shows that labour market signals are only one among several factors that 
lead to the choice of discipline (Briggs 2006, Reay et al. 2001), and that STEM disciplines 
are often those avoided by students (see e.g. Haynes 2008, Osborne, Simon, and Collins 
2003 for a review of the reasons). Hence, even in the presence of strong labour market 
signals, shortages in STEM are likely to occur in the absence of specific actions and 
policies to promote the supply of these skills. Such specific actions and policies might be 
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driven directly by business, for instance by entering into cooperation with universities to 
negotiate the provision of degree programmes that respond to their needs. However, 
given that higher education is a policy area where the scope for ‘social partnership’ has 
traditionally been low, it is conceivable that in the majority of cases, business’ preferences 
on higher education policy will be enacted through government policy, as the scope for 
governments to directly influence higher education policy is certainly larger compared to 
that of business.8 
To conclude this section: it has been argued that understanding how higher 
education systems align with knowledge economies requires considering how different 
types of knowledge economies are likely to require different types of high skills. The 
demand side has indeed been mostly side lined in the higher education literature seeking 
to explain the alignment between higher education and the labour market. Conversely, 
the CPE literature submits that the very expansion of higher education will be hampered 
in those countries where export-led manufacturing-based growth is dominant. This 
section showed that the CPE assumption is problematic: higher education has indeed 
expanded in countries that still today rely strategically on advanced manufacturing. But it 
has also been demonstrated that key actors’ preferences (such as governments and 
businesses) regarding the high skills needed to foster a particular knowledge economy 
might differ, an issue which structuralist and ideational literatures are by and large silent 
about. The insights drawn from this discussion on the different high skills needs that 
might be prompted by different knowledge economies will be picked up again in section 
2.3 to formulate hypotheses on the trajectories of high skill formation that we should 
expect across different countries.   
                                                
 
8 Although forms of governance of the higher education sector resembling ‘social 
partnership’ are traditionally found in some Scandinavian countries (Clark 1983, Olsen 
2007, see section 2.2). 
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2.2 The supply of high skills: university agency in context and the theoretical 
implications for institutional change 
While the previous section focused on the demand side, namely the type of skills that 
actors embedded in different knowledge economies might require and seek, I will now 
turn to the supply-side, that is the higher education systems that are expected to provide 
the high level skills demanded by knowledge-based labour markets. Chapter 1 highlighted 
the centrality of higher education as the main supplier of those high skills that are 
increasingly considered crucial to succeed in knowledge-based economies. It has also 
highlighted how the demands of policy-makers and business on universities have grown 
exponentially. As suggested by Regini, the development of knowledge-based economies 
has led to a situation in which “universities and companies can […] no longer ignore 
each other as they have done in the past, but are now forced to work together and 
cooperate” (Regini 2011b, 81). It has also triggered an interest by external actors in “the 
‘use’ of HE products […] to an extent previously unknown” (Regini 2011b, 203).  
In this section I discuss how higher education systems might respond to the 
demands of governments and employers in terms of closer alignment between higher 
education systems and labour markets. The starting point builds on recent work by 
Slaughter and Barrett. They argue that “universities are not simply acted upon by outside 
forces. Segments of the university, including some faculty, administrators, and students, 
embrace market activity […], while other segments are resistant or neglected” (Slaughter 
and Barrett 2016, 1, see also Schulze-Cleven and Olson 2017). In particular, aligning 
higher education and labour markets is a ‘political’ process, which entails eroding part of 
the ‘academic freedom’ retained by universities as to what should be taught and how, in 
terms for instance of including ‘employability’ skills in the curricula, seeking advice from 
business on course contents or prioritising some subjects over others.  
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Under what circumstances should we expect universities to embrace (or even 
drive) the quest for a closer alignment with the labour market? Under what circumstances 
should we expect universities to defend their exclusive prerogatives of pursuing teaching 
and research ‘in separation’ from the demands of external stakeholders? What kind of 
cross-country variation should we expect to occur in this respect? These questions have 
not been systematically addressed by the literature thus far. Rather, universities have been 
mostly depicted as having a passive role and being subject to the demands of external 
stakeholders, without giving much consideration to the stance that they might take 
themselves when confronted with such demands and to the institutional context that 
might influence the preferences of actors within the higher education sector (but see 
Schulze-Cleven and Olson 2017 for a notable exception). 
Borrowing Korpi’s categories of employers’ engagement with public policy-
making and transferring it to the higher education sector, we might ask: (when) should 
we expect universities to act as ‘protagonists’, ‘consenters’ or ‘antagonists’ (cf. Korpi 
2006)? In other words, once policy-makers implement reforms or promote policies that 
aim at increasing the alignment between the skills produced by the higher education 
sector and the needs of the labour market, when do we expect universities to second or 
to oppose these changes? 
The early literature on higher education provides significant insights to 
hypothesise a theoretically-informed answer. Higher education is a multi-layered policy 
arena and the university in itself is a multi-faceted institution that, for instance, comprises 
a variety of stakeholders whose interests might not necessarily be aligned at all times: 
from faculty, to administrators as well as students – in addition to the external 
stakeholders that have been highlighted thus far, such as governments and employers 
(see e.g. Ginsberg 2011 for an analysis pointing to the decline of power of faculty 
members vis-a-vis administration).  
 65 
Formulating any theoretical expectation as to how national higher education 
systems might react to the demands of external stakeholders, therefore, entails by 
definition a level of abstraction from the institutional complexity of universities and the 
host of micro processes that take place in each university on a daily basis. Yet, the 
literature on comparative higher education provides a starting point to simplify such 
complexity while simultaneously advancing a theoretically-grounded argument. In 
particular, I draw on Burton Clark’s seminal work “Academic organization in cross-
national perspective” (Clark 1983) to identify the institutional features of higher 
education systems that might help us theorise under what conditions universities will be 
more or less open to meet the demands of ‘external stakeholders’.  
Indeed, already in the early 1980s, Clark asked the question of which university 
system might be more amenable to changing environmental conditions and new external 
demands. After reviewing the organisational features and power dynamics across a 
variety of national higher education systems, Clark conceptualises university systems as 
being caught in a triangular tension between forms of ‘coordination’ – i.e. organising 
principles – relying on markets, states or academic oligarchies, providing an analytical 
framework that has profoundly shaped comparative higher education research for over 
three decades (Ferlie, Musselin, and Andresani 2008, Enders 2004, Neave and Van Vught 
1994, Neave 2000, Teichler 1996a, 2003, 2005, Marginson and Rhoades 2002, Becher and 
Kogan 1992, Kogan and Hanney 2000, Bleiklie and Kogan 2007). Different forms of 
coordination became institutionalised in different parts of the world. Market-
coordination, characterised by universities’ behaviour akin to that of private firms and 
aimed at seizing ‘market shares’ in the higher education market, was identified as 
particularly prominent in the Anglo-Saxon countries (Marginson and Considine 2000). 
State coordination was found primarily in Scandinavian countries. This form of 
coordination is characterised by concertation between the government and the university 
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sector in a way that resembles social partnership in economic and social policy (Olsen 
2007). Finally, university systems dominated by academic oligarchies were found chiefly 
in Continental Europe (Gieysztor 1992, Pechar 2012). Here, the state plays a crucial role 
in financing higher education but faculties enjoy extremely high de facto and/or formal 
power in academic matters (e.g. German professors’ freedom of teaching and research is 
enshrined in constitutional law) (Clark 1983, Van de Graaff 1978). 
Clark’s argument posits that systems that are relatively more reliant on market 
coordination are those most amenable to change. At the other end of the spectrum, 
systems dominated by academic faculties are hypothesised to be the least ready to 
accommodate ‘changes in environment’, while state-coordinated systems take a 
somewhat intermediary position (Clark 1983, 202). To understand what is meant by 
market coordination and why it is plausible to expect these systems to be relatively more 
open to change than the others, it is worth going into some detail on Clark’s work. First, 
with respect to the concept of markets in higher education, Clark points out that 
mechanisms of market coordination expand whenever there is “an increase in the 
capacity of students to choose among sectors, institutions, or disciplines” leading to an 
increase in “consumer sovereignty” (Clark 1983, 164, see also Jongbloed 2003). 
 Opportunities for choice are hypothesised to be particularly prominent in those 
higher education systems that “permit institutions to compete for students, engaging in 
claims of ‘product differentiation’ as a way of attracting consumers and thereby building 
a dependable base of support in a hived-off segment of the market” (Clark 1983, 162). 
The crucial feature for Clark in identifying a market-coordinated higher education system 
is the presence of tuition fees, as he submits that “when we hear the word tuition we are 
in the presence of a consumer market” (Clark 1983, 162), which in turn sets the 
incentives for higher education institutions to be malleable and change according to 
consumer demand (Clark 1983, 203). 
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Clark therefore concludes that “the market form appears […to be…] the form 
most likely to keep a system open to change and adaptable to new environmental 
demands” (Clark 1983, 204). The point put forward by Clark can be understood in terms 
of what incentive-set universities are faced with, depending on whether they operate in a 
more or less ‘market-like’ environment. The crucial point is the extent to which 
universities compete against each other for private and public funds as well as position in 
rankings and prestige – all features that are usually bundled together in a market-
coordinated higher education system. According to Clark’s line of reasoning, we expect 
universities to be more malleable to external demands when they operate in a highly 
competitive environment, because they perceive interaction with external stakeholders as 
a way to differentiate their educational offer, hence differentiate themselves from the 
competition. How does this general line of reasoning help us shed light on the dynamics 
of alignment between higher education systems and labour markets? There are at least 
two plausible mechanisms by which universities in high-competition settings might be 
expected to align their educational offer with labour market demands. Firstly, students 
might be (implicitly or explicitly) the transmission belt of employers’ preferences. Indeed, 
student surveys show that acquiring skills for their future professional life is a key 
motivation behind the pursuit of a university degree. A recent survey among university 
students in Europe reveals that the provision of “knowledge and skills […] needed to be 
employable” (Gallup 2009, 5) is the top purpose assigned to higher education by 
respondents. Thus, particularly in a context where attracting students is critical to 
institutional survival, it is plausible to expect that universities – aware of students’ 
demands – strive to provide these skills and engage in a ‘product differentiation’ exercise 
along the lines hypothesised by Clark. This can take the form of closer alignment of their 
educational offer with labour market demands. Secondly, such strategic behaviour of 
universities might also take place in the absence of explicit student demand. In the 
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highly-competitive US higher education market, for example, community colleges in the 
1970s transformed from liberal arts institutions into higher education institutions with 
strong ties with the local labour market. Such re-orientation of community colleges has 
been ascribed to managerial decisions that saw strong ties with the labour market as a 
strategic choice for these institutions to increase their viability in a highly-competitive 
higher education market (Brint and Karabel 1991). Clearly, concerns around institutional 
survival cannot be assumed to be exclusive to high-competition settings. However, it is 
plausible to assume that such concerns are stronger in these settings and that 
responsiveness to employers’ and government’s demand – whether channelled through 
student preferences or not – might be perceived as more urgent in these settings. 
The issue of competition raised by the early literature on higher education is 
particularly suitable for an empirical test, because we find significant variation across 
countries in the degree to which universities compete. By exploiting variation across 
countries in the degree of competition among universities, we can therefore provide a 
preliminary empirical test of the central theoretical claim developed in this section, 
namely: universities operating in highly-competitive institutional contexts will be relatively more open to 
the demands of external stakeholders compared to universities operating in low-competition settings. 
Despite all university systems having moved towards more market-based 
mechanisms across a variety of dimensions over the last two decades in particular 
(Dobbins and Knill 2014, Regini 2011b), we can still discern significantly different 
degrees of competition across universities in different university systems. Table 2.4 
captures this variety through a composite index of competition, which takes into account 
three factors. The first one is the share of private funding in higher education, which 
speaks to Clark’s argument that ‘when we hear the word tuition we are in the presence of 
a consumer market’ (Clark 1983, 162). This indicator is still certainly useful – and in fact 
it correlates with the following ones. However, compared to when Clark was writing, we 
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see in today’s higher education a much stronger role of quasi-markets (Le Grand and 
Bartlett 1993) in allocating public funds (see e.g. Jongbloed 2003) and therefore 
competition might exist not only for fee-paying students but also for public funds, which 
might follow students.  
Hence, to provide a more nuanced understanding of the extent to which a higher 
education system ‘promotes competition’ among universities, I also add two further 
dimensions drawn from the ‘Flash Eurobarometer 260: Students and higher education 
reform’. In particular, I include in the index two further indicators that give a more 
complete understanding of the level of competition beyond the private/public funding 
dimension. The two additional elements are provided by the share of students that in 
each country agree with the two following statements: (i) “students choose where to 
study on the basis of the quality/reputation of the institution and its study programmes”; 
and (ii) “performance rankings of universities and programmes would help students to 
choose where to study”.  
The first statement captures the extent to which universities should care about 
their reputation in order to attract students. If perceived reputation/quality of 
universities is not an important factor informing students’ choice, for instance because all 
universities are perceived as being of equal standing, then the competition – be it for 
public or private funds – would be significantly weakened. The second statement 
captures the extent to which reputation is a ‘fixed’ feature of universities. In other words, 
if universities know that moving up the rankings is important to uphold their reputation, 
this would increase competition. Conversely, if reputation, albeit important, was 
considered as unrelated to rankings, because for instance entirely judged on the basis of 
the history of a university, then, again, competition would be weakened because it would 
not make a huge difference moving up or down rankings, if these did not inform student 
choice. These three dimensions are averaged out to create an index of competition which 
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shows high inter-item correlation and reliability coefficient, suggesting that all three 
indicators are ‘pulling’ in the same direction. The Eurobarometer data is only available 
for European countries, hence a number of non-European countries only feature the 
private funding indicator, rather than the full ‘competition’ indicator. The data on 
competition among universities is reported in table 2.3. 
 
Table 2.3. A composite index of competition among universities 
Country 
Private 
funding Hierarchy Rankings 
Index of 
competition 
Finland 4.1 17.8 6.0 9.3 
Denmark 5.5 44.8 14.0 21.4 
Belgium 9.9 39.6 43.0 30.8 
Sweden 10.5 18.1 12.0 13.5 
Austria 13.1 23.0 24.0 20.0 
Germany 15.3 24.4 28.0 22.6 
France 19.2 39.4 34.0 30.9 
Ireland 19.5 44.7 34.0 32.7 
Spain 22.5 19.0 35.0 25.5 
Netherlands 29.2 34.0 16.0 26.4 
Portugal 31.4 38.6 42.0 37.3 
Italy 33.5 28.8 25.0 29.1 
Australia 54.4 n/a n/a n/a 
USA 65.2 n/a n/a n/a 
Japan 65.5 n/a n/a n/a 
United Kingdom 69.8 56.1 50.0 58.6 
South Korea 73.0 n/a n/a n/a 
Source: own calculations based on OECD (2017) and Gallup (2009)  
Note: average inter-item correlation: 0.5902; scale reliability coefficient: 0.8120; private funding refers to 
2011 
 
Looking at the table, we note that countries group differently under this dimension 
compared to the knowledge economy-related indicators presented in section 2.2. In 
particular, at the high-end of the ‘competition scale’, we see LMEs and East Asian 
CMEs, while at the low end of the competition scale, Continental and Nordic CMEs 
group together. Thus, following the line of reasoning developed in this sub-section, we 
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should expect higher education systems at the high end of the competition scale to be 
‘more open’ to external stakeholders compared to the ‘less competitive’ systems.  
Finding a proxy to capture the openness of higher education systems is a 
significant challenge. I rely again on survey data, namely the ‘Flash Eurobarometer 198: 
Perceptions of Higher Education Reforms’, which asks university management and 
faculty members across European countries various questions on their preferences 
towards possible directions of reforms of their university systems. To gather an 
understanding of the ‘openness’ of the system to the demands of external stakeholders, I 
use two questions from the Flash Eurobarometer 198 in which respondents were asked 
to rate their ‘confidence’ in the involvement of a variety of actors on the reform of the 
university system.  
In particular, they were asked to rate their confidence in the involvement of 
higher education reform of their own faculty and of professional associations. While 
confidence in faculty is a fairly close proxy for the confidence in stakeholders ‘internal’ to 
the system, the question on professional associations does not provide the same 
precision. However, given that the survey does not ask explicitly for ‘employer’s 
associations’, it is plausible to assume that these are considered as part of professional 
associations by respondents, and more broadly, it is plausible to assume that professional 
associations conform to the notion of a stakeholder ‘external’ to the higher education 
system and belonging to the private sector. 
 The share of respondents who stated that they have ‘full confidence’ is reported 
in table 2.4, along with a ratio of the share of respondents that stated that they have full 
confidence in faculty divided by the share who stated the same with respect to 
professional associations. 
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Table 2.4. A proxy of higher education systems’ openness to ‘external stakeholders’ 
Country Confidence in faculty 
Confidence in 
professional 
associations 
Ratio 
faculty/professional 
associations 
United Kingdom 47.6 28.8 0.61 
Netherlands 53.1 31.5 0.59 
Ireland 51.5 23.8 0.46 
Denmark 45.1 19.6 0.43 
Italy 47.2 15.9 0.34 
Sweden 58.8 19.6 0.33 
Portugal 53.3 17.6 0.33 
Spain 44.2 14.0 0.32 
France 52.0 16.4 0.32 
Austria 53.5 12.0 0.22 
Germany 72.6 16.3 0.22 
Belgium 41.4 7.4 0.18 
Finland 61.8 3.9 0.06 
Source: own calculations based on Gallup (2007) 
 
Taking the confidence in professional associations as a proxy for ‘openness’, given that 
these are ‘external stakeholders’, compared to the confidence in faculty that can be 
thought of as ‘internal stakeholders’, we should expect respondents in systems 
characterised by higher competition to be relatively more open towards external 
stakeholders. I test this relationship through simple scatter plots reported in figure 2.5. 
The top line plots the ‘competition index’ presented in table 2.3 against the proxies for 
openness developed in table 2.4, while in the bottom line we replace the ‘competition 
index’ with the ‘simpler’ measure of private funding in higher education. 
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Figure 2.5. A preliminary test of the relationship between ‘competition’ in the higher education 
sector and ‘openness’ to external stakeholders 
 
 
 
 
Competition index 
 
  
Share of private funds in higher education 
 
Source: own calculations based on OECD (2017) and Gallup (2009) 
 
R-squared values range from 0.28 to 0.44, and they do not therefore provide a conclusive 
answer, possibly also due to the small sample of countries and to the fact that 
measurements developed are only proxies for what should be captured. However, the 
relationship goes in the hypothesised direction across the four scatter-plots (and when 
using different variables), suggesting that the theoretically-implied positive relationship 
between ‘competition’ in the higher education sector and its ‘openness’ towards external 
stakeholders is plausible. Thus, going back to the starting point of this section, we should 
expect universities in high competition settings to come close to the ‘protagonist’ or 
‘consenter’ ideal type, when it comes to responding to (or driving) policy initiatives to 
open the higher education sector to external demands. On the other hand, a relatively 
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limited competition might incentivise universities’ ‘defence’ of the status quo, hence 
bringing them closer to the ‘antagonist’ type, when it comes to opening up to the 
demands of governments and/or employers. Piecing together the insights from this 
section and the previous one, I will suggest next that it is possible to hypothesise 
different trajectories of skill formation in higher education across countries, and the 
associated patterns of institutional change in national higher education systems. 
 
2.3 Piecing demand and supply together: varieties of high skill formation and 
hypotheses of institutional change 
The two preceding sub-sections have set out the case for thinking of high skill formation 
and associated patterns of institutional change in higher education systems as a bi-
dimensional space where ‘types of knowledge economy’ and ‘competition among 
universities’ are hypothesised to provide leverage in the theorisation of national 
trajectories of skill formation in higher education. The two sub-sections have also 
showed how countries cluster around the two dimensions differently. In particular, 
Continental European and East Asian CMEs share important features when it comes to 
the ‘knowledge economy’ dimension, namely high reliance on manufacturing vis-à-vis 
dynamic services; when we look at the ‘competition’ dimension, however, LMEs and 
East Asian CMEs cluster together to form a group of countries characterised by high 
competition among universities. Along this dimension, Continental European and 
Nordic CMEs cluster together in a group of countries with relatively low competition. 
Thus, we can graphically place countries in this bi-dimensional space according to Figure 
2.6. Figure 2.6 shows the bi-dimensional grouping of countries by using GVA share of 
manufacturing to capture variation in the type of knowledge economy and share of 
private funding in higher education as a proxy for inter-university competition. 
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Figure 2.6. A bi-dimensional categorisation according to ‘type’ of knowledge economy and 
‘competition’ in the higher education sector 
 
Source: own calculations based on OECD (2017) and WIOD 
 
As a general observation, we note that the four quadrants return a familiar pattern to 
CPE scholars as countries tend to cluster as we would theoretically expect, even as we 
consider a policy area – higher education – that has received comparatively limited 
scrutiny in the CPE literature: LMEs come close together in the bottom-right quadrant; 
East-Asian CMEs group in the top-right quadrant; Continental and Nordic European 
CMEs group on the left quadrants, differing by the weight of manufacturing in their 
economies that was already noted in section 2.2.    
How do the two analytical dimensions proposed translate into hypotheses and 
observable implications? Starting from the knowledge economy dimension, we expect to 
find main differences between the top and bottom quadrants. In particular, following the 
line of reasoning illustrated (and preliminarily tested) in section 2.2, we can put forward 
two hypotheses as to how the ‘type’ of knowledge economy might affect the type of high 
skills that governments cultivate and employers seek, namely: 
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• H1. Governments are more active in directly shaping the supply of high skills in 
those knowledge economies that rely on a specific set of high skills, namely 
STEM skills in knowledge economies with relatively high reliance on 
manufacturing (i.e. countries in the top quadrants). 
• H2. Governments across all four quadrants stimulate the provision of general 
skills across the higher education system, because cognitive/social skills are 
expected to be crucial in the knowledge economy, regardless of the ‘type’ of 
knowledge economy. 
Turning to the competition dimension, we can hypothesise how the degree of 
openness of universities towards external stakeholders might affect the patterns of 
institutional change in the higher education sector. In particular, I link the arguments 
developed in section 2.3 with recent advancements in the comparative political economy 
literature on gradual institutional change (Mahoney and Thelen 2009, Streeck and Thelen 
2005). We have pointed out that universities in ‘low competition’ settings are more likely 
to act as ‘antagonists’ to any reforms or policy initiatives that seek to open up the higher 
education system to the demands of external stakeholders. Thus, low competition 
settings approximate what Mahoney and Thelen (2009, 19) identify as a political context 
characterised by strong veto possibilities. Here it is important to note that I take a broad 
definition of veto possibilities, in which universities might be the de facto veto players, but 
they are not expected to have a formal veto right over policy-making as in the classic veto 
player theorem (cf. Tsebelis 2002). In such a context, it is expected that institutional 
change unfolds marginally, e.g. by side-stepping veto-players, rather than in an 
encompassing fashion, i.e. overhauling existing institutional arrangements. More 
specifically, marginal institutional change is expected to take the form of ‘layering’ and 
‘drift’. Conversely, where the political context features weak veto possibilities (in this 
case: there is high competition between universities), institutional change is expected to 
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be encompassing, and take the form of ‘conversion’ or ‘displacement’. These four 
mechanisms of gradual institutional change are described in greater detail in table 2.5. 
 
Table 2.5. Types of gradual institutional change 
 Layering Drift Conversion Displacement 
Definition New elements 
attached to existing 
institutions gradually 
change their status 
and structure 
Neglect of 
institutional 
maintenance in spite 
of external change 
resulting in slippage 
in institutional 
practice on the 
ground 
 
Redeployment of old 
institutions to new 
purposes; new 
purposes attached to 
old structures 
Slowly rising salience 
of subordinate 
relative to dominant 
institutions 
Political 
context 
 
Strong veto-players Strong veto-players Weak veto-players Weak veto-players 
Mechanism Differential growth Deliberate neglect Redirection, 
reinterpretation 
 
Defection 
Example of 
process 
Faster growth of 
new institutions 
created on the edge 
of old ones 
Change in 
institutional 
outcomes effected 
by (strategically) 
neglecting adaption 
to changing 
circumstances 
Changing contextual 
conditions and 
coalitions open up 
space for 
redeployment 
Active cultivation of 
a new ‘logic’ of 
action inside an 
existing institutional 
setting 
Source: Mahoney and Thelen (2009) and Streeck and Thelen (2005), with own modifications 
 
Thus, bearing in mind the preferences that universities might have in the process of 
aligning higher education with labour market demands, and considering how these 
preferences might affect patterns of institutional change, we can put forward the 
following additional four hypotheses: 
• H3. Where competition among universities is high, the role of universities 
conforms to the ideal types of ‘protagonists’ or ‘consenters’ and institutional 
change is encompassing (i.e. it proceeds through conversion and/or 
displacement).  
• H4. Where competition among universities is low, the role of universities 
conforms to the ideal types of ‘antagonists’ and institutional change is marginal 
(i.e. it proceeds through layering and/or drift). 
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Finally, combining the four hypotheses advanced so far, we can list the observable 
implications of the proposed theoretical framework in each of the quadrants. The 
observable implications of the theory are presented in figure 2.7. 
 
Figure 2.7. Observable implications of the proposed theoretical framework 
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Source: own elaboration 
 
As described graphically in figure 2.7 and illustrated at length through sections 2.1, 2.2. 
and 2.3, the proposed theory offers a set of outcomes (e.g. the ‘type’ of high skills that 
will be cultivated by governments and sought by employers; the ‘type’ of institutional 
change that is expected to take place), a theorisation of actors’ preferences, the 
underlying reasons for a given preference formation process (e.g. the role of universities 
as informed by the institutional context of ‘university agency’), as well as the mechanisms 
through which these preferences are expected to play out in the policy process. In other 
words, it tries to comply with what Peter Hall defines as “good theories”, i.e. those 
characterised by “a set of causal processes associated with the operation of particular 
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variables” such as “predictions about the events that can be expected to occur, the 
sequence of those events, and the public and private positions actors are likely to take, as 
well as many other features of the relevant causal chain” (Hall 2003, 393). 
 
2.4 Zooming into the four quadrants: the ‘centre of gravity’ of higher education 
systems and the implications for continuity and change 
Before concluding the chapter with a comparison of the proposed theoretical framework 
with the existing theories illustrated in section 1.2, it is worth zooming into the four 
quadrants to provide some preliminary considerations on the cases that each quadrant 
contains. In particular, we ask whether the mechanisms of change hypothesised in 
sections 2.2 and 2.3, once taken out of the (mostly) theoretical discussions developed 
thus far, are equally expected to manifest across all quadrants. In particular, to the extent 
that this thesis is concerned with patterns of institutional change, we need to ask whether 
change is indeed what we should reasonably expect across all quadrants. Let us recall the 
dependent variable of this research as illustrated in section 1.1. We defined ‘skill 
formation in higher education’ as “the institutional set-up of a higher education system and its 
connection to the labour market, in particular those segments of the labour market that are reliant on 
high skills”. We also outlined that higher education systems have traditionally enjoyed a 
significant degree of freedom from ‘external stakeholders’ but also that pressure has been 
mounting since the mid-1990s to align higher education provision and labour market 
demands, as high skills have become increasingly crucial for economic success in the 
knowledge economy. But has this pressure for change been the same across countries? In 
other words, to what extent can higher education systems have an institutional set-up 
that makes them well connected with the labour market at the outset? 
Theoretically we can argue that pressure of change is greater the more distant a higher 
education system is at the outset with labour market demands. In other words, if the ‘centre of 
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gravity’9 of a higher education system is close to labour market demands, the pressure for 
change in the context of continuous expansion of higher education is limited. A 
particularly significant proxy to assess whether the centre of gravity of a higher education 
system is in line with labour market demands or, conversely, removed from it is the 
proportion of students that are enrolled in ‘professional’ or ‘vocational’ higher education 
(such as those enrolled in universities of applied sciences and similar institutions) vis-à-
vis those enrolled in universities. If a sizeable share of students is enrolled in 
professionally oriented higher education institutions, we suggest that the centre of gravity 
of a higher education sector is in its vocational sub-set. To the contrary, if traditional 
research-oriented institutions are home to the majority of students, the system’s centre of 
gravity is located in its research-oriented sub-set. If the centre of gravity of a higher 
education system is to be found in its vocational sub-set, we should expect that those 
higher education systems are ‘aligned by default’ with labour market needs and therefore 
governments – and employers – would work towards preserving the status quo and 
prioritising continuity over change when confronted with the pressing need to align 
higher education provision with labour market needs. Table 2.6 shows that differences in 
this respect were particularly striking in the second half of the 1990s, i.e. as the issue of 
high skill formation for the knowledge economy became particularly salient. 
 
Table 2.6. Identifying the centre of gravity of higher education systems in the second half of the 
1990s 
Country Share of students in universities Share of students in professionally-
oriented higher education institutions 
Denmark 30% 70% 
Netherlands 37% 63% 
South Korea 73% 27% 
Germany 76% 24% 
UK 100% -- 
Source: Huisman and Kaiser (2001, 19) and KEDI (2015, 32) 
                                                
 
9 I am grateful to Kathleen Thelen for her advice to look for the ‘centre of gravity’, 
although she should not be implicated for what has been identified as such. 
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Note: bold indicates the ‘centre of gravity’ of the system in each country. Data refers to 1996 for Denmark, 
Netherlands, Germany and the UK and to 2000 for Korea 
 
Table 2.6 highlights remarkable cross-country differences. Starting from the bottom line, 
the UK has a unitary higher education system. As such, all students are formally enrolled 
in the same ‘type’ of institution, and universities differ from each other mainly by virtue 
of their individual reputation. Despite some legacy effects, given that the UK used to be 
a binary system with explicitly vocationally-oriented higher education institutions, namely 
the Polytechnics, until 1992 (Pratt 2008, 1992), the major line of differentiation is 
expected to be a vertical one (as briefly mentioned in section 1.2 and as will become 
more apparent in chapter 4, when the UK case will be discussed in detail). But if we look 
at the other four countries in the table, we note that all display a proportion of students 
enrolled in traditional universities and a proportion of students enrolled in a different set 
of higher education institutions, namely professionally-oriented higher education 
institutions, such as German Fachoochshulen, Dutch hoghscholen, or Korean Junior Colleges 
(it should be noted, however, that the latter do not provide full degrees, only offering 
sub-degree programmes, so differing from the German and Dutch cases where full 
degrees are offered by Fachhochschulen and hoghscholen too). In other words, these countries 
have a binary higher education system, in which different groups of institutions serve 
different objectives. However, the relative weight of the two sub-sectors of the higher 
education system varies greatly: a vast majority of students is enrolled in traditional 
universities in Korea and Germany, while the reverse holds true for the Netherlands and 
Denmark, i.e. the two countries belonging to the bottom-left quadrant of the proposed 
bi-dimensional space in figure 2.6.  
Because of specific historical developments in these two countries, higher 
education systems were therefore already heavily geared towards labour market demands 
in the mid-1990s through a remarkably high share of students enrolled in professionally-
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oriented higher education institutions. Given that the centre of gravity of the higher 
education system is close to the labour market in these two countries, do we observe 
limited pressure for change in their respective higher education systems? We can answer 
this question with reference to the Dutch case. In particular, looking at a series of 
reforms undertaken from the second-half of the 1990s we indeed find that the skewed 
distribution of students towards the vocational sub-set of the higher education system 
steered the reform process relatively more towards stability than change. When the 
Dutch government embarked upon a large-scale reform process of the national university 
system under the auspices of the Bologna process, the issue of labour market relevance 
of higher education – which was part and parcel of the Bologna process (recall section 
1.2 in this respect) – gained political salience (Witte 2006). Yet, the ensuing reform 
process was characterised by remarkably little change, and by a constellation of key 
actors’ preferences that closely resembled a political-economic equilibrium.  
In a detailed reconstruction of the Dutch reform process, Witte finds that: 
“hogescholen [i.e. professionally oriented higher education institutions] made up an 
important part of the Dutch HE system. Massification in the Netherlands was by and 
large accommodated by the hogeschool sector […]. Accordingly, the pressure to 
‘professionalise’ university degrees was quite low” (Witte 2006, 209 emphasis added, see also 
Huisman and Kaiser 2001). As expected from the theoretical framework presented in the 
preceding section, (traditional) universities objected to any potential transformation of 
their own degrees towards closer labour-market orientation (i.e. they performed the 
hypothesised antagonist role) (Witte 2006, 377, Lorenz 2006). Critically, policy-makers 
sided with (research) universities – instead of putting pressure on them – because of the 
historically-inherited skewed distribution of students in favour of professional higher 
education institutions, which made it unnecessary to push traditional universities towards 
a professionalisation of their degrees.  
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Furthermore, the Dutch hogeschool sector was traditionally seen as extremely 
responsive to societal needs, thus making it a particularly suitable target for government 
policy when adjustments in the higher education sector were required, as opposed to the 
relatively more rigid (research) university sector (Teichler 1989, Maassen, Moen, and 
Stensaker 2011). Early assessments of the hogescholen sector went as far as suggesting 
that “almost everything seems to be open for reform” (Teichler 1989, 200). And such 
openness to reform has accompanied Dutch universities of applied sciences for the 
following three decades. For example, the association of the hogescholen (i-HBO) has 
been actively involved in policy initiatives bringing together government and industry and 
aimed at adjusting the provision of higher education to the needs of the Dutch 
knowledge economy. Most recently, the i-HBO coordinated a policy initiative to improve 
the provision of higher level ICT skills, including the development across universities of 
applied sciences of ICT degrees with the explicit aim “to strengthen the position and 
image of ICT in the Netherlands, for both future students and industry” (European 
Commission 2014). More broadly, the important role of the hogescholen in meeting the 
needs of the Dutch labour market is well noted by domestic and international observers. 
A key strength of this sub-set of the Dutch higher education system is found in its ability 
to connect creatively theory and practice in their educational approach (Boezerooy 2003) 
and the OECD regards the hogescholen as the key component of a “highly developed 
model of a binary system”, whose core strengths lie in the “multifaceted connections to 
working life – in their pedagogy and instructional staff; through employer participation in 
their supervisory boards; and in advisory relationships between employers and 
hogescholen that extend from the development of programmes to their quality 
assurance” (OECD 2008, 219). 
Given the availability of a large and vibrant sub-set of the higher education sector 
intimately linked to labour market needs, the minister in charge of higher education 
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policy was strongly in favour of keeping a distinction between professional and academic 
(higher) education, which was considered “an important form of differentiation that 
matches the prior education of students as well as labour market needs” (Witte 2006, 
221, see also Ballarino 2011). The same view was held by employers who were 
systematically involved at the national level on the reform of Dutch higher education in 
the late 1990s (Ballarino 2011, Perotti 2011). In particular, business representatives 
“strongly opposed [any deviation from the binary system] as they highly valued the 
provision of ‘different types of graduates’” (Witte 2006, 221), with work-ready graduates 
from universities of applied sciences being particularly appreciated by internationally-
oriented Dutch SMEs in high-tech sectors (Perotti 2011). This constellation of actors’ 
preferences was crystallised in the Dutch Education Council, the permanent advisory 
body set up to supervise and advise on the reform, which “strongly supported the 
maintenance of a binary system” (Witte 2006, 221).  
Thus, a large professionally-oriented higher education system created the 
conditions for a political-economic equilibrium (Witte, Van der Wende, and Huisman 
2008, Witte 2006), in which “state actors had fewer incentives to change the inherited 
task distribution between universities and hogescholen” (Witte 2006, 371). The 
importance of the historically-inherited distribution of students between the academic 
and professional sub-sets of the higher education system will become even clearer when 
the German case study will be presented (chapter 5): in Germany the size of ‘traditional’ 
academic and ‘professionally-oriented’ higher education in the mid-1990s was almost 
perfectly the reverse of that of the Netherlands (see table 2.6) and therefore the system 
was perceived by government and employers as overall irresponsive to labour market 
needs. In the German context, government and employers put pressure on traditional 
research universities to make a greater contribution towards professional higher 
education (Toens 2009), therefore tilting political-economic coalitions in favour of 
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change rather than continuity. In the Dutch case, instead, the strong professional 
orientation of higher education inherited by the government in the late 1990s contributed 
to cementing an alliance between business, policy-makers and (traditional) universities 
which supported ‘continuity’ in higher education policy as long as the relationship 
between the labour market and the higher education system was concerned.  
Furthermore, the qualitative evidence just presented with reference to the Dutch 
case is consistent with how both Denmark and the Netherlands locate in figure 2.6. 
Indeed, in all four scatter plots both countries featured higher ‘openness’ towards 
external stakeholders than we would have expected given their level of ‘competition’ 
among universities. In light the of the evidence just provided on the Dutch case, a 
possible interpretation could be precisely that the higher education sector is relatively 
more open to external stakeholders on the basis that they do not feel significant pressure 
for change from them. On the basis of the evidence presented in this section, we 
therefore modify the theoretical expectations developed in section 2.3 to make explicit 
that the pressures for change introduced in chapter 1 and hypothesised to unfold as illustrated in this 
chapter do not apply to countries in the bottom-left quadrant. In the latter, a scenario of continuity – 
rather than change – is expected to prevail. 
 
2.5 Setting-up a ‘three cornered fight’: how would I know if I am wrong? 
This chapter sketched out a theoretical framework to understand the alignment of higher 
education systems and knowledge-based labour markets in contemporary advanced 
capitalist countries. By way of conclusion to the chapter, I provide a summary of the 
existing theories presented in section 1.2 and the alternative theory developed in chapter 
2, which I label ‘varieties of high skill formation’. As illustrated by Peter Hall, “[p]rogress 
in social science is ultimately a matter of drawing fine judgments based on a three-
cornered comparison among a theory, its principal rivals, and sets of observations” (Hall 
 86 
2003, 392). Accordingly, this section summarises the observable implications and 
underlying mechanisms of institutional change that the three theories presented in 
chapter 1 (structuralist; ideational; and CPE/VoC) posit and compares them with 
implications and mechanisms of change hypothesised by the alternative theory developed 
in this chapter (named ‘varieties of high skill formation’).  
Two main differences between the proposed alternative theory and the three 
existing theories stand out. Firstly, both ideational and structuralist explanations predict a 
convergence of higher education systems through ‘conversion’ (in the ideational 
approach) or ‘layering’ (in the structuralist approach). The proposed theory, instead, 
predicts that we will see ‘conversion’ or ‘layering’ depending on the incentive set that 
different higher education systems pose on individual universities in the form of strong 
or weak competition; more specifically we expect institutional change to proceed via 
layering where competition is weak and via conversion where competition is strong.  
Secondly, CPE/VoC approaches predict divergence on the basis of weak 
expansion of higher education in CMEs, which are expected to rely instead on vocational 
training, which is complementary to CME-like production regimes, while higher 
education expansion is expected to complement LME-like production regimes. The 
proposed theory – consistently with CPE/VoC approaches – appreciates the importance 
of the education-labour market nexus in leading to different institutional arrangements in 
the realm of education and skills, but it puts forward a case for different arrangements 
within the higher education sector rather than between higher education and vocational 
training, depending on the high skills needs of different knowledge economies. More 
specifically, it is expected that high skill formation will be centred around STEM skills in 
those countries where the knowledge economy relies strongly on the advanced 
manufacturing sector while higher education expansion is expected to be less constrained 
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in terms of disciplines in those countries pursuing knowledge-based growth reliant on 
high-end services.  
By laying out alternative theories and identifying both observable implications / 
outcomes and underlying causal processes, I follow Hall’s conceptualisation of 
“systematic process analysis” (Hall 2003, 391), which is based on the principle of 
examining “the processes unfolding in the cases at hand as well as the outcomes in those 
cases” (Hall 2003, 393). The methodological focus on both processes and outcomes 
reflects advancements in the ontologies underpinning the social sciences, which 
increasingly recognise “political outcomes as the result of causal processes in which 
distant events, sequencing and complex interaction effects play important roles” (Hall 
2003, 398). Such complexity – it is suggested – is more fully appreciated when combining 
observations “not only about the values of the principal causal variables, but also about 
the processes linking these variables to the outcomes” (Hall 2003, 394). Once theories 
are illustrated in both outcomes and processes, alternative predictions can be confronted 
with “observations drawn from data about the world” and can be “shown to be false by 
available data” (Hall 2003, 394), preparing the ground for a ‘three-cornered comparison’ 
between rival theories and empirical observations. Table 2.7 provides a summary of the 
rival theories.  
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Table 2.7. Summary of alternative theories 
Theory Observable implications Underlying mechanism 
Proposed theory 
Varieties of high 
skill formation 
All universities systems adjust to the knowledge 
economy, but providing different skillsets 
depending on type of knowledge economy 
Institutional change encompassing/marginal 
depending on incentive-set faced by universities 
Governments and employers 
demand universities to provide 
high skills according to the 
needs of national knowledge 
economy and institutional 
change is mediated by higher 
education sector 
Existing theories 
Structuralist Horizontal differentiation of higher education 
systems 
Vocationally-oriented higher education located in 
separate tier/institutions 
Convergence via layering/differential growth 
Expansion of universities 
enrolments prompts 
governments to create an 
additional vocationally-oriented 
tier 
Ideational Transformation of higher education systems 
subsumed to market needs 
Universities serving the needs of labour markets 
Convergence via conversion/displacement 
Governments/international 
organisations reform higher 
education sector according to 
‘marketising’ principles 
Institutionalist/VoC Higher education expanding in LMEs 
Higher education suppressed in CMEs, which 
continue to rely on vocational training instead 
Divergence via continued reliance on higher 
education in LMEs and on vocational training in 
CMEs 
Governments respond to 
employer preferences, which 
support expansion of higher 
education in LMEs but not in 
CMEs 
Source: own elaboration 
 
From the next chapter onwards, the discussion moves on to the empirical observations: 
chapter 3 will show how the empirical material underpinning the observations needed to 
‘judge’ between theories has been collected, before moving on to the presentation of 
such empirical material by means of country case studies in chapters 4, 5 and 6. As part 
of the conclusions (chapter 7), the empirical findings will be summarised and discussed in 
light of the alternative theories.  
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3 Methodology 
This chapter provides details on key methodological issues, namely: the criteria used to 
select case studies (section 3.1); the tools that have been employed to collect the data 
(section 3.2); the limitations of the data collection strategy (section 3.3); and how the 
material collected will be presented across the three empirical chapters (section 3.4).   
 
3.1 Case selection 
As has been discussed in the preceding chapters, this thesis seeks to make sense 
theoretically and empirically of the distinct national patterns of high skill formation 
within the convergent trend of skill formation in higher education. Chapter 2 introduced 
a theoretical framework that, as I have argued, can explain the phenomenon of interest. 
In particular, the theoretical framework builds on two crucial variables: the type of 
knowledge economy that is dominant in a given country (as proxied by the share of 
national GVA that the manufacturing sector contributes to) and the degree of 
competition within the higher education sector (as proxied by the share of private 
spending in higher education). Given the theoretical framework is captured by a two-by-
two matrix, I have selected case studies that maximise variation along the two dimensions 
that have been theoretically identified as relevant; that is, I have opted for a ‘diverse’ 
cases design , which has “stronger claims to representativeness than any other small-N 
sample” (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 301).  
 However, a caveat to a ‘pure’ diverse cases design applies: the thesis is primarily 
interested in the study of institutional change. It has been illustrated in section 2.4 that 
continuity is theoretically expected to prevail over change in the countries located in the 
bottom-left quadrant of the bi-dimensional space (i.e. marked in darker shade in figure 
3.1). Through the brief case study of the Netherlands presented in section 2.4, it has also 
been demonstrated that – empirically – continuity indeed prevailed over change. Thus, 
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the selection covers a set of diverse cases drawn from the ‘universe of cases’ in which we 
theoretically expect institutional change to take place (i.e. drawn from the three quadrants 
in lighter shade in figure 3.1).   
 
Figure 3.1. Universe of cases 
 
Source: own calculations based on OECD (2017) and WIOD 
 
The case selection therefore comprises three case studies, which make for a jointly 
exhaustive and mutually exclusive combination of cases for the three quadrants of theoretical 
interest. The selection of cases within each of the three quadrants of interest is performed 
according to a logic of “typological theorising” (Gerring 2008, 253), i.e. it is driven by the 
assumption that “different combinations of variables […] have effects on an outcome 
that vary across types” (Gerring 2008, 253). This is precisely the theoretical expectation 
that was put forward in chapter 2, and that was made explicit in particular in section 2.3. 
Because the quadrants contain groups of cases that are internally homogenous with 
respect to the variables of interest, the choice of cases should target ‘typical’ cases within 
each quadrant (Gerring 2008). Thus, the choice is relatively unproblematic unless a 
AU 
AT 
CAN 
DK 
FI 
DE 
IE 
JP 
KR 
NL 
SE 
UK 
US 
5% 
10% 
15% 
20% 
25% 
30% 
35% 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 
Sh
ar
e 
of
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
 G
V
A
 
Share of  private financing in higher education 
 91 
quadrant contains cases characterised by “suspected diversity” (Gerring 2008, 254), 
which only occurs with respect to the top-left quadrant, where Ireland (usually referred 
to in the literature as a LME) groups together with Western European CMEs. 
Furthermore, in the same quadrant, there are both Continental European and 
Scandinavian CMEs, that have been identified in the literature as different when it comes 
to their education and training systems and broader welfare states (Busemeyer 2009a, 
Busemeyer and Iversen 2014, Esping-Andersen 1990). Thus, selecting a case study from 
the top-left quadrant requires more elaboration (see point 2 below) compared to the 
selection of cases in the bottom-right and top-right quadrants (see points 1 and 3 below, 
respectively). Following this line of reasoning, and paying particular attention to both 
‘typological theorising’ and ‘suspected diversity’, the case selection is performed as 
follows: 
1-  UK: it represents a knowledge economy based on dynamic services with a higher 
education sector characterised by high competition among universities. The UK 
falls within the bottom right quadrant together with the other LMEs and it has 
often been picked out in the CPE literature, and in particular in the comparative 
analysis of education and skills policies, as a typical LME case (Busemeyer and 
Vossiek 2016, Busemeyer 2015, Thelen 2004). More specifically, given that higher 
education policy varies across the UK, the empirical focus is on England. In this 
quadrant, a logic of typological theorising can be applied without particular 
problems: the UK, US, Australia and Canada have all been examined at length as 
cases of ‘academic capitalism’ in which competition among universities has 
increased and has been actively promoted by governments (Slaughter and Leslie 
1997). Furthermore, these countries – with a particular focus on the UK and the 
US – have been identified in the literature as pursuing growth strategies in which 
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high-end services play a prominent role (Hassel and Palier 2017, Ansell and 
Gingrich 2013). 
2-  Germany: it represents a knowledge economy based on advanced 
manufacturing with a higher education sector characterised by limited 
competition among universities. Germany falls in the quadrant of Western 
European CMEs and, as for the UK, it has been invariably picked out in the CPE 
literature as the typical CME (Thelen 2004, Busemeyer 2009a, Busemeyer and 
Vossiek 2016, Busemeyer 2015). It should be noted that while the German 
school system is highly decentralised and each Länder has a high degree of 
autonomy in policy-making, the higher education sector is characterised by 
comparatively larger federal authority, which makes Germany suitable for a 
country case study when it comes to this policy area (Busemeyer 2015, 92). The 
selection of Germany in the top-left quadrant deserves more elaboration, 
however, given that this quadrant features next to Germany and Austria (i.e. 
Continental European CMEs), also an LME (Ireland) and – although not in a 
clear-cut position – two Scandinavian CMEs (Sweden and Finland). The Irish 
case can be ruled out in a relatively unproblematic way: given that the Irish 
growth model has been picked out in the literature as rather sui generis (Brazys and 
Regan 2017, Regan and Brazys 2017 see also section 2.1.), it does not provide 
significant leverage for broader theorising. In picking Germany over Austria or 
either of the Scandinavian CMEs, I select a critical case (Eckstein 1975), in which 
institutional change in the direction of better alignment between higher education 
provision and labour market needs is least expected, i.e. I stack the cards against 
myself (Hancké 2009, 68). Indeed, out of the countries in this quadrant, the 
German higher education system is the one featuring historically strongest self-
governance of academic faculties, making it a least likely case of a higher 
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education system opening up to labour market needs (Clark 1983, Toens 2009, 
Pechar 2012). Furthermore, Germany’s growth strategy is firmly centred on 
advanced manufacturing compared to the relatively more mixed-growth strategies 
found in the Nordic countries and entailing both high-end services and advanced 
manufacturing (Thelen forthcoming, Hassel and Palier 2017). As far as countries 
relying on advanced manufacturing are concerned, the literature stresses 
continued reliance on post-secondary vocational training systems (Anderson and 
Hassel 2013, Ansell and Gingrich 2013), thus providing an additional (higher) 
barrier to change compared to the other countries in the quadrant. By picking a 
critical case in the face of ‘suspected diversity’ within this quadrant, I select the 
case that provides me with greater theoretical leverage. 
3- South Korea: it represents a knowledge economy based on advanced 
manufacturing with a higher education sector characterised by high competition 
among universities. South Korea is picked from the top-right quadrant, where – 
together with Japan - the East-Asian CMEs are located. Although Japan has been 
researched at length to explore this group of countries, scholarly interest in South 
Korea has been prominent over the last decade to illustrate patterns of 
institutional change of East Asian CMEs (Fleckenstein and Lee 2017, 2014), 
making it a suitable choice for a typical case within this quadrant. Indeed, the 
Korean and Japanese higher education systems are comparable in their key 
features, such as the high share of private financing and significant competition 
between public and private universities (Kariya 2011, Kim and Lee 2006), while 
both growth strategies have been identified in the literature as based on advanced 
manufacturing (Hassel and Palier 2017). Thus, in this quadrant as in the case of 
the UK, I can resort to a logic of ‘typological theorising’ without encountering 
particular problems. 
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Furthermore, taken as pairs, the three cases also allow exploiting of most similar and 
most different designs (Yin 2003, Seawright and Gerring 2008) along the two key 
variables that have been identified, thus strengthening confidence in the generalisability 
of the findings, as illustrated in table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1. How case studies pair up in most similar/most different designs 
 Dimension 
Country comparison Type of knowledge economy Competition in higher education 
UK-South Korea Most different Most similar 
Germany-South Korea Most similar Most different 
Source: own elaboration 
 
3.2 Data collection 
The empirical material has been collected using three main sources of information: (i) 
analysis of relevant policy publications and descriptive statistics; (ii) interviews with 
relevant policy stakeholders at the national level; and (iii) interviews at university level. 
The remainder of this section reviews each data source. Firstly, documents issued by 
relevant stakeholders as well as descriptive statistics from these publications have been 
analysed. These include policy publications by university associations, employer 
associations and policy-makers, special Eurobarometer reports focusing on higher 
education as well as newspaper articles. The analysis of these documents and related 
descriptive statistics – part of which has already appeared in chapter 2 – served three 
main purposes: (i) it was used to test the empirical plausibility of the theoretical 
framework (in particular, cross-national descriptive statistics served this purpose); (ii) it 
was used to map the policy landscape in the three countries that were analysed in depth 
(in particular, policy documents served this purpose); and (iii) both descriptive statistics 
and policy documents were used to triangulate (Hancké 2009, 92) the data collected at 
university-level (see later in this section) and test whether they were representative of 
broader national trends.  
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Secondly, ‘national-level’ interviews were conducted with senior representatives 
of university associations, employer associations and policy-makers (e.g. present or past 
civil servants). The role of national-level interviews was twofold: (i) they initially helped 
to test the accuracy of the policy mapping conducted through documents, namely by 
checking with interviewees whether relevant initiatives had not been identified through 
document analysis; and (ii), similarly to the document analysis discussed in the previous 
paragraph, they were subsequently used to triangulate the findings from the interviews at 
the university level and test the extent to which information collected at university level 
was representative of the higher education sector more broadly. This included in some 
instances follow-ups via telephone or email with national level interviewees.  
Thirdly, interviews within universities were carried out to shed light on the 
specific patterns and strategies of skill formation within universities. Given that an 
important part of the theory builds on the assumption that universities’ behaviour 
depends on the institutional context within which they operate, university-level 
interviews were crucial to ensure that the meso-foundations of the theory were either 
confirmed or disproved. Individual universities were selected according to two main 
criteria: (i) location and (ii) type of institution. As far as location is concerned, universities 
have been selected in the capital cities of the three countries, where the economy tends 
to be relatively more reliant on dynamic services, and in regions that are more heavily 
geared towards the manufacturing sector (these regions are not named because, given 
that there are fewer universities compared to the number of universities in capital cities, 
doing so might compromise the anonymity of interviewees). Systematic regional data on 
GVA across the three countries of interest is slightly problematic to collect. To my 
knowledge, the most complete dataset of GVA by sector at regional level is the OECD 
regional dataset, which however lacks data for dynamic services for Germany. 
Nonetheless, combining the OECD regional data with national German statistics, it is 
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observed that the economy of the capital cities’ regions in all three countries has a 
systematically higher share of GVA in the dynamic services and systematically lower in 
manufacturing. The aggregation of sectors is such to make it as compatible as possible 
with the WIOD data used in section 2.2, but some slight variations between the two 
datasets exist due to the different aggregation of economic sectors. Nonetheless, the two 
datasets are by and large consistent in the information that they provide. 
 
Table 3.2. Differences in sectoral GVA between capital cities’ region and country average (2011) 
Country/region Share of manufacturing on 
total GVA 
Share of dynamic services on 
total GVA 
UK 10% 25% 
London region 3% 46% 
Germany 23% 19.5% 
Berlin region 11% 31% 
South Korea 31% 17% 
Seoul region 21% 25% 
Source: own elaboration based on OECD Regional Demography database, except for the share of GVA of 
dynamics services in the Berlin region, which is based on IHK Berlin (2015, 8) and it refers to 2014, and 
the share of dynamic services in Germany, which is based on WIOD 
 
Examining the behaviour of universities embedded in regions with different 
employment configurations is instructive to pick up and control for potential differences 
due to local economic structures. In other words, I take into account the warning that 
‘regional’ varieties of capitalism are potentially relevant alongside national varieties of 
capitalism (Crouch et al. 2004, Crouch et al. 2001, Crouch, Schröder, and Voelzkow 
2009). 
Furthermore, universities were selected to ensure representation of different 
types of institutions. In the UK, the main line of differentiation is between so-called 
‘post-1992’ and ‘pre-1992’ universities. Post-1992 institutions are former polytechnics, 
which have had traditionally close links with the labour market. Although the end of the 
binary system in 1992 abolished the formal boundary between universities and 
polytechnics, and the main line of differentiation is today to be found in the reputation 
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and prestige of individual universities, it is still appropriate to control for the possible 
differences that may exist due to specific historically-rooted ‘institutional traditions’. In 
Germany, the main line of differentiation is between research universities and 
Fachhochschulen, with the latter being roughly similar to the British polytechnics prior to 
1992. In South Korea, the main line of differentiation is between public and private 
institutions, hence both types of institutions have been investigated. Higher education 
institutions across the three countries have been selected only among those institutions 
that provide full degrees at undergraduate and graduate level (hence Korean junior 
colleges, which offer professionally-oriented sub-degree qualifications have not been 
included in the analysis). To control for potential variation across disciplines, 
interviewees (at least two per university) were drawn from the senior management of the 
university (i.e. pro-vice chancellor for teaching and learning and/or other senior 
academics who have (had) managerial positions within the university so as to have an 
overview of educational activities across the institution) and from engineering 
departments. Selecting two interviewees per university allowed a degree of data 
triangulation within institutions. The rationale for selecting engineering was driven by the 
importance assigned to STEM across countries. STEM subjects have been a central 
theme in recent higher education policy (Freeman, Marginson, and Tytler 2014), hence 
engineering, as a chief component of STEM provision, represents a core area of concern 
as far as skill formation for the knowledge economy is concerned.  
In total, 56 interviews have been conducted and a full (anonymous) list of 
interview partners is provided in appendix 1. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide a breakdown of, 
respectively, the interviews carried out and the universities analysed according to key 
characteristics. 
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Table 3.3. Summary data of interviews  
Country Total National University 
UK 20 7 13 
Germany 20 8 12 
South Korea 16 5 11 
Total 56 19 37 
Source: own elaboration 
Table 3.4. Summary data of universities  
Country Universities Capital city Elsewhere Research 
university 
Non-research 
university 
UK 6 3 3 3 3 
Germany 6 2 4 3 3 
South Korea 5 3 2 2 
(private) 
3 
(public) 
Total 17 7 9 8 9 
Source: own elaboration 
 
All interviews were conducted by the author in English, with two exceptions: one 
interview was conducted in German by a colleague of the author (with the author present 
during the interview); the person conducting the interview was briefed in detail prior to 
the interview and she provided a full English transcription upon completion; one 
interview was conducted in Korean with simultaneous translation. All semi-structured 
interviews followed a template that was slightly adjusted to accommodate each country’s 
specificity (see appendix 2 for a sample interview topic guide). Interviewees have been 
identified through universities, associations and governments websites and/or through 
snow-balling via prior interviewees. When approached, each interviewee was provided 
with an information sheet outlining the purpose of the interview, the right of the 
interviewee to withdraw at any time from the research, as well as the anonymity 
conditions and the potential outputs of the research (the information sheet that was sent 
to interviewees is included in appendix 3). When interviews are referenced in the text, 
they have been coded to include whether the interview was conducted in the UK, 
Germany or South Korea (marked as UK, DE and KR respectively) and whether the 
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interviewee is a ‘national-level’ stakeholder or a representative of a university (marked as 
N and U respectively). Thus, for example, reference to an interview conducted in a 
British university would appear as ‘interview UK_U3’ while that of a representative of a 
German university association would appear as ‘interview DE_N3’.  
 
3.3 Limitations of the data collection strategy  
The data collection strategy just presented holds some limitations that should be 
recognised and discussed at the outset. Two in particular stand out. Firstly, this thesis is 
not a study of curricular changes within individual universities and/or degree 
programmes. While occasional references to such changes are made, the data collection 
was geared towards capturing the direction and mechanisms of change in higher 
education policy at national level, since the core concern of this dissertation is to 
document and explain the emergence of national patterns of high skill formation. Thus, 
for the most part, interviewees were asked to identify, comment and explain overarching 
patterns of change at the national level (in the case of ‘national’ interviews) and at the 
institutional level (in the case of ‘university’ interviewees) with a twofold focus: (i) the 
nature of the relationship between governments, business and the higher education 
sector; and (ii) the responses of higher education institutions to the demands posed on 
them by governments and business (see appendix 2 for details on the interview topic 
guide).  
Secondly, the focus on engineering comes with both disadvantages and 
advantages. The clear disadvantage is that the picture emerging from university-level 
interviews in engineering departments might create a bias in the findings, as other 
departments might have different relationships with business and governments or might 
be under a different degree of pressure. To avoid this bias, interviews at department level 
were triangulated with interviews at a ‘higher’ level within the same universities (e.g. 
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deans of studies and equivalent, as outlined in the preceding section). Yet it is still fair to 
say that actors’ preferences and behaviour outside engineering departments could not be 
gauged as systematically. On the other hand, as alluded to in section 3.2, this 
disadvantage is in my view offset by the advantage that STEM subjects are at the heart of 
‘high skill formation’ across countries to the point that contemporary higher education 
policy has been described as ‘the age of STEM’ (Freeman, Marginson, and Tytler 2014).  
 
3.4 Presentation of the empirical material 
As section 3.2 illustrated, the collection of the empirical material for the study has been 
carried out in the same way across the three country case studies, using a mix of national-
level sources (i.e. national descriptive statistics; policy documents; and national-level 
interviews) and university-level sources (i.e. university interviews). However, the 
presentation of the empirical material differs slightly across chapters. In particular, there is 
relatively more reliance on ‘university-level’ evidence in the British chapter compared to 
the German and Korean chapters where, in turn, there is slightly more national-level 
evidence. In practical terms, this means that – while all chapters contain both national- 
and university-level evidence – the British case study focuses more on individual 
universities, while the German and Korean cases focus relatively more on government 
policies. The reason for such partial asymmetry between chapters is entirely empirical. 
Indeed, once the material has been collected, it was found that individual universities 
drove dynamics of institutional change in Britain to a greater extent compared to 
Germany and Korea where, on the contrary, government policy was found to be a 
greater (direct) lever of institutional change. Moreover, the different importance between 
universities and governments as ‘key’ agents is also entirely consistent with the theoretical 
expectations, and in particular with the argumentation developed in sections 2.1 and 2.3 
that governments are more likely to intervene in knowledge economies that rely 
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strategically on advanced manufacturing. Notwithstanding the different weight of 
national- and university- level evidence across chapters, all case studies are organised 
according to the same structure, namely: 
• Each case starts with an introductory section identifying a country-specific empirical 
puzzle upon which the research question answered by each case study is based; 
• The introduction is followed by a background section outlining the policy landscape 
at the national level; 
• Once the relevant policy background has been set out, each chapter provides a 
detailed analysis of the dynamics of institutional change taking place in the higher 
education sector, as far as high skill formation is concerned; 
• In the final sections, I set out country-specific conclusions. 
The empirical investigation focuses primarily on the period from the mid-1990s onwards, 
i.e. when (most) advanced political economies started pursuing patterns of knowledge-
based growth (Hall 2015, 19).   
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4 Britain: competing universities as ‘general skills coordinators’ 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the changes that took place in British higher education over the last 
two decades,10 with the aim to explain the mechanisms that led to a substantive ‘opening 
up’ of universities towards meeting the skills needs of the labour market. In particular, by 
way of approaching the British case, the chapter seeks to explain the following empirical 
observation. In the late 1980s, the Thatcher government launched a programme, 
Enterprise in Higher Education (EHE), which has been defined as the “largest direct 
government intervention ever into the higher education curriculum” (McNair 1995, 3). 
Although the programme was limited in its financial resources, it illustrates a significant 
concern of policy-makers at the time that higher education was not ‘close enough’ to the 
world of work (Whiteley 1995, Burniston, Rodger, and Brass 1999).  
In particular, the government argued that universities were not taking an active 
role in ensuring that their educational provision was sufficiently attuned to labour market 
needs and therefore set up a programme that would provide funding to universities on a 
competitive basis to increase the alignment of their provision with the needs of the 
labour market. The results of the EHE, however, were not particularly satisfactory. The 
evaluation showed that the effects of the initiative did not trigger a significant step 
change, given that curricular reforms only took place in those institutions that received 
funds through the initiative – as opposed to the government’s expectation that a change 
in mentality would travel from funded institutions to non-funded ones – and that it only 
affected a limited number of polytechnics that, during the years of implementation of the 
measure, had become in the meantime universities (Burniston, Rodger, and Brass 1999).  
                                                
 
10 More specifically, as higher education is a devolved policy area, the empirical material 
has been collected with reference to England and interviews were carried out in English 
higher education institutions and with policy-makers and stakeholders operating in the 
English context. 
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Yet, fast forward by approximately 20 years and British universities have come to 
the forefront of the so-called ‘employability agenda’, broadly understood as the 
commitment of universities to provide degree courses that are relevant to the labour 
market and to equip students with a set of professional skills beyond the discipline-
specific knowledge of the degrees. Influential international organisations, such as the 
OECD, cite British universities as an example for other countries of how the higher 
education sector could enhance the employability of their graduates (OECD 2015, 64); 
the UK comes at the top end of a large-scale survey financed by the European 
Commission on the extent of university-business cooperation in curriculum development 
(Davey et al. 2011); and more broadly researchers have discussed how issues around 
employability, labour market relevance of degrees and engagement with employers have 
become crucial for British universities – both research-intensive pre-1992 universities and 
post-1992 universities, i.e. the former polytechnics (Mason, Williams, and Cranmer 2009, 
Cranmer 2006). However, while existing research has shed significant light on the 
normative implications of skill formation in British universities as well as on its impact 
on individual level transitions to the labour market (Boden and Nedeva 2010, Bourner, 
Greener, and Rospigliosi 2011, Brown, Hesketh, and Williams 2004, Brown, Hesketh, 
and Wiliams 2003, Cranmer 2006, Jackson 2012, Morley 2001, Prokou 2008, Sharma 
2013a), the question of why universities engage in these activities still remains unanswered 
and empirically under-specified, thus the specific research question that I seek to answer 
with respect to the British case is the following: why are British universities, accused of 
neglecting the relationship with employers and the labour market in the late 1980s/early 
1990s, today at the forefront of efforts to establish links between higher education and 
the world of work? The question becomes more interesting if coupled with an additional 
piece of information, namely: the recent initiatives that were specifically designed by the 
government to align higher education provision with employers’ needs (namely, 
 104 
Foundation Degrees and more recently Higher Apprenticeships) have been assessed as 
not particularly successful (cf. Greenwood et al. 2008, 36, Russell Group 2015, 3). Why, 
then, do we observe such a marked shift in the direction of ‘skill formation’ in 
universities? 
Based on the theory developed in chapter 2, the UK locates in the bottom-right 
quadrant of the bi-dimensional categorisation as part of a universe of cases broadly 
corresponding to the countries referred to in the CPE literature as LMEs, characterised 
by high competition among universities and the limited weight of the manufacturing 
sector in their knowledge economies, which are in turn heavily geared towards dynamic 
services, as illustrated in figure 4.1.  
 
Figure 4.1. Locating the UK in the bi-dimensional categorisation 
 
 
Source: own calculations based on OECD (2017) and WIOD 
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• Governments cultivate the supply of general high skills 
• Universities act as protagonists or consenters 
• Institutional change proceeds by conversion or displacement 
 
The empirical material broadly corroborates these hypotheses. The evidence collected in 
this chapter allows us to identify a strong link between competition in the higher 
education sector, which manifests itself in the growing concern on the side of universities 
to perform well in rankings and attract fee-paying students, and skill formation in higher 
education, which manifests itself in the growing engagement of universities with the 
employability and skills agenda. In this framework, universities – as hypothesised – have 
used skill formation as a way to stand out in a highly competitive higher education 
market and, thereby, to attract fee-paying students. The pattern of institutional change 
that can be discerned is also, as hypothesised, one of conversion. In particular universities 
have redeployed their degrees to adapt them to a changed socio-economic context, 
namely one in which it became imperative for them to make an explicit effort to equip 
graduates with the skillset required by employers as a way to enhance their institutional 
reputation and boost the prospects of future student recruitment. Thus, the behaviour of 
universities fits squarely with the mechanisms hypothesised in chapter 2, and it also 
conforms to the ‘protagonist’ type.  
A review of government policy, on the other hand, suggests a slight 
reconsideration of the theoretical framework, to the extent that – as will be elaborated 
further in the chapter – while the government has certainly highlighted the growing 
importance of general skills in the context of a knowledge economy based on services 
(Dearing 1997a), it has also promoted policies that go in the direction of ‘specific skills’. 
For example, Foundation Degrees and, in particular, Higher Apprenticeships have been 
introduced by the government with the aim of ‘rebalancing’ the UK economy towards 
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the high-end manufacturing sector (Steedman 2012, 2). As part of this strategy, Higher 
Apprenticeships aim to create high level STEM skills that should respond to the needs of 
particular companies and economic sectors, and foreseeing heavy involvement of 
employers in their design and delivery – thereby suggesting that governments have not 
exclusively aimed at cultivating high general skills. However, employers have largely 
refrained from engaging in these programmes, owing to the dominant type of knowledge 
economy, which relies strongly on general rather than specific skills. This suggests that 
even when governments promote policies to deviate from the dominant growth regimes, 
their implementation will be hampered by limited demand ‘on the ground’. Thus, even in 
the presence of explicit government efforts, the implementation of policies that are not 
aligned with the dominant knowledge-based regime is bound to be rather problematic. 
The evidence that this chapter puts forward is therefore overall supportive of the 
hypotheses developed in chapter 2, while also specifying them further.  
This chapter proceeds according to the following structure: first it outlines the 
(higher education) policy context of the last 20 years (section 4.2); then, evidence at the 
university-level and at the national policy-making level concerning the patterns of change 
in universities is introduced and assessed against the theoretical expectations set out in 
chapter 3 (section 4.3); section 4.5 discusses the limited success of policy initiatives aimed 
at creating specific skills; finally, section 4.6 provides some conclusive thoughts on the 
British case study, with reference to the theoretical expectations and empirical evidence 
collected.  
 
4.2 Context: increasing emphasis on skills in an increasingly marketised higher 
education sector 
Prior to the 1990s the British education and training system found itself in a rather 
peculiar position: compared to Continental European CMEs, its vocational training 
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system was considered highly dysfunctional as it failed to provide the labour market with 
high quality skills, and employers were reluctant to engage in training. Yet, unlike other 
LMEs, such as the US, that compensated the chronic weaknesses of the vocational 
training system through large higher education systems, the UK featured rather low 
enrolments in higher education too (Soskice 1993). After vocational training policy 
represented a terrain of political conflict between trade unions and the Thatcher 
governments in the 1980s, which ultimately led to its breakdown, attempts to revive the 
system in the 1990s did not bring about significant improvements: employers’ 
disengagement with the vocational system has not been reversed (Keep 2014, Keep and 
Mayhew 2010, Keep, Mayhew, and Payne 2006, Gleeson and Keep 2004) and parity of 
esteem with general education was not achieved (Hansen and Vignoles 2005). As 
improving vocational training proved problematic, the mid-1990s saw an increasing focus 
on the higher education sector to ensure an adequate supply of skill to labour market, in 
connection with the increasing importance assigned to knowledge-based economic 
growth (Wilson 2012, 18). 
Indeed, a major piece of policy review carried out in the 1990s on higher 
education policy – the Dearing report – makes the link explicit even in its title: ‘Higher 
Education in the Learning Society’, thus emphasising how high-level skills were deemed 
fundamental in a changing socio-economic landscape. Indeed, the Dearing enquiry, 
initiated (with bipartisan support) in 1996 under a Conservative government and released 
in 1997 under New Labour, set the scene for radical changes in the higher education 
landscape (cf. Shattock 2012, 155-168). Of particular relevance is the strong focus of the 
report on enhancing skill formation in higher education. Indeed, one of the starting 
points of the Dearing report was that “historic boundaries between vocational and 
academic education [are] breaking down, with increasingly active partnerships between 
higher education institutions and the worlds of industry, commerce and public service” 
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(Dearing 1997b, 2). Throughout the report, Dearing tightly links higher education to the 
changing labour market and while rejecting “a purely instrumental approach to higher 
education” (Dearing 1997a, 49), it stresses the key role of higher education for economic 
competitiveness, a section worth citing at some length: 
 
[…] higher education has become central to the economic wellbeing of 
nations and individuals. The qualities of minds that it develops will be 
the qualities that society increasingly needs to function effectively. 
Knowledge is advancing so rapidly that a modern competitive economy 
depends on its ability to generate that knowledge, engage with it and use 
it to effect. Above all the country must enable people, in large numbers 
and throughout life, to equip themselves for a world of work which is 
characterised by change. Our examination of the future of higher 
education must therefore cover the changing context in which it will be 
operating. (Dearing 1997a, 49) 
 
Furthermore, Dearing notes that “high quality, relevant higher education provision will 
be a key factor in attracting and anchoring the operation of global corporations because 
of the research capability of its institutions and the skills and knowledge it can develop in 
the local workforce” (Dearing 1997a, 55). But what are the skills that higher education 
institutions should equip the workforce with? The report points to de-industrialisation as 
a major trend in the British labour market, leading to a substantial expansion of 
employment in the service sector (Dearing 1997a, 56). Reflecting on the skills needs of an 
economy based on services, and as hypothesised in chapter 2, the Dearing report places 
strong emphasis on general skills arguing that higher education is expected “to give 
students the opportunities and skills to work across disciplines and to develop generic or 
transferable skills which are valuable to many contexts” (Dearing 1997a, 59 emphasis 
added). One of the key nine principles laid out in the Summary Report make the general 
skills argument even more explicit by arguing that “learning should be increasingly 
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responsive to employment needs and include the development of general skills, widely 
valued in employment” (Dearing 1997b, 5 emphasis added).   
Interestingly, if we analyse the extent to which degree programmes have been 
‘converted’ to meet the aims set out by Dearing, we note a striking correspondence 
between what government policy demanded and how universities restructured and 
redesigned their programmes. A quote from Universities UK (the association 
representing all British universities) illustrates the commitment of the higher education 
sector to pursuing an agenda that appears to closely match the auspices of the Dearing 
report and, as argued by Universities UK, to even go beyond what Dearing asked: 
 
higher education institutions have been creative in developing a range of 
opportunities for their students that go beyond the proposals in the 
Dearing Report. There have been three broad areas of development. 
First, they have developed a more sophisticated understanding of the 
complexity of the modern workplace and of the needs of employers and 
of graduates in a variety of different work settings […]. Institutions have 
developed a new appreciation of the diversity of attributes that 
contribute to employability […]. This process has been aided by 
increased employer–higher education dialogue, co-operation in curricular 
developments, [and] the articulation of workforce needs beyond lists of 
key skills […]. Second, there has been a wider debate on the nature of 
employability, informed by long-term studies of graduate employment 
and career paths […]. Third, there is growing awareness of the diversity 
of activities within universities and of changes in approaches […]. 
Increasingly, institutions are aware of the need to develop a long-term 
integrating strategy for employability that maximises links with 
employers, [and] embeds employability in the curriculum […] (UUK 
2002, 5-6) 
 
 110 
Admittedly, it may be argued that university associations use these reports mostly for PR 
purposes and that real changes may not necessarily follow from these statements. Yet, 
the description of the activities provided in the association’s publication reflects closely 
the activities implemented by individual universities across the country. Table 4.1 
illustrates the main ‘skill formation measures’ undertaken by six universities in which 
interviews were carried out for this thesis and shows how ‘general skill’ formation has 
been introduced, increased and made explicit across universities. The information 
presented in table 4.1 covers both research-intensive universities (marked as ‘A’) and 
former polytechnics (marked as ‘B’).  
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Table 4.1. A summary of the main initiatives undertaken in the six institutions analysed 
University  Skill formation measure(s) Nature of the measure Year of 
introduction 
Position in 
national ranking 
A1 Employability modules available to all undergraduate 
students, focus on: business and professional skills; 
international awareness. Industrial advisory boards 
traditionally operate across the university 
Employability modules not compulsory (but taken up 
voluntarily by ca. 60% students).  
Advisory boards with limited impact 
2014 
 
‘Always’ 
present 
High 
A2 Interdisciplinary project weeks introduced across the 
department and curricula aligned with the ‘graduate 
attributes’ identified at university level. Industrial 
boards operate across the department. 
Interdisciplinary projects introduced as a way to 
formalise employability activities that were already 
taking place 
Industrial advisory boards incentivised to take a more 
active role, including shifting chair of the board from 
member of faculty to representative of industry 
2012 
 
 
2010 
High 
A3 Skill development modules across all undergraduate 
programmes, focus on: business skills and 
communication. Industrial advisory boards operate in 
the department 
Skills development modules are a key part of the 
‘revisited’ degrees. 
Advisory boards had an important role in the process 
of setting up the ‘revisited’ degrees 
2014 
 
ca. 2000 
High 
B1 Employability modules across all undergraduate 
programmes, focus on: enterprise and 
entrepreneurship, industry certified skills, international 
and social awareness. Industrial panel validate degrees 
across the university 
Each year of the undergraduate degrees students must 
undertake at least one employability project 
All new degrees must show evidence of industrial 
engagement (as well as existing degrees that are 
updated) 
2007 
 
2005 
Medium, previously 
low 
B2 Three key ‘graduate attributes’ embedded in all 
undergraduate courses: digital literacy, enterprising, 
global outlook. Validation panel bringing together 
industrial partners set up across all departments 
Compulsory, with guidelines set out to ensure that 
these are introduced in all degrees 
All new degrees must show evidence of industrial 
engagement (as well as existing degrees that are 
updated) 
2012 
 
ca. 2000 
Low 
B3 Introduction of employability module across all 
undergraduate degrees, focus on management and 
communication skills, but also interpersonal skills. 
Advisory boards formalised to seek employer views on 
new or updated curricula 
Compulsory modules, first two years in particular 
Advisory boards meet every two months and have 
significant impact 
2010 
 
2008 
Low 
Source: own elaboration based on interviews, university websites and documents 
Note: regarding rankings, the Guardian University League Table has been consulted to triangulate the information received by interviewees regarding the ranking of their 
respective universities. To preserve anonymity of institutions, the precise position in the rankings is not provided 
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Yet, neither the Dearing Report nor any concrete reform that followed provided explicit 
regulation to guide universities through such a process of conversion. Then, how did this 
shift happen? In chapter 2 we have hypothesised that highly marketised higher education 
(Shin and Toutkoushian 2011, Marginson 2007) systems provide the incentive set for 
universities to engage in skill formation out of competitive pressures to recruit students 
and gain standing in rankings. Indeed, the UK system is an excellent case to test whether 
the hypothesised link between marketisation of higher education and skill formation in 
universities holds up.  
Such process of marketisation started most prominently in 1997 when the 
Dearing report recommended a change in funding of the higher education system away 
from full reliance on general taxation towards a degree of cost-sharing between 
students/families and the tax-payer (see Shattock 2012, 155-169 for a full overview of 
these developments). In particular, an up-front fee of £1,000 per year was introduced, 
accounting to roughly 25% of the cost of a degree, which was to be shouldered by 
students and their families (Shattock 2012, 155, Dearing 1997b). This approach was 
radically changed by the 2004 Higher Education Act, which introduced from 2006 
variable fees of up to £3,000 to be financed via a government-organised loan system and 
re-paid by graduates on an income-contingent basis.  
In 2010, the Browne Report set the scene for a further radical move towards 
marketisation, by increasing the cap on the fee that universities are allowed to charge to 
£9,000 and, importantly, gradually lifting the cap on the number of students that 
universities can accept to the point that from the academic year 2015/2016 universities 
have been allowed to accept as many students as they want (Shaw 2014, The Economist 
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2017).11 Accordingly, the reliance on universities on private sources grew exponentially: 
in 2000 over 30% of expenditure on tertiary education was drawn from private sources, 
and the figure reached 70% in 2009 (OECD 2012c).  Student fees are particularly 
relevant in this respect as they constitute the bulk of private expenditure, and the main 
overall source of income for universities – standing at an average of around 45% of total 
universities’ funding in the academic year 2014/2015 (UUK 2016)  .  
Contextually, the high degree of autonomy that universities enjoy vis-à-vis the 
government in terms of setting curricula, expanding or down-sizing departments or 
subjects, and the increasingly important and powerful role of university management vis-
à-vis faculty created the conditions for what has been labelled as a ‘real market’ of higher 
education (Shattock 2012, 155) characterised by highly autonomous institutions, run in a 
managerial fashion and competing for fee-paying students. This market-like mechanism 
was further oiled by the proliferation and extensive use of university rankings. Rankings 
are provided by private organisations, such as ‘The Complete University Guide’; ‘Times 
Higher Education Rankings’; or the Guardian’s ‘University League Table’ as well as by the 
government, such as ‘The Destinations of Leavers from Higher Education (DLHE)’, 
which compares employment outcomes of graduates from different institutions and 
disciplines. These have become part and parcel of higher education policy since the late 
1990s in particular across Anglo-Saxon countries and allow students to compare between 
institutions and universities to rate their performance ‘against the competition’ (Altbach 
2012, Hazelkorn 2015, Shin and Toutkoushian 2011, Marginson 2007) . The two features 
just outlined – fees and rankings – sharpened the vertical differentiation of the British 
higher education system, increasing the pressure on universities to stand out by virtue of 
their individual ‘reputation’ (Anderson 2016). Compounding heightened competition 
                                                
 
11 Although it should be noted that regulations on student numbers persist for specific 
disciplines, such as medicine (Hoareau McGrath et al. 2014). 
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driven by student fees, public funds have also been increasingly allocated to British 
universities on a competitive basis. This has been primarily true for research funding 
since the mid-1990s, when the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) and the subsequent 
Research Excellent Framework (REF) were set-up to allocate public research funds to 
higher education institutions by means of competition in terms of research outputs, 
which was seen by policy-makers as the most effective tool to drive up quality of 
research in higher education (Shattock 2012, Palfreyman and Tapper 2009). This trend 
has further expanded at the time of writing of this thesis, as the Teaching Excellence 
Framework (TEF) has been introduced to replicate some of the RAE and REF dynamics 
in the allocation of public funds towards teaching (see OFS 2018 for an overview). 
Importantly, one of the key metrics of the emergent TEF is students’ labour market 
outcomes, which is therefore likely to provide additional incentives for universities to 
focus on those skills that might maximise students’ success in the transition to the labour 
market. However, neither the RAE/REF nor the TEF are of primary relevance for this 
thesis. The former focus on research (rather than teaching and skills) and therefore fall 
outside the main area of interest of this thesis, while the latter was just rolled out at the 
time of writing, hence the empirical material did not cover any of the developments that 
might be associated with the TEF. However, it is nevertheless important to mention 
these initiatives to provide more complete evidence of the highly competitive higher 
education market within which British universities find themselves operating. The next 
section tests whether skill formation in higher education developed as a by-product of 
the increasing competition within the higher education system. 
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4.3 Institutional change through competition: evidence at the university and 
national levels  
We can test the hypothesised link between skill formation and competition in the higher 
education sector by relying first on interview data collected at the university level across 
six universities, and then by triangulating these findings with data drawn from 
comparative cross-national surveys and interviews with stakeholders representing 
organisations operating at the national level, as well as policy publications issued by these 
organisations. 
 
Institutional change in selected universities 
The picture emerging from table 4.2 makes clear that British universities have had an 
increasing concern in tightening their curricula around the ‘employability agenda’ and 
skill formation. The first substantive element that we find is that of the limited pro-active 
role of employers, which are rather found at the ‘receiving end’ of universities’ efforts to 
attune their provision to labour market needs. When asked about the ‘direction’ of the 
relationship between the university and labour market actors, responses from 
interviewees were nearly unanimous across the spectrum: it is the university that 
proactively organises skill formation by stepping up the provision of employability skills 
and engaging with employers, as illustrated by the following quotes, which speak to the 
‘protagonist’ role that universities play, and cover interviewees in both pre- and post- 1992 
institutions:  
 
We know which ones are the top companies that employ [our graduates] 
so we felt that it would be helpful to work with them and they felt it 
would be helpful to work with us to define what are the skills and 
attributes that they should have. And it was the university’s initiative to 
start this relationship. (interview UK_U13) 
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In balanced terms, it is much more us going to employers. We do get 
employers occasionally that ask us to develop a particular course for 
them, but it is probably 80% us and 20% them. (interview UK_ U11). 
 
It was predominantly university-driven. Some of it was employer driven 
where we had an existing relationship but I cannot think of an example 
when a company out of the blue came to us with a new angle. So we 
either went out to actively seek it or we had an existing relationship with 
a company. (interview UK_U5) 
 
In particular, several universities mentioned how they encourage members of staff to 
take a proactive stance in the relationship with industry, for instance by having “people in 
professional body boards” as well as “encourag[ing] people to take non-executive 
directorships” (interview UK_U9) and by having “members of academic staff in every 
area who make it their business to go out and talk to local employers and professional 
bodies and sector skill councils” (interview UK_U11). Thus, the ‘employability’ agenda 
does not seem to affect universities via pressures from employers but rather through the 
metrics that are used to assess universities’ success: 
 
It [the employability agenda] is not predominantly driven by employers. 
We are all very conscious of how we are assessed. The Destination of 
Leavers of Higher Education [DLHE] survey gives you a sense of how 
many students are employed and more importantly how many are 
employed in graduate level jobs. And that’s an annual key performance 
indicator that we report to our board of governors, we analyse internally, 
and we worry about how we refer against our world of competitors. 
(interview UK_U11)  
 
The data collected points in the direction of a joint – and inter-related – effect of two 
main elements as drivers of the skills agenda within universities. Firstly, the need to 
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catch-up or keep-up in university rankings in order to ensure a stable pipeline of future 
student recruitment emerged as a key factor: as employability comes into rankings and 
league tables, universities strived to form those skills that they perceived that employers 
valued highly (e.g. employability skills) and to ensure the relevance of their degrees to 
labour market needs (e.g. by organising and strengthening industrial advisory boards). 
Senior personnel highlighted that the changed framework conditions within which 
universities operate were key in pushing universities towards more skill provision as the 
widespread availability and practice of ranking forced them to show a firm commitment 
towards ensuring graduates’ preparation for the world of work. Thus, the employability 
agenda was used by and large by universities as a way to keep up or catch up in rankings 
and as such ensure that reputation is upheld or improved and in turn keep attracting 
students. Indeed, students’ expectations is the second crucial element, given that 
universities feel that students seek returns on their investments in the form of a graduate 
job and they therefore expect universities to make an explicit link between their 
educational offer and labour market needs. These two factors are reviewed in closer 
detail by drawing on interview data. 
As far as rankings are concerned, the pressures are felt in rather similar terms by 
pre-1992 and post-1992 institutions. A representative of university A3 argued that “the 
university is very sensitive to student feedback, department audits, league tables. These 
factor in employability. It is more visible whether we are delivering or not” (interview 
UK_U6). A colleague from the same institution argued further that even universities that 
sit at the top of rankings feel the pressure from the competition because “a lot is shifting 
[in the] landscape of scrutiny. There are all these measures that start allowing 
comparisons on all of these areas” (interview UK_U5). A representative of university A1 
that is at the very top of most national and international rankings explained their 
engagement with the employability agenda in the following terms: “we attract the best 
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students from around the world [...] We know that we have to enhance the reputation in 
terms of recruiting the best students around the world. We want to make sure we are 
keeping up and preferably ahead” since “rankings 20 years ago didn’t really exist, [and 
now] there is much more benchmarking […] so we need to maintain our position of 
excellence in the rankings” (interview UK_U2). 
The link between the ability to provide students with the right skillset and the 
perceived performance of the university itself was made even more explicit in universities 
that have struggled with their performance indicators. Thus, university B3 decided to 
step up the provision of employability skills when “the university recognised that it was 
not doing as well as other institutions in terms of employment prospects. And that was 
made clear by the DLHE data. Our data were not as good as other universities” 
(interview UK_U13).  
A similar strategic reasoning had been undertaken at university B1. Here, it was 
explained that the management of the university in the early 2000s neglected the 
importance of league tables but that a change of management in 2004 brought about a 
connection between skill formation and performance in rankings: “it was early days of 
the league table movement, there was a denial that league tables were going to be 
important by the previous regime, and so a denial of some of the issues that were there. 
And therefore like any organisation that stood at the bottom of its own league table, 
there was something wrong” (interview UK_U9). Yet, when the new management came 
in, they decided to seek more employer involvement in course design and more practical 
inter-disciplinary skills in course content because “whether you like it or not, the students 
getting graduate-level jobs is one very important outcome from the DLHE survey and 
therefore important in the league tables” (interview UK_ U9). Therefore, the university 
“[…] looked at relevant competitive organisations at that time, we looked at how we 
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needed to be different and to improve in all sorts of directions but we also used league 
tables as well to drive behaviour” (interview UK_ U9) 
Jointly with the pressures stemming from operating in a highly scrutinised and 
comparable sector, student expectations also proved to be a crucial driver. Again, the 
process observed across the spectrum of the universities analysed was rather similar, 
insofar as universities tightly linked issues of student recruitment with the employability 
agenda. However, some universities, mostly the former polytechnics, felt a pressure in 
terms of recruiting enough students, whereas research-intensive universities felt pressures 
in terms of recruiting students of the highest quality. University B3 made clear why 
student recruitment and skill formation are tightly linked:  
 
The driver [for skill formation] is our client-base, by which I mean the 
students. They want more than they did in the past to get a job at the 
conclusion of their studies. To get that job they need a certain set of 
skills, which include the transferable skills. We’ve had to change the way 
we do things to enable them to have this skillset […] students come to 
university now for different reasons than they did 20 or 25 years ago. 
They come to get a job. If we don’t provide that, that means that not 
enough students apply and if we don’t have enough students, then we 
don’t have our funding. That means we go bust. It’s just finance. We are 
a service provider. (interview UK_U12) 
 
Hence, “the university would like to give graduates a set of skills that are useful to 
employers immediately. In order to give our graduates an edge that would make them 
more interesting for employers. And we would be able to improve our key performance 
indicator in terms of employability” (interview UK_ U12). Indeed, the evidence that 
students go into higher education to improve their job prospects is strong given that it is 
indicated as the most important reason to go to university by nearly 80% of the 
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respondents to a study run by the National Union of Students (NUS) and the CBI (CBI 
and NUS 2011, 7). Survey data also shows that employment considerations are key 
concerns for students when deciding to pursue a university degree without significant 
differences across universities of varying ‘prestige’ (i.e. across Russell Group12 and non-
Russell Group universities) and between students of different socio-economic 
backgrounds (Ainley and Weyers 2008), suggesting that all universities are subject to 
similar pressures. 
Furthermore, student expectations towards landing a graduate-level job were 
perceived to be heightened by the increase in fees, hence at university B2, equipping 
students with employability skills was a response to “getting students out into graduate 
level jobs” because “the students themselves want to make sure they have the best 
possible chance when they graduate” (interview UK_U11) especially given that “they are 
now investing a considerable amount of their future borrowing in their courses and [they 
are looking to get] a return on the investment” (interview UK_ U11). Along the same 
lines, a senior representative at university B3 argued that equipping students with the 
right skillset for the world of work is “a moral obligation on the part of the university 
particularly in light of the fees. When the £9,000 fee came in, I think that if a student 
spends £27,000 for a degree, there is an obligation on the side of the university to ensure 
that the student is as fit as possible for the world of work” (interview UK_U13). 
While the pressure from student expectation was softer in more prestigious 
research-intensive universities, the concern with (quality) student recruitment was a key 
element in the curricular changes, as noted by a senior academic in the department: 
“although we were attracting very good students, we wanted to be the place that people 
looked at first. We felt there was room to do something different in terms of careers and 
                                                
 
12 It indicates a group of 17 research-intensive universities that are usually considered as 
the top higher education institutions in Britain. 
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employability” (university UK_U5). An increased focus on employability was therefore 
the response provided by the department at university A3 to the perceived fall in 
reputation:  
 
How would we grow the brand? Probably one of the things in [the 
university management’s] mind is that [university A3] scores very well on 
individual measures for individual faculties but we tended to come a lot 
lower in reputation, so it was something of brand identity (interview 
UK_ U11).   
 
In those universities where changes were most marked, as in universities A3, B1, B2, and 
B3, interviewees assigned a crucial role in the process to the senior management of the 
university or of the department. At university B3, it was made clear that “as with all 
major shifts, it tends to come from [a new] Vice Chancellor, who noticed that the 
university was not doing as well as other universities and the driver really was that we 
were not doing the best for our students” (interview UK_ U13). A particularly strong 
argument on the side of the management to bring about change was to tie curricula 
change with “organisational survival”, hence – as explained by a senior academic and 
current pro-Vice Chancellor for Student Experience in university B1 – the new 
management could convince a part of the faculty that was not ready to undertake 
substantive changes to curricula because: 
 
let’s say the economic position of the university was at risk, that was 
demonstrated, then an argument was made that this [enhancing the 
provision of employability skills and tightening links with the economy] 
was a way to differentiate and stand out at that time, and then [the new 
university management] delivered that, and showed that that was true 
and that also improved the economic prosperity of the university. Then 
the argument was much easier to win. (interview UK_U9) 
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Triangulating this interview finding with survey data on the attitude towards employers 
of higher education professionals in the UK, it emerges rather unequivocally that 
university management is strongly in favour of such a direction, as proxied by figure 4.2, 
which shows the extent to which respondents with different roles within the university 
would favour university programmes that adapt more with labour market needs. 
 
Figure 4.2. Response to the statement ‘Study programmes need to adapt more to labour market 
needs’ by respondent’s role at university 
 
Source: own elaboration based on Gallup (2007) 
 
The preferences of university managers are particularly relevant in the UK context and in 
the broader LMEs context. These higher education systems saw a sharp increase in the 
power of university management vis-à-vis faculties over the last three decades and 
managerial personnel in higher education emerged as a separate professional group from 
academic faculties (Ginsberg 2011, Deem, Hillyard, and Reed 2007, Deem 1998). This 
stands in sharp contrast with the Continental European experience where university 
managers are appointed from academic faculties, they do not display radically different 
preferences from them, and the balance of power between management and academic 
faculties has not radically tilted in favour of the former (Schimank and Lange 2009, this 
point will be picked up again in the German case). Thus, given the high power resources 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 
Management (N=35) 
Academics (N=197) 
Disagree Agree 
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at their disposal, it is plausible that in the British context managers’ preferences translate 
into organisational change as illustrated by the interview data.  
A final element of evidence concerns the type of skills that universities promoted. 
Even where interviewees argued that a specific skill formation measure was inspired by a 
‘search for organisational diversity’, the direction of travel was very similar across 
institutions and very much in line with the hypothesised emphasis on general skills: 
management and business skills, IT literacy and international awareness featured 
prominently across all universities (see table 4.2 for details). Indeed, having established 
that student recruitment, student expectations and position in rankings – which are in 
turn shaped by employment rates of graduates – are key interrelated drivers for 
universities to engage in skill formation, universities have a rather narrow road towards 
the provision of employability skills. In particular, a curious coalition of students and 
employers emerged and was shaped by the common interest in ‘employability’ skills – 
which are demanded by employers and, as a consequence, by students who seek a 
financial return on their investment in higher education. Indeed, the National Union of 
Students (NUS) and the Confederation of British Industry came together to pose a set of 
demands to the university sector regarding skill formation and set out explicitly the key 
skills that universities should enhance in their graduates, which resonate closely with the 
skills that universities have been promoting (as presented in table 4.2), namely: “self-
management, team working, business and customer awareness, problem solving, 
communication, application of numeracy, and application of information technology” 
(CBI and NUS 2011, 13-14). 
Furthermore, the structural composition of the labour market, heavily geared 
towards the service sector, heightened – as hypothesised in the theoretical framework – 
the need for general skills, decreasing the importance of the specific discipline of 
graduates. Particularly enlightening in this respect was the reflection of one of the 
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interviewees who described how in STEM subjects, the university had undertaken a 
process to make the degrees less narrowly focused on technical issues and more focused 
on broad general skills, because “people often think that engineering graduates would go 
into engineering jobs, but that is almost a minority, they are going to many other sectors 
such as consultancy, finance. We have a broad range of people that employ our 
graduates” (interview UK_U5).  
National-level data confirms the interview finding. Indeed, the data on labour 
market destination by economic sector of engineering graduates shows that these are 
more likely to end up working in dynamic services than in manufacturing. To the extent 
that STEM graduates are hired across the economy and to the extent that universities 
seek to equip graduates with the skills needed to succeed in the labour market, it is 
understandable that we also observed a trend towards general skill provision in STEM 
subjects. In other words, the demand side of the economy – as represented by employers 
– in its interaction with universities led to an emphasis on general skills in the 
development of university curricula.  
  
Figure 4.3. Full-time first degree leavers in engineering entering employment in the UK in 
selected sectors (absolute number; 2011/12 to 2014/15) 
 
 
Source: own elaboration based on HESA (2016) 
Note: HESA data is categorised differently compared to the data presented in chapter 2. In this graph, 
manufacturing is the sum of the following categories in the HESA data: Manufacturing Electricity, gas, 
steam and air conditioning supply; while dynamic services is the sum of the following categories: 
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Information and communication; Financial and insurance activities; Professional, scientific and technical 
activities 
 
Thus, competitive pressures from the higher education market by and large led 
universities to convert their curricula towards increasing the provision of skills demanded 
by the labour market. Across institutions we have noted that the main measures 
introduced are considerably similar – even in those universities where interviewees have 
explicitly stated that skill formation measures were introduced to ‘differentiate’ their own 
institution from the competition. Thus, the main line of differentiation that has emerged 
is not so much around what individual institutions offer, but rather how central the skills 
agenda is to the institution. Here, we can identify institutions that did not feel an 
immediate pressure in terms of student recruitment (universities A1 and A2) and that 
only introduced limited changes to ensure that they would not fall behind in terms of 
reputation. On the other hand, radical changes were observed in institution A3, where 
there was a clear concern about the quality of student recruitment, and institutions B1, 
B2, B3 where there was a clear concern of ‘organisational survival’ determined by their 
low position in the ranking and the fear that this would translate into insufficient 
recruitment given the heightened competition in the higher education market.  
 
National-level evidence and data triangulation 
Moving on from university-level evidence to national-level evidence, we start by noting 
that the increase in fees – arguably, the main indicator of increasing marketisation of the 
sector (cf. Clark 1983, 162) – has had an impact on both students and universities 
according to stakeholders working for policy organisations in the higher education sector. 
As argued by a representative of a UK university association:  
 
126 
 
 
in the past some of the levers […] resembled ‘bribery’ – paying 
universities to do certain things [such as the EHE] – […] now in the 
context of austerity, the scope for the government to throw money at 
universities is very limited and it is much more a dynamic of, well, the 
students are paying this money, you universities should be doing it 
anyways. (interview UK_N1)  
 
Along the same lines, a representative of a think-tank promoting dialogue between 
universities and businesses and former representative of one of the largest UK student 
unions argued that:  
 
the main driver behind this change [the employability agenda in 
universities] can be thought of as the growing number of students who, 
in the context of increasing cost and risk of the investment in higher 
education, are more concerned with employability and labour market 
outcomes. (interview UK_N6)  
 
The interviews with representatives from associations, that have a view on the entire 
sector, are therefore in line with the evidence collected at the university level. Cross-
national datasets provide further confirmation that universities in Britain are under 
strong pressure from students to equip them with skills needed in the labour market – as 
perceived by interviewees. Figure 4.4 shows that university students in Britain are among 
those in Europe who more strongly favour the presence from private enterprises in 
higher education management, curricula design and funding (as a proxy for attitudes 
towards employability and labour market relevance of degrees). Furthermore, plotting the 
extent to which students would welcome more involvement of companies in higher 
education against the extent of private funds in higher education, which is largely driven 
by student fees, we find a positive relationship between the two measures (R-squared = 
0.41), as assumed by interviewees at both university- and national- level.  
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Figure 4.4. Relationship between student preferences for firms’ involvement in university 
education and share of private financing  
 
Source: own elaboration based on OECD (2017) and Gallup (2009)  
Note: the figure plots the share of private funds in tertiary education systems against the percentage of 
students who ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ with the statement: ‘enterprises should be more involved in higher 
education management, curricula design and funding’ 
 
 
A clear interpretation of this figure is provided by one of the interviewees at national 
level who argued that: 
 
fuelled by the fact that students are paying handsomely for their higher 
education, […] there is a high level of interest in ensuring that the 
qualifications which are being studied at university are relevant to, and 
therefore incorporate content from, industry and business. (interview 
UK_N6).  
 
Furthermore, next to the increased ‘cost’ of a university education, the array of tools by 
which students can make an informed choice has increased since the late 1990s as 
highlighted by several interviewees at university-level. The DLHE survey stood out as a 
particularly important component in the ranking domain as it maps graduate employment 
outcomes six months after graduation and it is used by major national league tables to 
produce an employability indicator for universities.  
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Indeed, the extent to which students choose universities on the basis of their 
reputation is in the UK the highest among Western European countries as figure 4.5 
illustrates. Yet, reputation also appears to be under constant scrutiny, as interviewees 
across all the institutions discussed. Indeed, British students are not only more likely than 
their European peers to take ‘reputation’ into account, but they are also more likely to 
rely on rankings as a way to inform their choice of university, as indicated in figure 4.6. 
 
Figure 4.5. The importance of university reputation for students’ choice 
 
Source: own elaboration based on Gallup (2009)  
Note: the figure shows the percentage of students who ‘strongly agree’ with the statement: ‘students 
choose where to study on the basis of the quality/reputation of the institution and its study programmes’ 
 
Figure 4.6. The importance of university rankings for students’ choice  
 
Source: own elaboration based on Gallup (2009)  
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Note: the figure shows the percentage of students who ‘strongly agree’ with the statement: ‘performance 
rankings of universities and programmes would help students to choose where to study’ 
 
 
Finally, ‘importance of reputation’ and ‘reliance on rankings’ correlate (R-squared = 
0.35), confirming that rankings come into the equation when students consider the 
reputation of the university, which also gives a plausible explanation as to why 
universities that are commonly considered as ‘more prestigious’ could not be fully 
insulated from the employability agenda, but were rather pushed to engage with it, 
although admittedly in a less systematic and profound way than their counterparts who 
struggle in the rankings. Hence, despite ‘research-intensive’ universities being often 
considered in the literature as immune from competitive pressures due to their ‘high 
status’ (cf. Marginson 2006), the evidence collected suggests that these institutions are 
also very much aware of and influenced by competitive pressures, as highlighted from 
findings at the university-level.  
 
Figure 4.7. Relationship between ranking and reputation 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration based on Gallup (2009) 
Note: the figure plots the percentage of students who ‘strongly agree’ with the statement: ‘students choose 
where to study on the basis of the quality/reputation of the institution and its study programmes’ against 
the percentage of students who ‘strongly agree’ with the statement: ‘performance rankings of universities 
and programmes would help students to choose where to study’ 
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4.4 The constrained development of specific skills in higher education: a bird’s 
eye view on Foundation Degrees and Higher Apprenticeships 
Yet, successive governments – next to a profound marketisation of the higher education 
sector (Shattock 2012) – also promoted policies that specifically incentivised skill 
formation in STEM areas. Both the New Labour and the Coalition governments sought 
to involve employers directly in the design and delivery of programmes with a strong 
component of work-based learning and aimed at forming high specific skills. Foundation 
Degrees and Higher Apprenticeships were assigned this task by the New Labour and the 
Coalition government respectively. Higher Apprenticeships in particular have been 
initiated with the aim of providing STEM skills to rebalance the UK economy towards 
manufacturing. Yet, as the remainder of this section discusses, neither initiatives have 
developed in such a way that suggests strong demand for specific skills on the side of 
employers (as hypothesised in a knowledge economy strongly reliant on dynamic 
services), while universities have engaged with these initiatives (confirming the 
responsiveness of the higher education sector towards external demands). 
Foundation Degrees are sub-degree level qualifications “designed and delivered 
to equip people with the relevant knowledge and skills for business” (UKCES 2013, 15). 
They were introduced as a flagship policy by New Labour in 2000 upon recommendation 
of the Dearing Report to meet “intermediate skills needs across all sectors of the 
economy” (HEFCE 2000, 6) and satisfy employers’ demand “for higher technical and 
associate professional skills” (HEFCE 2000, 6). Thus, from the perspective of the 
government, Foundation Degrees were expected to fill a traditional gap of the British 
skill formation system, namely that of technical specific skills by tasking employers in 
cooperation with the HE sector to provide these skills (DfEE 2003, 36). In 2003, the 
Labour government created a quango, Foundation Degree Forward (FDF), which was 
funded by HEFCE, and it was assigned the objective of developing “innovative 
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approaches to the creation of [Foundation Degrees]” and to “stimulate, support and 
sustain employer partnerships with higher education in order to meet the demands of 
workforce development, business improvement and the knowledge economy” (FDF 
2009). Foundation Degrees had a smooth start, with the Government achieving – in fact 
exceeding – the target of 100,000 Foundation Degrees learners by the academic year 
2010/2011. Partly because of the very low initial base, Foundation Degrees have been in 
the first decade of the 21st century the fastest growing segment of higher education 
provision in England (Harvey 2009). However, the steady growth of Foundation Degrees 
does not tell us much about the impact of Foundation Degrees on the pattern of skill 
formation in British higher education. To what extent have Foundation Degrees actually 
met the need for higher level skills – to paraphrase the emphatic title of the 2003 
government paper ‘Foundation degrees: Meeting the need for higher level skill’? While 
the evidence for their (initial) quantitative growth is unambiguous, the evidence on the 
qualitative developments of Foundation Degrees points to a mixed picture. Already in 
the early days of the Foundation Degrees, the extent to which employers would be keen 
to participate in the design and delivery of Foundation Degrees had been questioned. For 
instance, a witness to the House of Lords inquiry into the expansion of higher education 
stated that: 
 
foundation degrees are developing rather well in the face of some of the 
scepticism which is apparent about them in some quarters. I think that 
the real issue is engaging employers with foundation degrees. They have 
an absolute right to be involved in the design of the curriculum for 
foundation degrees and we have found the engagement of employers 
really rather patchy. (House of Commons 2003, paragraph 91) 
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More structured evidence produced in 2008, i.e. after seven years Foundation Degrees 
had been introduced, found that employer engagement in Foundation Degrees – which 
was the crucial element of the policy initiative – was “very variable” and that some 
employers “had been actively engaged, but for the majority such engagement was passive, 
and for a minority, it had been minimal’ (Greenwood et al. 2008, 53). The evaluation 
report goes on to find that it has been the higher education sector ‘going out’ and trying 
to engage with employers, rather than employers actively taking steps to engage with the 
higher education sector in skill formation (Greenwood et al. 2008, 33). Along the same 
lines, a review of the literature produced on Foundation Degrees from their 
establishment until 2009 concludes with respect to employer engagement that “lack of 
understanding of [Foundation Degrees] amongst employers is a major challenge for 
institutions attempting to develop partnerships with employers” and that “real and 
perceived time constraints are major inhibiting factors for employer involvement in the 
design and delivery of [Foundation Degree] programmes” (Harvey 2009, 36). Thus, the 
lack of employer engagement in Foundation Degrees, that has been defined as employers 
pushing back the task to universities (Colombo 2011, 107), confirms the direction of the 
relationship between universities and employers, which is strongly driven by the former 
while the latter play a far more passive role. Such a relationship – actively pursued by 
universities and rather passively consented by employers – is amplified by the importance 
of general over specific skills, which provides a strong incentive for employers to take a 
step back given that general skills do not require strong employer involvement, while 
universities face the opposite set of incentives, namely to satisfy the needs of the labour 
market. Supporting this line of reasoning, a survey by the University Alliance, an 
association representing former polytechnics, found that “the burden of funding 
employer engagement activities largely fell on the university” (University Alliance 2015, 
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11) leaving the university-employer partnership substantially imbalanced towards 
universities (Colombo 2011, Reeve and Gallacher 2005). 
The policy emphasis around Foundation Degrees vanished with the Coalition 
government taking office in 2010 and switching the focus onto Higher Apprenticeships, 
which can be thought of as a more focused version of Foundation Degrees, requiring 
deeper employer involvement. In other words, Higher Apprenticeships set the 
framework for fully-fledged apprenticeships located in the HE sector, where the learner 
has the double role of student and employee. Higher Apprenticeships are expected to 
provide qualifications at level 4 (i.e. that of a Foundation Degree) or higher (i.e. at 
undergraduate honours level and above) and they have been specifically developed with a 
view to involving employers in high level STEM skills to be deployed as a recalibration of 
the UK economy towards high-end manufacturing (Steedman 2012, University Alliance 
2015). The development of Higher Apprenticeships is difficult to assess as of yet, since 
they have been introduced only recently. However, to date, Higher Apprenticeships have 
been faced with one of the key issues that affected Foundation Degrees as well, namely 
the extent to which employers are willing to take the lead in providing high specific skills 
in conjunction with higher education institutions. The lack of employer engagement 
outlined with respect to Foundation Degrees had not prevented the ‘quantitative’ 
development of Foundation Degrees because employer engagement was a clear policy 
objective openly sought by the government, but not a necessary condition for 
Foundation Degrees to be implemented. However, in the case of Higher 
Apprenticeships, employer engagement is crucial because of the double status of the 
learner (i.e. student and apprentice/employee) and therefore, without direct demand and 
commitment from employers, Higher Apprenticeships cannot start.  
According to government data, the demand for Higher Apprenticeships does not 
seem to be particularly strong. Figures from the academic year 2014/2015 show that 
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19,800 Higher Apprenticeships have started. This represents 4% of all apprenticeship 
starts, which is a significant increase from the previous year, when Higher 
Apprenticeships represented 2% of all apprenticeship starts. Yet, a closer inspection 
shows how Higher Apprenticeships do not seem to be used by employers as an initial 
form of training, but they rather appear as a form of up-skilling/continuous training of 
their current workforce, given that over 14,000 of the Higher Apprenticeships starts are 
for people aged 25+ (DfE, SFA, and ESFA 2017). In addition, as predicted given the 
structural composition of the British economy, the evidence from individual employers 
and their associations shows that the appetite for Higher Apprenticeships is limited to a 
small fraction of British businesses. Traditionally, small businesses have not had 
extensive engagement with the skills system and their quest for high skills has translated 
into routes to access graduate skills easily and cheaply. Thus, instead of engaging 
extensively with the higher education institutions in design and delivery of degree 
programmes, as would be required in the framework of a Higher Apprenticeship, small 
businesses have mostly campaigned for the government to ring-fence the public 
investment into a scheme called the ‘Talent Pool’. This provided government-sponsored 
internships for recent graduates and was almost exclusively used by small businesses 
(House of Commons 2011, 60 - 61, FSB 2011). Similarly, employers (large and small) in 
the low-end services have voiced their satisfaction with lower-level apprenticeships (e.g. 
level 2), i.e. restrictive apprenticeships that provide support to basic literacy and numeracy 
skills and are mostly focused on the work-related component as opposed to the 
educational part (Fuller and Unwin 2003), and therefore do not need to engage with the 
HE sector in higher education skill formation. Support for Higher Apprenticeships was 
therefore mostly confined within a few large employers located in high-tech industries 
that expressed their support for vocational programmes co-designed and co-delivered by 
employers and higher education institutions (House of Commons 2012), that nonetheless 
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has been mostly used so far to up-skill existing workforce rather than to train and employ 
secondary school leavers. Again, comparing employers’ and universities’ reactions is quite 
striking: while employers have been rather ambivalent and only a minority expressed 
their willingness to engage in these programmes, the higher education sector has 
responded positively across the board. It is significant to note that even Russell Group 
universities, i.e. research-intensive universities, stated their availability to engage in the 
development of Higher Apprenticeships, while noting how they perceived weak 
employer demand as a key limitation that Higher Apprenticeships are faced with (Russell 
Group 2015, 3).  
This positioning of actors towards Foundation Degrees and Higher 
Apprenticeships provides a stark comparison with the German case, highlighting how 
demand for high skills and universities’ incentives to satisfy governments and employers 
demands played out in the two countries in exactly the opposite way, as the theoretical 
framework hypothesised. In the British case, universities (including research-intensive 
universities) have expressed their willingness to engage with employers in the provision 
of STEM skills, which, however, did not develop to a significant extent due to the 
demand for these skills being limited to a minority of British employers (Cruickshank 
2016). In the German case, as the next chapter will illustrate in detail, the business sector 
demanded more engagement with the higher education sector, but these demands have 
been met with a lukewarm reaction – if not open opposition – from (research) 
universities, paving the way to a strategy of layering whereby both employers and 
governments had to look ‘beyond’ research universities to meet their high skills needs 
and found a suitable partner in universities of applied sciences, triggering a process of 
layering and differential growth.  
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4.5 Conclusion: back to theory and final remarks 
While there is widespread agreement that higher education systems across countries are 
subject to increasing pressures from employers and policy-makers to become more 
instrumental to labour market needs, the processes by which this alignment occurs 
remain underspecified. This chapter provided a case study to understand this process by 
focusing on the UK, which exemplifies a broader set of cases which share two key 
features: (i) a knowledge economy where services are predominant compared to 
manufacturing and (ii) a higher education sector in which competition among universities 
(for students, funds, reputation) is a defining feature. The UK represents therefore a 
broader set of cases that share these characteristics, which are commonly referred to in 
the literature as LMEs.  
The findings from this chapter broadly support the theoretical framework developed 
in chapter 3 by suggesting that the alignment between labour market needs and 
educational provision in universities is strongly mediated by the competitive environment 
within which higher education institutions have been operating in the UK since, in 
particular, the late 1990s. As far as ‘organisational survival’ rests upon the recruitment of 
fee-paying students and performance in league tables, universities emerged as 
‘protagonists’ in the development of the skills agenda driven by a strategic choice to 
formulate an appealing educational offer to current and future students. As such, 
employability skills have been introduced in most universities and made explicit in 
curriculum design and development, and the advisory role of industrial partners has often 
been strengthened. The changes applied by universities to their degrees – therefore – 
conform to the notion of conversion as illustrated in table 2.5, namely the redeployment 
of existing institutions to new purposes, identified in the increasing importance of 
equipping graduates with a set of skills sought by employers, with changing contextual 
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conditions (namely: an increasing competition in the higher education sector) providing 
the underpinnings for such restructuring. 
Moreover, the chapter also highlights how the demand side of the economy 
‘constrains’ higher education policy. The dominant knowledge-based regime – based on 
high-end services – meant that interaction between universities and employers in high-
end services led to a prioritisation of ‘general skills’ even in those subject and disciplines 
(such as STEM) where sector-specific technical knowledge used to be explicit. The 
constraints posed by the demand side of the economy emerged even more clearly in the 
case of Foundation Degrees and Higher Apprenticeships whose development was – at 
best – patchy due to weak demand of high specific and technical skills on the side of 
employers.  
More broadly, this chapter points to the role of universities and their institutional 
contexts as a key variable to understand the formation of high skills in post-industrial 
societies. In particular, the analysis of universities’ engagement in skill formation in the 
British context uncovers a curious collective-action dynamics taking place in liberal 
higher education systems that goes in the opposite direction compared to the well-known 
‘free-riding’ problem of firms as far as skill formation is concerned in the liberal labour 
market. While in a liberal labour market, firms refrain from training because of the risks of 
poaching associated with it (Finegold and Soskice 1988, Soskice 1993), in a liberal higher 
education market, universities engage in training as a way to boost their student 
recruitment prospects. In a way, we can characterise universities in a liberal higher 
education system as ‘general’ skills coordinators – triggered by the pressures of a highly 
competitive higher education market. 
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5 Germany: failed conversion and the layering of high skills 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter analyses the processes of institutional change that took place in the German 
higher education system over the last two decades with respect to its relationship with 
the labour market. The empirical observation that this chapter starts from – and seeks to 
explain – is the substantive alignment of higher education with labour market needs, 
which has primarily occurred via three routes: firstly, the government financed an 
increased supply of study places in those subjects that are high in demand from 
employers (by and large the STEM subjects); secondly, enrolments have increased in 
those institutions that have traditionally been closer to labour market needs, namely 
Fachhochschulen (or universities of applied sciences) vis-à-vis traditional research 
universities; thirdly, we also observe an expansion of dual study programmes, i.e. 
university degrees that combine theory (at a university or, more commonly, at a 
university of applied science) and practice (with substantive elements of work experience 
in a firm, which also finances the programme). Why did this alignment between higher 
education and the labour market take place? 
At the outset, these developments are puzzling from the perspective of a higher 
education system that has been traditionally considered by comparative standards as 
‘distant’ from labour market concerns and skill formation even in those disciplines, such 
as engineering, that tend to be more oriented towards practice (cf. Kivinen and Nurmi 
2003). Indeed, the skills needed in the labour market have been traditionally provided by 
the VET system, and to a rather limited extent by universities of applied sciences. The 
latter have been historically overshadowed by traditional research universities, which 
have been for a long time the dominant actor in the higher education system – both in 
terms of political power and in terms of share of students enrolled (Witte 2006, Witte, 
Van der Wende, and Huisman 2008, Toens 2009). The strict distinction between VET 
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and higher education, which has been referred to as “educational schism” (Baethge 
2006), also contributed to keeping the university system relatively limited in size (Powell 
and Solga 2011) and strongly guarded by an academic oligarchy who took a certain pride 
in keeping higher education apart from labour market needs (Pechar 2012, Clark 1983). 
How can we then explain this shift? 
Based on the two main dimensions identified in chapter 3, Germany locates in 
the top-left quadrant of the bi-dimensional categorisation as part of a universe of cases 
broadly corresponding to the Continental European CMEs (see figure 5.1). 
 
Figure 5.1. Locating Germany in the bi-dimensional categorisation 
 
Source: own calculations based on OECD (2017) and WIOD 
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• Universities act as antagonists 
• Institutional change proceeds by layering/drift 
The empirical data presented in the chapter lends support to the hypothesised trajectories 
and mechanisms of institutional change. In particular, I identify two main phases of 
institutional change, introduced as ‘de-differentiation’ (which took the form of 
‘attempted’ conversion) and ‘re-differentiation’ (which proceeded by layering and differential 
growth). In analysing the processes of change, it is highlighted how the critical juncture of 
the Bologna process offered a unique window of opportunity to ‘open up’ to the 
demands of external stakeholders (governments, employers) a system traditionally 
dominated by the academic oligarchy (Witte 2006, van Santen 2014, Pechar 2012). Most 
prominently, ideational explanations – as introduced in the first chapter – have singled 
out ‘Bologna’ as an example of neoliberal convergence of European higher education 
systems driven by the political agency of the European institutions (notably, the 
European Commission).  
However, the exogenous shock of Bologna does not provide us with sufficient 
analytical leverage to make sense of the overall move of the university system towards 
the labour market. Rather, it is argued that to account for the change, we need to focus 
on the “subterranean political process” (Hacker 2005, 243) and its implications for 
gradual, yet transformative, reconfigurations of existing institutional arrangements (cf. 
Mahoney and Thelen 2009, Streeck and Thelen 2005). A preview of the argument put 
forward by the chapter runs as follows: the ‘de-differentiating’ process triggered by 
Bologna aimed at establishing a bachelor degree across traditional universities and 
universities of applied sciences with equal footing on the labour market and characterised 
by a balance between discipline-specific skills and employability/professional skills. This 
change was strongly supported by policy-makers and employers, and it foresaw the 
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bachelor degree as the main entry point into the labour market (cf. van Santen 2014, Ertl 
2013, BMBF 2007, BDA 2004, 2009, 2003). Yet, this de-differentiating process fell short 
of its initial objectives, to the extent that (research) universities successfully resisted 
government’s and employers’ ‘call to employability’ and defended their distinct 
organisational field and status within the higher education sector – characterised by the 
pre-eminence of research and knowledge over teaching and skills and by a degree of 
distance from the demands of external stakeholders. The veto-playing role on the side of 
universities is therefore in line with the hypothesised ‘antagonist’ role, preventing 
institutional change from being encompassing. This can be thought of as an attempt of 
conversion, i.e. the process of redeploying existing institutions to new purposes (Streeck 
and Thelen 2005, 31) that we have seen occurring in the British case, that reached its 
results only to a limited extent. 
Rather, other forms of institutional change following the attempted conversion 
led to a new settlement in skill formation in higher education. Institutional change has 
mostly proceeded by layering, i.e. the process of attaching new elements to existing 
institutions (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 31), through the introduction of the Higher 
Education Pact, a government policy established in 2007, which spurred a process of 
‘differential growth’ (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 31) of those institutions and skills profiles 
that were deemed high in demand in the labour market, i.e. universities of applied 
sciences and STEM subjects respectively. Employers also played a part in the process of 
layering by stepping up the provision of dual study programmes. In both the 
establishment of the Higher Education Pact and the growth of dual study programmes, 
universities of applied sciences emerged as the ideal partners for policy-makers and 
employers in a process that led to a re-differentiation of the higher education landscape in 
the country. The expansion of teaching has been primarily located in universities of 
applied sciences, while research funding concentrated in (selected) research universities 
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through the Excellence Initiative, a research-focused government policy that has been 
running roughly in parallel to the Higher Education Pact. The process of layering 
focused on STEM provides two key insights that speak directly to the theoretical 
framework put forward in chapter 2. Firstly, it highlights the importance of high specific 
skills in manufacturing-heavy knowledge economies; secondly, it also shows how 
institutional change is likely to proceed at the margins if the policy context is populated 
by veto-players.  
The chapter is organised as follows: the next section discusses the policy context, 
focusing on the pressures that had been mounting on the higher education system, which 
intensified in particular in the 1990s (section 5.2); the following sections illustrate the two 
phases of institutional change, i.e. the de-differentiating and re-differentiating phases 
(sections 5.3 and 5.4 respectively); section 5.5 concludes the chapter by bringing together 
its main insights.  
 
5.2 Context: mounting pressures on the higher education system  
The German education system at large has been traditionally characterised by a schism 
between vocational training and higher education (Baethge 2006), as radically different 
normative assumptions and organisational logics underpinned the two sectors. The 
“normative reference for the curricula” was that of “economic demand for 
qualifications” in the vocational training sector as opposed to that of “representative 
systematic knowledge in academic disciplines” in higher education (Baethge and Wolter 
2015, 100). These normative assumptions translated into distinct organisational logics: 
social partnership underpins vocational training, while academic self-governance 
dominates the higher education sector (Baethge and Wolter 2015, Graf 2013).  
Such a strong divide should be treated with some caution, as for instance 
exemplified by the establishment of universities of applied science in 1969 which do not 
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fit neatly in either category. Yet, the notion of ‘educational schism’ has the merit of 
capturing the broad picture that had characterised the German system until the early 
1990s, not least because the higher education sector has been traditionally limited in size, 
and the universities of applied sciences had traditionally constituted a minority within an 
already ‘small’ sector. In other words, research universities have firmly represented the 
‘centre of gravity’ of an ‘elite’ higher education system (Ansell 2012, 2008), as illustrated 
already in section 2.5.  
Vocational training delivered primarily through the dual apprenticeship system 
was on the other hand traditionally at the centre of the German skill formation providing 
the vast majority of skilled labour to the labour market. The role of intermediary 
organisations (notably Chambers of Commerce, Trade Unions) is the key feature of this 
model ensuring that curricula are broad enough to deliver predominantly industry- (as 
opposed to firm-) specific skills (Culpepper 2001, 2003): encompassing employer 
organisations ensure firms against the risk of poaching (Soskice 1994), industrial relations 
institutions work as “beneficial constraints” pushing German firms towards a high skill 
equilibrium characterised by “diversified quality production” (Streeck 1997a, 1991); and 
an authoritative certification process ensures the industry-wide applicability and 
recognition of the vocational qualifications (Busemeyer 2009a). Contrary to the repeated 
failures of training policy in Britain outlined in section 4.2, the German vocational system 
has traditionally had high social recognition and it has been an attractive option upon 
completion of secondary school also for high achieving pupils, while successfully 
integrating low achievers in the labour market (Iversen 2005). Its success and complex 
underpinning of institutional arrangements led to the dual system being regarded as an 
equilibrium where key actors (firms, unions as well as individual learners) had no 
incentive to change (Soskice 1994). Indeed, Powell and Solga (2011) argue that it is 
precisely the high societal esteem around the German vocational training system which 
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has traditionally limited the expansion of higher education. To give an example of the 
quantitative relationship between the two sectors, in 1985 the number of new entrants in 
the VET system was approximately three times higher than the number of entrants in the 
HE system – roughly, 600,000 and 200,000 students respectively (Baethge and Wolter 
2015, 99). Thus, until the late 1980s skill formation was firmly located at the secondary 
level.  
Yet, this traditional configuration of the relationship between vocational training 
and higher education muted profoundly in recent years. From the 1990s in particular, the 
number of new entrants into the apprenticeship system has been decreasing, while the 
numbers of new entrants in higher education have been constantly and steeply on the 
rise. Baethge and Wolter (2015, 98) argue that “[t]he preliminary end of this development 
was reached in 2011/2012 when there was an equal number of entrants in both sectors”. 
To capture this trend, it is instructive to contrast the ‘size’ of the higher education system 
with that of the apprenticeship system in terms of total number of students and new 
entrants (see figure 5.2).  
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Figure 5.2. New entrants and total number of students in the dual system and in higher education 
in Germany 
 
 
 
Dual system 
 Higher education 
New entrants Total number 
  
Source: own calculations based on Statistisches Bundesamt 
 
Indeed in recent years, by some measures, entry rates to university in Germany have been 
higher than in the UK, which is traditionally associated with a mass university system (see 
e.g. Ansell 2010), as shown in figure 5.3.  
 
Figure 5.3. Entry rates into higher education of students under the typical age of entry, adjusted 
from international students in 2012 (ISCED 5A) 
 
Source: OECD (2014) 
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Hence, in Germany as in most affluent countries, universities are today the primary locus 
of skill formation for young people before they enter the labour market (Warhurst 2008). 
This trend is captured in figure 5.4, which shows the percentage change of young 
employees between 2000 and 2013 by highest educational attainment. 
 
Figure 5.4. Percentage change in the number of 25-29 year-old employees between 2000 and 2013 
by highest educational attainment 
 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat 
 
The stark expansion of higher education vis-à-vis vocational training has been ascribed to 
two simultaneous trends: (i) increasing ‘credentialism’ on the side of young people and 
their families and (ii) the changing composition of the labour market, which relies 
increasingly on higher-level skills (Baethge and Wolter 2015, Graf 2017, Fleckenstein, 
Saunders, and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011, Oesch 2013, Oesch and Rodríguez Menés 2010). 
Baethge and Wolter show in particular that the long-term trends in Germany’s secondary 
education system fuelled the expansion of enrolments at the tertiary level:  
 
There has been a dramatic change in the educational decisions 
determining the allocation of pupils across the different school types 
within the secondary school system. In the early 1950s the share of 
pupils transferring from the primary to the lower secondary school […] 
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amounted to more than 75% nationwide; this proportion decreased 
continuously to less than 12 % in 2012 […] the participation rate in the 
grammar school track (at grade 5 or 7) leading to the entitlement 
necessary to access higher education has expanded in the same period 
from 15 % to more than 40 %. (Baethge and Wolter 2015, 103) 
 
This trend in secondary schooling had an asymmetric effect on the distribution of 
students between vocational training and higher education as it triggered a massive 
expansion of potential demand for higher education while shrinking potential demand 
for the dual system (Baethge and Wolter 2015, 104). Secular macro-sociological trends 
played a prime part in this development as “the allocation processes between alternative 
school types seems to be the increasing level of educational awareness, aspirations and 
ambitions in wider parts of the population” (Baethge and Wolter 2015, 104). 
On the demand side, the changing composition of the labour market provided a 
further set of functional underpinnings: the occupational distribution saw a stable 
decline, in Germany as in most advanced capitalist countries, of intermediate occupations 
(typically in need of intermediate skills delivered by the vocational system) to the 
advantage of professional and managerial occupations (typically in need of a higher 
education) (Oesch 2013, Oesch and Rodríguez Menés 2010); furthermore, Germany 
experienced a significant expansion of knowledge-intensive sectors, across both high-end 
manufacturing and services (Thelen forthcoming, Durazzi 2017, recall also figure 1.2). 
The introduction to a recent publication by the German Rectors’ Conference 
(HRK) sums up eloquently the quantitative and qualitative changes occurring within the 
German education system and highlights the central role retained by the higher education 
sector in the process: 
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Over the past few years, the educational debate has been enriched with 
several new key terms. Whilst previously conducting research in the 
interests of technical progress and educating the future social elite were 
among the noblest responsibilities of universities, today further aims are 
coming into focus that are of increasing significance: Universities are 
now expected to make a growing contribution to social integration and 
to prepare young people for conditions of life and work that are 
becoming ever more complex, international, and nuanced. A glance at 
the statistics quickly reveals the extent of the changes that this entails: 
Within just a few decades, the number of students has more than 
doubled; today, half of the secondary school graduates will go on to 
university. (HRK 2013, 3) 
 
In this context, pressures mounted on the higher education sector to engage with 
external stakeholders (see, e.g., Regini 2011b), which included also delivering relevant 
skills demanded by the labour market. This implied a shift away from the traditional 
focus on teaching and research in separation from labour market concerns but rather 
embarking upon a path of ‘hybridisation’ which could increasingly accommodate skill 
formation within the higher education sector (Graf 2013, Powell and Solga 2010). 
Looking back at the main socio-economic changes that had taken place through the 
1990s and reflecting on future developments, the Wissenschaftsrat, an advisory board that 
brings together scientists, public figures (by and large business people) and policy-makers 
to advise the federal government on higher education and science policy, argued that the 
need to align higher education and labour market needs mainly stems from “[t]he 
anticipated increased demand for personnel with higher educational qualifications” 
(Wissenschaftsrat 2000, 7). They go on to argue that this demand is translated into an 
increasing interest towards profiles “with academically sound, practice-oriented training” 
(Wissenschaftsrat 2000, 7). To satisfy this need, it is argued that teaching in higher 
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education institutions “must be far more connected to actual practice” (Wissenschaftsrat 
2000, 6).   
However, German universities have been largely perceived as not sufficiently 
interacting with society, because of many actors in the higher education field “still 
holding on tight to traditional stereotypes of reasoning and practice” (Wissenschaftsrat 
2000, 15). The attempt to step-up practice-oriented teaching in higher education 
institutions goes back to the 1980s, when several reform proposals were made to increase 
the share of students in Universities of Applied Sciences (cf. Toens 2009), and it has 
been strongly advocated “time and again” by the Wissenschaftsrat through the 1990s 
(Wissenschaftsrat 2000, 22). However, these attempts largely failed for a variety of 
reasons (Witte 2006, 154), and most prominently because of research universities 
opposed to a significant expansion of Universities of Applied Sciences (Toens 2009, 81, 
interviews DE1, DE2. DE3, DE7), which would have required financial support through 
“a shift of resources in favour of the Fachhochschulen” (Wissenschaftsrat 2000, 7). Thus, in 
the 1990s, universities came increasingly under the spot-light “as politicians began to 
expect regular universities to take a larger share of responsibility for practice-oriented 
higher education” (Toens 2009, 81), while employers  lamented the irresponsiveness of 
the higher education sector to labour market needs and argued for greater involvement in 
higher education matters. As argued by van Santen (2014) in a detailed study on the 
transformation of German higher education: 
 
While in the past, German employers have predominantly depended on 
the vocational training system to provide their workers with the 
necessary skills and have mainly cooperated with universities in research 
and development, higher education has become increasingly important 
for the education and training of the general workforce. This is also one 
reason why German employers have played an important role in the 
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reform of the German higher education system, and why the Bologna 
declaration and recent German higher education reforms put a strong 
focus on employability issues. (van Santen 2014, 64) 
 
Yet, it is theoretically and empirically debatable whether we should expect the 
notion of greater business involvement in the reforms of higher education to be 
uncontested. Indeed, the seminal work by Burton Clark on “Academic Organization in 
Cross-National Perspective”’ illustrates how the German system comes close to the idea 
of a system dominated by the “academic oligarchy”, where “guildlike authority has 
predominated within the universities, with much personal authority at the operating level 
and with groups of professors exercising string collegial rule over the higher levels of 
faculty and university” (Clark 1983, 125). An important implication of this “mode of 
authority” (Clark 1983, 107-134) is that: 
 
in comparison with the British and especially the American mode, the 
Continental mode has exhibited weak autonomous authority at the levels 
of the university and its constituent faculties. The professors have not 
wanted a separate administrative class and have simply elected deans and 
rectors as amateur administrators on short appointments and easy recalls. 
(Clark 1983, 126) 
 
This mode of authority is therefore expected to be resistant to change, in particular when 
a demand for such change comes from external stakeholders (Pechar 2012). On the other 
hand, however, recent contributions by historians of higher education looked back at the 
roots of the German universities, considered the present challenges (many of which have 
been outlined in this section), and conclude that the traditional research universities 
would be somewhat forced to give way to the mounting pressures of external 
stakeholders by “significantly weakening” their research infrastructure, and “emphasizing 
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the teaching functions” over their research mission (Ash 1997, 205). It is therefore 
ultimately an empirical question whether change has occurred, and to what extent the 
balance of power between external and internal stakeholders has shifted, leading to 
significant changes. 
 
5.3 De-differentiation and (attempts of) conversion: competing ‘organisational 
fields’ in the higher education sector (2003-2007) 
The Bologna process has been widely regarded as a critical juncture in German higher 
education policy. As a European process whose “main goal is to increase staff and 
students’ mobility and to facilitate employability [of graduates]” (EHEA n.d.), it 
represented an opportunity to reform the higher education sector and align it to the 
needs of a knowledge economy (Fallon 2012, Pritchard 2011, Schulze-Cleven 2015, van 
Santen 2014, Welsh 2010, Winkel 2010). Interviewees from the higher education sector, 
business community and policy-making shared the view that “[Germany] never had such 
big structural reform of the higher education system. Bologna changed a lot in the higher 
education system and it changed the relevance of higher education” (interview DE_N3) 
and it also “attracted a degree of interest and attention towards study methods that was 
absolutely unknown in the past” (interview DE_N1).  
Governments and employers in particular, who had become by the 1990s long 
standing critics of the university system, seized the opportunity offered by Bologna to 
‘modernise’ the higher education sector (BMBF 1999, BDA 2003). The issue of the 
labour market relevance of higher education featured prominently in the early years of 
Bologna as a crucial component of the transition from the old system with a 4 to 5-year 
degree (the Diplom), to the new ‘tiered’ structure composed by a 3-year bachelor degree 
followed by a 1 to 2-year master degree. In this context, employers and governments 
expected the bachelor degree to become the main point of entry to the labour market. In 
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the run up to the start of Bologna, “employer demands for reforms of curricula of degree 
structures had become more pronounced” (Witte 2006, 164) culminating in an extensive 
memorandum released by the peak employer association BDA in 2003 on the 
expectations of the business community on the reform. The memorandum contained 
several key points revealing employers’ preferences. In particular, the BDA argued that:  
 
The bachelor should be established in Germany as the first standard 
degree in German universities conferring eligibility for employment. The 
business community will work to give bachelor graduates an attractive 
start on the labour market. […] An essential precondition for a bachelor 
degree giving a realistic chance of entry into the labour market is a 
university education in the relevant bachelor course geared to consistent 
transmission of basic and core skills that confer employability. (BDA 
2003, 1) 
 
Furthermore, employers made clear that “a change in the study structure is not enough 
on its own to meet the employability demands on first and higher degrees. The study 
content of bachelor and master courses also needs to be redesigned” since a “re-labelling 
of old courses is not acceptable and will permanently damage acceptance of the new 
degrees” (BDA 2003, 1-2). The BDA argued therefore in favour of a “work-oriented 
bachelor degree” (BDA 2003, 3) that could combine discipline-specific knowledge with 
the acquisition of broader professional skills that businesses deemed crucial in a fast-
changing economic environment. Business’ ideas of bachelor degrees had been outlined 
as follows: 
 
A bachelor who has specialised in engineering should have mastered the 
principles of mathematics and physics, technical principles, basic 
information technology skills (information technology, informatics, 
microcomputer technology, computer organisation, software technology) 
153 
 
 
as well as a basic knowledge of a technical application area and a 
methodology for solving engineering problems. This profile should be 
supplemented by elements of management accounting and a knowledge 
of quality, environmental and energy management (BDA 2003, 3-4) 
 
The conception of higher education put forward by the BDA is consistent with that of 
the BDI, the employer association representing the large German industry that linked a 
reformed higher education to contemporary changes in production processes. Indeed, a 
1998 paper by the BDI had already called for a shift towards a “productive information 
society” where “not only the organisation of work, but also its content will change. More 
and more employees will work on the generation, collection, processing, distribution, and 
commercialisation of information. The pure production of goods will take a back-seat 
and highly qualified labor will dominate over low-skilled labor” (BDI 1998, 18-19 cited in 
van Santen 2014, 136-137). Put more simply by an engineering company cited in Arthur 
(2006, 247):  
 
[…] in the railways, the focus is no longer just on one wheel, or even one 
type of engine, we are now looking for people who understand a train 
and all vehicles connected with the railway industry. Graduates should 
have a basic understanding of technology but also of the economy as a 
whole. So they need to be less narrowly specialised and have a broader 
view on a range of technology related matters. In that sense we need 
specialists who are also generalists. 
 
The turn towards employability of university education was shared by policy-makers as 
well, and in particular by the Centre-Left government that was in office when the 
Bologna process was embraced in Germany in the late 1990s. While not providing a 
similar level of details to that of businesses, the two key government actors in German 
higher education, namely the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) and 
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the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Culture (KMK) that brings together the 
education ministries of the Länder, shared substantive elements with businesses as long as 
a closer connection between university education and labour market is concerned. A 
1999 policy paper issued by the BMBF argued that competitiveness and quality of life 
will be in the future increasingly dependent on individual knowledge, skills and creativity. 
As such universities have a key role to play insofar as they are asked to train a highly 
skilled workforce while being the backbone of national research output. However, it is 
also argued that the contribution of universities towards smoothing the transition to a 
knowledge-based economy is hampered by, among other things, lengthy study periods, 
high drop-out rates and – most relevant from the perspective of skill formation – lack of 
practical orientation of the programmes (BMBF 1999, 1 - 2).  
Opening up the higher education system to external stakeholders by tightening 
cooperation between universities and employers is identified a crucial element towards 
the ‘modernisation’ of the higher education system (BMBF 1999, 13). Along the same 
lines, the KMK promulgated in 2003 a decision titled “10 theses on the bachelor and 
master structure” that makes clear how the bachelor degree is to be considered a 
‘professional qualification’ that allows entry to the labour market and as such must 
incorporate scientific competences and professional skills (KMK 2003). Accordingly, the 
Standing Rectors Conference (HRK), i.e. the organisation representing the university 
sector, indicates that “[b]achelor programmes are oriented towards subject-specific 
standards, but also general skills relevant to the labour market” (HRK n.d.).  
In the early 2000s, therefore, the transition to a bachelor/master structure in 
which the bachelor degree would constitute a full qualification for entrance to the labour 
market appeared to work in an analogue way to the concept of “coalition magnet” 
developed in the ideational literature (Béland and Cox 2016), i.e. a ‘polysemic’ policy 
option that spoke to the preferences of various actors and therefore facilitated the 
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establishment of a policy coalition. The government saw the opportunity to restructure 
the degrees as a way to modernise the higher education sector: the government not only 
saw this as an opportunity to increase the professional orientation of higher education, 
but it also represented a way to tackle the long standing issue of excessively lengthy study 
programmes, thus also allowing for a significant saving in public financial resources 
(King 2010, 5) – a key strategic issue at times of education expansion (cf. Ansell 2010). 
The attractiveness of this re-structuring was even more pronounced for businesses that 
had the opportunity to increase their voice in higher education policy-making, a policy 
area in which they had been traditionally weak (Toens 2009, Baethge 2006, Baethge and 
Wolter 2015, van Santen 2014). A detailed reconstruction by Witte (2006) of the policy 
processes taking place in the early 2000s concludes that German businesses should 
“generally be seen as proponents [of the reform]”’ (Witte 2006, 473).   
Indeed, after the 2003 memorandum, the BDA started in 2004 a major campaign 
named ‘Bachelor welcome!’13, supported by several large firms including BMW, Deutsche 
Bahn and Deutsche Telekom. Since 2004, the BDA has been releasing statements every 
two years that reiterated business support for the transition to the bachelor/master 
system and pointed out business’ demands to improve such transition (see, e.g., BDA 
2004, 2008, BDA, Stifterverband, and BDI 2010, BDA 2006a). Finally, a third actor also 
joined the coalition, although less explicitly than employers and policy-makers, namely 
universities of applied of sciences. Indeed, the ‘vocational drift’ prompted by the Bologna 
process, with its “emphasis on graduates’ employability and labour market relevance” 
also “strengthened the position of professionally oriented institutions” such as, indeed, 
the universities of applied sciences (Reichert 2010, 14-15). Clearly, universities of applied 
sciences stood to gain from this transition for two main reasons. Firstly, they increased 
                                                
 
13 Since 2012, the campaign has been renamed ‘Bologna@Germany’. 
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their prestige given the formal equivalence of bachelor and master degrees regardless of the 
institution that awards them. Indeed, the formal boundaries between the traditional 
university sector and the universities of applied sciences has been blurring as a 
consequence of Bologna (Witte, Van der Wende, and Huisman 2008).  
Secondly, the cost of adjustment to the new degrees was lower for universities of 
applied sciences, which have been since their establishment “characterised  by  a practice-
oriented  bias  in  teaching  and  research,  a usually  integrated  semester  of  practical 
training’ (Lohmar and Eckhardt 2015, 149) and have traditionally been offering shorter 
degrees. As such, universities of applied sciences were already offering a type of 
education rather close to the ideas of policy-makers and employers in form (i.e. shorter 
degrees) and substance (i.e. significant practical orientation). These factors contributed to 
“Fachhochschulen finding themselves in a more favourable position” (Ertl 2015, 3). 
Interviews with key stakeholders confirmed this constellation of actors. A KMK 
representative, when asked about the main actors behind the emergence of this agenda in 
Germany, left little room for doubt: “Politicians, business leaders, universities of applied 
sciences” (interview DE_N7). 
The constellation depicted above, however, clearly misses one crucial actor: 
research universities, which, it should be recalled, accommodated over two thirds of the 
total student population in higher education in the early 2000s. As expected from the 
early literature on higher education discussed in section 2.2 (Clark 1983, Van de Graaff 
1978), universities firmly opposed what was perceived as a downgrading of the old 
degrees to short-term training, and a blurring of profiles between traditional universities 
and universities of applied sciences, i.e., again, a downgrading of traditional university 
education. In other words, the reforms initiated in the context of the Bologna process 
were perceived by the academic community as “utilitarian approaches [to university 
education] that threaten the cultural profile and identity of the Germanic tradition” 
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(Pechar 2012, 616). The conflict was particularly stark in the engineering discipline since 
engineering is the main area of overlap between universities and universities of applied 
sciences, i.e. both types of institutions offer degrees in this subject. Hence the blurring of 
boundaries between the two ‘organisational fields’ promised to be the strongest in this 
discipline, which was additionally under the spotlight because of the key role that was 
assigned to STEM subjects for a highly skilled workforce in the knowledge economy (see 
e.g. BDA 2006a).  
Indeed, at the same time when employers and policy-makers were setting the 
scene for the transition to a bachelor/master system, and for the establishment of the 
bachelor degree as the main professional qualification towards labour market entry, 
academic faculties had a very different view. For instance, commenting on the KMK’s 
“10 theses” published in 2003, the Fakultätentag for Mechanical and Process Engineering 
(FTMV), i.e. the association of deans of universities for this discipline, strongly criticised 
the idea of a bachelor degree as a fully qualifying, main point of entry to the labour 
market and the implied blurring of boundaries between universities and universities of 
applied sciences. More specifically, their disagreement with current policy was articulated 
along three lines, which would characterise the position of research universities for the 
following decade. Firstly, they argued that for academic quality to be upheld, it needed to 
be clear that the master degree was going to be the equivalent of the old Diplom. 
Secondly, they argued that two different profiles should have been clearly identified for 
degrees pursued at universities and degrees pursued at universities of applied sciences. 
Thirdly, they argued that at bachelor level only a limited preparation for the world of 
work could be achieved because a three-year degree should only focus on the theoretical 
foundations of the discipline, while job-related skills could not be achieved. If companies 
were to hire bachelor graduates, they were expected to stand ready to provide significant 
on-the-job training (FTMV 2004). The stance of universities was therefore in clear 
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tension with that of policy-makers and employers. As argued by a senior academic in an 
engineering department of a research university: “My university, as well as all other 
universities, considered the master the level at which you leave the university and the 
bachelor more like an emergency exit, but not the standard degree at which to leave the 
university” (interview DE_U12). 
In the public debate, research universities, and their engineering faculties in 
particular, were nonetheless perceived as the ‘academic oligarchy’ fighting to preserve 
their status (see also Pechar 2012). Employers kept demanding a fast conversion of 
degrees to the new structure, and after their initial support to a work-oriented bachelor 
degree in 2004 (BDA 2004), in 2006 they urged the university sector to implement a 
“faster and more consistent transition in all study courses to the new structure, in which 
bachelor degrees are expected to provide a professional qualification” (BDA 2006a) 
signalling some growing discontent in the business community. Furthermore, leading 
figures of the BDA’s working group on higher education made several public statements 
in the early years of the implementation of the new degree structure where they 
complained rather openly about the lack of cooperation that business had found on the 
side of universities. Thomas Sattelberger, chair of the BDA’s working group on higher 
education, argued that “technical universities [i.e. research universities with a specific 
focus on STEM subjects] discuss way too long what they could lose – this is totally 
unnecessary”, while “Fachhochschulen […] are thinking about what they could win” and 
that “most of all, the leading technical universities want to save the prestigious Diplom of 
Engineering” (Gillman 2006). A senior policy officer from the BDA illustrated how the 
conversion of degrees at universities had been problematic: 
 
When you ask employers themselves, you ask if they are happy with the 
discipline content, they say we are more than content. But if you ask 
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about generic skills, like taking decisions, presenting, leading a small 
team, being responsible for a small budget, having rhetoric skills, 
communication. If you ask about key competences, they say that 
universities should do more, they are not content with the graduates. 
They say there is not enough training at universities. There are 
differences between Fachhochschulen and universities – Fachhochschulen 
students do internships, longer than six months, and they get training of 
generic skills in the enterprise. We argued for universities to introduce 
these as well. (interview DE_N3) 
 
Another BDA representative reinforced the point by suggesting that the lack of 
alignment between universities and employers’ preferences “has lots to do with the 
history of our universities and their mentality” which meant that “there always has been a 
separation between universities and the world outside” (interview DE_N4). Policy-
makers’ assessment was very close to that of employers’. In a document reviewing the 
interim process of restructuring of degrees, the Federal Ministry illustrated the problems 
encountered as follows:  
 
For higher education institutions – large universities more than 
universities of applied sciences – the challenge of ‘employability’ means 
to conciliate – sometime short-term interests – of the labour market and 
the impartment of academic, science-based knowledge and skills that will 
be useful for students and alumni all of their work-life. The teaching staff 
of universities sometimes still has reservation to align generic 
employability skills and in-depth knowledge of the subject. The paradigm 
shift that the increased integration of generic employability skills means 
has not yet been fully accepted by university staff i.e. there is still concern 
that academic studies might not be sufficiently science-based anymore. 
(BMBF 2007, 1-2) 
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Even the HRK, i.e. an organisation representing universities’ rectors, generally perceived 
as the reformist part of the higher education sector (see Toens 2009), provided a very 
similar assessment as employers’, therefore placing academic faculties in research 
universities under the spotlight as far as the difficulties in the transition to the new 
degrees are concerned: 
 
The bachelor degree is something that is not yet working in an optimal 
way in Germany. […] It still takes some time for professors, students 
and employers to adjust and to consider the bachelor as a full grown 
academic degree. It varies from subject to subject, for instance a bachelor 
in engineering in Fachhochschulen find it rather easy to find a job but 
bachelor graduates from engineering from universities find it very 
difficult and the universities professors say “you’re not a real engineer if 
you leave university with a bachelor degree”. […] We still encourage 
universities to reflect on how they construct a polyvalent bachelor 
degree. It should be polyvalent in the sense that it should allow you to go 
into the labour market or to continue your studies in the same area or to 
switch area. (interview DE_N1) 
 
To be sure, universities did not shy away from these ‘accusations’, but rather reinforced 
their position, which was informed by their collective identity as research universities, 
whose functions and purposes in relation to the labour market – and to society more 
broadly – have to be kept separate from other organisational fields, namely that of 
universities’ of applied sciences. Thus, universities have strived to uphold their collective 
differentiation, as made clear by several stakeholders holding senior positions in research 
universities: 
 
We have research universities, which are called universities, then we have 
these universities of applied sciences, Fachhochschulen, which are closer to 
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the needs of the labour market, and then we have these universities of 
cooperative education and they are really doing these dual programmes 
where students spend half of their time in a company and half of their 
time at these institutions. Everything is fine, everything serves a specific 
need of the industry as a whole but not every type of institution is 
appropriate to do everything else. (interview DE_ U8) 
 
Clearly, the reference point for the restructuring – or, rather, lack thereof – of curricula 
for (research) universities has been their peer organisations, as opposed to any external 
stakeholder: 
 
We are trying to be comparable, and also adaptable, to the other 
[research] universities. Well, because I also think it is good for the 
students to know that if I studied in [university A] I have a similar or 
same profile as I would in [university B]. I mean, at least on the national 
level there are standards set by the faculty association, Fakultätentag, and 
this is why we participate in it, in order to simply not fall out of our role. 
[…] For most students it is important to know that they are not worse 
nor better than if I had studied in [university B] or [university C]. 
(interview DE_U7) 
 
Thus, as highlighted by the interview excerpt just reported, the position of research 
universities is reinforced and institutionalised by organisations, such as the faculty 
associations, which provide a forum for coordination among universities along discipline 
lines, as brought up even more clearly by a university vice-dean who illustrated how:  
 
in each subject [...] you have a meeting of all deans and representatives of 
all schools or faculties in [say] electrical engineering, and they talk to each 
other exactly about those things [how to develop curricula] and so you 
may have universities who are outstanding in some areas but due to these 
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discussions it is rather disciplines that follow some joint track. (interview 
DE_U8) 
 
The concern with horizontal collective differentiation of research universities was also 
formalised by sector associations. The TU9, the association of technical universities, 
argued for instance that the designation ‘TU’ should be added to the degrees awarded by 
technical universities to differentiate their degrees from those of universities of applied 
sciences (TU9 2014). Along the same lines, the Deutscher Hochschul Verband (DHV), 
the association of university professors, argued forcefully that the horizontal 
differentiation between universities and universities of applied sciences and, more 
broadly, vocational training should not be blurred (DHV 2015), despite political attempts 
to do so (cf. Witte, Van der Wende, and Huisman 2008, interviews DE_U11, DE_U12). 
In this context, therefore, the conversion of degrees towards professional skills and 
employability only occurred to a limited extent in universities:  
 
We still at least in engineering did not change [the curriculum] in that 
way the politicians wanted us to go, that the science part had to move up 
to the master’s degree and we should focus on skills and employability in 
the bachelor and leave everything, the math and the more difficult parts, 
to the masters because they thought this is something only needed by 
people who later do real science. And we did not do this. We stick to the 
old structure that the fundamentals of the discipline, which is math in 
many cases, should be taught right from the beginning. (interview DE_ 
U8) 
 
Upholding the difference between universities and universities of applied sciences 
appeared as a major reason for universities to keep policy-makers’ and employers’ 
demands at bay. Commenting on the differences between the two types of institution, a 
professor with overall responsibility for teaching and learning in a university argued that:   
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the type of education is also different. We are providing our students 
with knowledge that lasts long. So companies that are recruiting 
graduates from a research university should know that they have to 
invest, I don’t know, another half a year, in order to teach them on 
specific tools they need to know. I remember that once the head of 
Microsoft Germany complained that our graduates are not able or are 
not familiar with the software development tools of Microsoft itself. And 
I said to him, that is not our task and obligation […] if you, Microsoft, 
want them to be familiar, then you have to familiarise them. That’s not 
our task. (interview DE_ U8) 
 
The focus on theory – as opposed to practice – was also made clear at another research 
university: 
 
What you see [in our university] and all other universities as well, is that 
the changes to the bachelor/master structure required much bigger 
changes at universities than at universities of applied sciences, because 
they already before had something like a 6 semester lecture period while 
the Diplom was 8 or 10 semesters. […] If you have to achieve a level of 
employability in just 6 semesters you have to cut in those areas 
[mathematics, physics, etc.]. And all I can see is that all universities in 
Germany have been very careful in cutting these basics and if there was a 
clear conflict in cutting basics and achieving extremely high levels of 
employability, what I can see is that universities usually chose that they 
stuck with the more elaborate basic studies and accepted that perhaps 
some more job-related topics were probably less in the study 
programmes than it would be required for full employability. (interview 
DE_U12) 
 
Compared to the UK case, where we have seen a firm commitment towards 
‘employability’ on the side of universities – driven by (powerful) university managers in 
the context of a highly competitive higher education market, German universities were 
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able to resist to a much greater extent the demands of government and business. Indeed, 
managerial control and high competition among universities – which as we have seen 
were crucial factors in shaping universities’ behaviour in Britain – are much less 
prominent in Germany. Firstly, despite attempts to reduce the power of academic 
faculties in favour of university management, it has been shown that very limited change 
was in fact achieved at the level of university governance – not least because managerial 
positions are often occupied by faculty members who share the same preferences 
(Schimank and Lange 2009, 65) – while in the British context, university managers have 
gradually become a ‘distinct’ profession (Whitchurch 2008) responding to a different set 
of incentives and displaying different preferences compared to academic faculties (as we 
have noted in chapter 4 and as captured by figure 4.2). The German case, despite the 
(neoliberal) push stemming from the Bologna process (recall section 1.2), shows 
remarkably limited change in the degree of power and self-governance retained by 
academic faculties. This speaks to a key limitation of the ideational literature, namely the 
lack of explicit attention to the role of actors within universities mediating between the 
spread of neoliberal ideas and their translation into actual organisational or institutional 
change. While it is true that under the auspices of Bologna policy-makers tried to curtail 
academic faculties’ power by introducing management boards in universities with 
representatives of external stakeholders (including local government and businesses) 
(Regini 2011b), evaluations found “little evidence” that these new structures “have 
uprooted collegial, professor-dominated university governance structures” (Dobbins and 
Knill 2017, 75, see also Hüther 2009). Indeed, in a systematic cross-country analysis of 
the changing patterns of power and authority across European higher education systems, 
Dobbins and Knill maintain that the German system – despite some tendency towards 
empowering university management – is still today a system in which the ‘academic 
community’ represents the ‘dominant decision-maker’ and where a collegial ‘management 
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approach’ still prevails over bureaucratic or entrepreneurial management styles (Dobbins 
and Knill 2017, 78). 
Secondly, the competitive pressures experienced by British universities, e.g. in 
terms of student recruitment, are not present (at least to the same extent) in Germany. 
Indeed, even where performance-based budget allocations have been expanded, which 
has been in itself uneven across Lander, these were the result of a compromise by which 
performance is measured through a wide-array of criteria including student recruitment, 
but also a number of other criteria, such as gender balance, average time to graduation or 
graduation rates (Burgard and Grave 2013, 8). The availability of a large number of 
criteria upon which budget is allocated provides German universities with more room for 
manoeuvre compared to their British counterparts. In the latter, if student recruitment 
drops, a university’s finances are directly at risk, while in the former, if student numbers 
drop, universities can focus on improving other indicators and keep their finances, by 
and large, stable.14  
Faced with the lower competitive pressures compared to their British 
counterparts, German universities made therefore clear that employability is not a 
concern that firms should offload on to universities, in particular as far as bachelor 
graduates are concerned. Indeed, the TU9 argued that their bachelor degrees are not a 
professional qualification and that their “value on the labour market will depend on the 
preparedness of the enterprises to provide the necessary continued training” (TU9 2014). 
Despite pressures from politics and businesses, universities have therefore resisted to a 
significant extent the rise of the employability agenda. Thus, until circa 2007, we observe 
a transition towards ‘more employability’ pushed by politicians, business associations, 
and supported by universities of applied sciences.  
                                                
 
14 I am thankful to Ulrich Schreiterer for pointing this out to me. 
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Yet, universities – where the vast majority of students are enrolled – opposed the 
move away from discipline specific preparation towards more general employability skills. 
The concerns voiced by the BDA and other industry representatives that the transition to 
the two-tiered system has to an extent represented a case where “old wine is […] filled 
into new bottles” (BDA et al. 2009) have now characterised higher education policy for 
over 15 years. Indeed, as of 2015, the Association of the Chambers of Commerce argued 
that “the promotion of employability represents an important target of the Bologna 
reforms. At many universities there is still a need for improvement with respect to the 
practical orientation of the contents of study programmes required for this, as well as the 
teaching of employment market-related skills” (DIHK 2015, 34). Hence, the conversion 
of degrees at bachelor level towards full qualification for labour market entry with a focus 
on broad professional skills was very limited, largely because of universities who felt that 
it is not their task to prepare students for the labour market, especially upon completion 
of a bachelor degree.  
 
5.4 Re-differentiation through layering and the coordination of skill formation 
in higher education (2007 to present)   
The early 2000s have therefore been characterised by a strong commitment to reform of 
the higher education sector. Bologna was used by key stakeholders – government, 
employers and partly universities of applied sciences – to further their interests on a 
higher education system that had been perceived as irresponsive to labour market needs 
for a long time. Yet, the template promoted through Bologna, implicitly pushing research 
universities to design their curricula in a way that resembled those of universities of 
applied sciences while removing formal differences of qualifications awarded by the two 
types of universities, fell short of its objectives. As the previous section illustrated, 
faculties in research universities significantly resisted government’s and employers’ call to 
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employability and hampered the conversion of degrees along the lines promoted by 
policy-makers. It is in this context of ‘truncated’ reform that, however, the German 
higher education system came under growing pressures. In 2007 it became clear for the 
government that the number of entrants into higher education was growing beyond 
previous projections, increasing the pressure on universities. This trend was expected to 
further exacerbate by 2011 when a change in legislation in four Länder15 shortened 
compulsory schooling by one year thus leading to a double cohort of students enrolling 
into university. The trend of rising enrolments has been remarkable: even after adjusting 
for the effect of the double graduation cohort, the share of the relevant age cohort 
entering higher education rose from 36% to over 50% in just a five-year period, between 
2007 and 2011 (Hüther and Krücken 2014, 104). 
This development worried business: while through the apprenticeship system 
businesses could ensure the skills needed by directly shaping the supply (i.e. employers 
would offer apprenticeships in particular occupations according to their needs), such a 
massive and rapid expansion of higher education – if not located in the disciplines 
needed in the labour market – could have led to significant problems of skill mismatch 
and shortages given that business cannot directly influence the allocation of students to 
degrees and disciplines. Accordingly, businesses began to formulate ever more detailed 
demands towards the higher education sector. The 2008 release by the BDA not only 
made statements regarding the necessity of strengthening the practical orientation of 
higher education, but it also advanced more detailed demands on the need to increase the 
supply of STEM graduates. Businesses feared greatly the skill shortage that expansion of 
higher education and unfavourable demographic conditions might have led to. This was 
particularly alarming in the STEM subjects – which are considered by the BDA as the 
                                                
 
15 Bavaria and Lower Saxony implemented this change in 2011, Baden-Wuttenberg and 
Berlin in 2012. 
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backbone of German economic success in knowledge-intensive sectors (BDA 2008). In 
actual fact, the campaign of large industry had moved from demanding a general 
modernisation of the higher education sector through more employability and work-
oriented education in 2004 to a much more defined demand in 2008 for practice-oriented 
STEM graduates that could support the expansion of knowledge-intensive services, and 
high-tech manufacturing in particular, that rely to a much greater extent on highly skilled 
workers compared to traditional manufacturing. 
Accordingly, starting from 2007, we observe a shift in focus of higher education 
policy. While until 2007 the Bologna process had been the key trigger of the reformist 
effort of policy-makers, new domestic issues contributed to national policies (and 
politics) becoming more prominent vis-à-vis the international processes that 
characterised the previous years. Increasing numbers of students put pressure on 
universities, which needed additional financial resources if they were to meet the 
increasing demand. In the meantime, unfavourable demographic conditions and the need 
for highly skilled STEM scientists made business’ voice louder.  
To solve a potentially double crisis – universities not being able to meet increased 
demand for higher education, and businesses not being able to meet their high skill needs 
– the Centre-Right government in office at the time showed a similar keen concern for 
the alignment of higher education provision and labour market needs as its Centre-Left 
predecessor, and it launched a new policy initiative in 2007: the Higher Education Pact. 
While this policy looks at first sight like a rather ‘simple’ increase of the public budget for 
university education in the face of unprecedented – and not fully predicted – expansion 
of students seeking to enrol at university, a closer look at the measure reveals the 
transformative potential that the Higher Education Pact has had on the university 
system. To understand the key features of the Pact, we should first recall a peculiarity of 
the German system: research universities have traditionally dominated the sector vis-à-vis 
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universities of applied sciences, politically (by being more influential) and, as a 
consequence, financially (by attracting more public resources).  
The higher education system, in other words, has traditionally had its centre of 
gravity in the research universities (recall section 2.5 in this respect). Indeed, when 
universities of applied sciences were created in the late 1960s, they were expected to 
grow in such a way that the majority of students would be pursuing their studies in these 
institutions. However, while this trend was achieved in countries that set up analogous 
institutions around the same time (section 2.5 discussed one of the most notable 
examples, the Netherlands, where two thirds of students attend the equivalent of 
universities of applied sciences), this re-distribution of students (and financial resources) 
internal to the system was never achieved in Germany because of strong resistance of 
faculties in universities who veto-played the implied shift of resources towards 
universities of applied sciences (Toens 2009, Wissenschaftsrat 2000). The political role of 
universities in keeping at bay the expansion of universities of applied sciences was 
articulated further by stakeholders belonging to both the business and higher education 
sides, as illustrated by the two following quotes by a BDA and HRK representative 
respectively: 
 
Of course you can argue that even more money should be located in 
universities of applied sciences but there are structures, peoples in 
traditional universities that need money and the only way would be to 
reduce the number of faculties, close disciplines and because of our 
federal structures we have big discussions in each state about closing 
small disciplines and how the government is managing universities. And 
politicians are probably in fear of such discussions. (interview DE_N3) 
 
When it comes to taking decisions on the ground, universities proved 
too strong in the political setting of the land to take something away 
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from them, and universities are of course prestigious. It is nice to have 
Heidelberg as one of your higher education institutions rather than an 
anonymous university of applied science somewhere in the countryside. 
So there are all sorts of vested interests on the side of the universities 
and a certain local pride on the side of the politicians. (interview 
DE_N1) 
 
The nature of the Pact represented the opportunity to sidestep the veto player role of 
universities and use these resources to address the main issues that higher education 
faced, and that Bologna did not solve, because the conversion of degrees only happened 
to a limited extent in universities, as illustrated in the previous section. The expansion of 
students above and beyond the previous forecast by the KMK allowed the government 
to pursue a policy specifically to create additional study places to meet increasing demand. 
Given that the Pact was in practice increasing the size of the higher education pie, the 
room for political manoeuvre by the government was larger than in the case of an 
internal redistribution to the system, which is by and large a zero sum game, and that, as 
such, had been veto-played in the past by universities. Thus, the government was able to 
create additional study places with two very clear objectives: universities of applied 
sciences and the STEM subjects had to be expanded the most through the new policy 
(BMBF 2014, 2009). Starting from the expansion of universities of applied sciences, the 
choice stems directly from the failure of the ‘conversion’ of bachelor degrees towards a 
fully-fledged professional qualification outlined in the previous section. As illustrated by a 
representative of the KMK, “universities of applied sciences were ‘born partners’ for the 
Higher Education Pact, because the implementation of the Bologna-Process turned out 
well at universities of applied sciences, universities had much more problems and less 
readiness; they were reluctant to install ‘just’ additional Bachelor-programmes” (interview 
DE_N7). On a similar note, a representative of the Hochschullehrerbund (hlb), the 
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association representing the interests of universities of applied sciences, argued that the 
Higher Education Pact was a reactive response to the societal demand of more university 
education:  
 
If there is a need in society, and politicians say there are demographic 
developments, and we need more scientists, then once the need is 
identified, universities of applied sciences can move faster than research 
universities. Universities of applied sciences are more easily prepared to 
respond to societal demands, while traditional universities do not feel 
that they are there to respond to societal demands. (interview DE_N2) 
 
Furthermore, the smoother implementation of the Bologna process in universities of 
applied sciences and the strong applied and practical orientation of these institutions was 
also recognised in terms of employer satisfaction with graduates from universities of 
applied sciences, hence the expansion of universities of applied sciences through the Pact 
also met the long-standing employers’ demand for practical orientation of study 
programmes. Indeed, a study carried out by the VDI and based on a survey of companies 
employing engineering graduates found that: 
 
the professional qualification and practical orientation of the bachelor 
graduates, especially university graduates, is often not considered 
sufficient by the graduates and students themselves as well as by the 
executives. […] The integration of practical semesters and modules is 
stronger in universities of applied sciences than in universities. At the 
universities in particular bachelor graduates are often not sufficiently 
prepared for an industry career. (VDI 2016) 
 
Commenting on the findings of the VDI study, the vice-president of the Verband 
Deutscher Maschinen- und Anlagenbau (VDMA), representing companies in the 
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mechanical engineering industry, argued that “Fachhochschulen show that more praxis in 
study programmes is possible” and that “only a heavily practice-oriented education 
optimally prepares students for an industry career’’ (VDI 2016). The firm support for 
universities of applied sciences expressed by engineering business groups like VDI and 
VDMA, operating primarily in high-end manufacturing, is particularly significant, as 
these are among the key actors at the core of the coalition sustaining the transition to a 
knowledge economy reliant on advanced manufacturing (Thelen forthcoming). To be 
sure, employers’ support for universities of applied sciences is not only a rhetorical 
exercise, but also reflected in the salaries of graduates. While university graduates have 
traditionally received a higher salary than their counterparts from universities of applied 
sciences (see e.g. Teichler 1996b, 129), the situation became more nuanced after Bologna, 
as illustrated by Ertl who shows that “the comparison between the two types of higher 
education institutions is reversed for Bachelor degrees”, with graduates from universities 
of applied sciences earning one year after graduation on average €32,700 per annum, 
compared to €27,100 of university graduates (Ertl 2013, 20). 
Moreover, the expansion of universities of applied sciences was to an extent also 
a mechanism for ‘automatically’ expanding STEM graduates, given that STEM subjects – 
and engineering in particular – tend to make up for a larger share of the student cohort at 
universities of applied sciences than at research universities. In this respect, a 
representative of the KMK explained that “universities of applied sciences had – and still 
have – a reasonable share of MINT-subjects and also less dropouts, compared to 
universities” (interview DE_N7), although it should be noted that the Higher Education 
Pact was also used to increase the share of STEM students at research universities. Thus, 
looking at the subject distribution of the additional study places, we notice that STEM 
subjects have gained significantly, relative to other areas. The most recent report on the 
implementation of the Higher Education Pact shows the trend clearly: engineering 
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increased by almost 57% between 2005 and 2015, while social sciences expanded by 44% 
and humanities by only 18% (GWK 2016, 11). The expansion of engineering, and more 
broadly STEM, subjects was partly a response by policy-makers to increased lobbying of 
businesses who feared that shortages of high skills in these subjects would create 
problems to the expansion of high-tech manufacturing and knowledge intensive services. 
The Cologne Institute for Economic Research, a business-financed research centre, 
published several reports on the shortage of STEM workers, and the BDA released 
several statements following the 2008 campaign ‘Bachelor Welcome – Securing young 
STEM!’, when the BDA painted a rather gloomy picture, suggesting that the lack of 
STEM graduates constituted a “dramatic bottleneck” in a context where “STEM 
graduates are not only required in the classical manufacturing sectors such as the metal 
and electrical industry, but increasingly also in the service sector. New technological 
challenges also require new qualification profiles” (BDA 2008, 1). The same fear was 
reiterated in 2011, in conjunction with double cohorts of high school graduates coming 
up in several states. Thomas Sattelberger, chairman of the BDA/BDI/HRK working 
group University/Industry, urged the government to expand the STEM potential of the 
country: “Double graduation cohorts represent a huge reservoir of talent for the 
economy. Given the alarming shortage of skilled workers, it would be outrageous to shut 
the doors of higher education to so many young people. In the STEM fields of science, 
technology, engineering and mathematics alone, companies currently have demand for 
more than 150,000 professionals” (BDA, HRK, and BDI 2011, 1). Policy-makers used 
therefore the Higher Education Pact also to respond to the skill shortage highlighted by 
business. A KMK representative argued that the efforts of “all kinds of well organised 
stakeholders, under them big companies, local firms, associations […]” did “shape the 
political opinion in a way” and that indeed the STEM area was chosen “because of the 
urgent need for engineers and the upcoming discussion on the shortage of skilled 
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‘MINT’-workers” (interview DE_N7). The federal government highlighted the same 
process, and argued that: 
 
in order to ensure training of a highly-qualified work force, inside and 
outside higher education, and the maintenance of the economic 
competitiveness of the economy, the GWK has acknowledged the need 
to supplement the quantitative expansion of higher education by growth 
in qualitative expectations with respect to fields of major impact. 
Universities of applied sciences and the academic disciplines 
of science, technology, engineering and mathematics are perceived as 
being of such significant relevance. (interview DE_N6) 
 
Accordingly, the official agreement signed by the federal government and the 
Länder makes clear the ‘human resource development’- aim of the Higher Education Pact 
by setting out at the very beginning of the document that the Pact is a way for the 
Federal government and the Länder to meet the demand in the labour market for skilled 
labour (GWK 2007, 1). Thus, government documents on the implementation of the 
Higher Education Pact issued by the GWK and the BMBF specify that labour market 
demands were to be met through the expansion of Fachhochschulen and study places in the 
STEM areas (GWK 2016, 3, BMBF 2014, 3, 2009, 2) and “accordingly, they were 
mentioned as qualitative targets in the agreements between the Federal and Länder 
government on the higher education pact” (interview DE_N6). As captured in figure 5.5, 
the expansion of STEM subjects was indeed successful: businesses, after voicing their 
worries in the mid-2000s and early 2010s, argued in 2015 that “years of public campaigns 
for more engineers and technical skills have paid off” and that given the increase in new 
entrants in engineering degrees between 2008 and 2013, “the lack of skilled labour is no 
longer a threat” (Gillmann 2015). 
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Figure 5.5. New students in higher education by (selected) disciplines (2005 = 100) 
 
Source: GWK (2016, 11) 
 
Thus, compared to the conversion attempted through Bologna, which only occurred to a 
limited extent, institutional change advanced a much greater deal through a layering 
process via the Higher Education Pact. Indeed, ‘layering’ is a form of institutional change 
expected to be successful in a political context populated by veto players (the research 
universities in this case) and that aims at spurring a process of “differential growth” 
(Streeck and Thelen 2005, 31) of a previously relatively ‘marginal’ institutional 
arrangement vis-à-vis the dominant part of the system, i.e. universities of applied sciences 
vis-à-vis research universities in this case. As discussed by a leading German think-tank in 
higher education policy, the Centrum für Hochschulentwicklung (CHE), the Pact has 
indeed had a differential impact upon the higher education system: 
 
The types of higher education institution benefit from the sharp increase 
in students to a different extent. Universities of applied sciences are 
among the winners in the expansion of the number of places available. 
The proportion of first-year students at universities of applied sciences 
increased from 32 per cent (2005) to 40 per cent (2013). (CHE 2015) 
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Figure 5.6 compares the relative figures in the number of entrants and universities and 
universities of applied science and shows the process of differential growth induced by 
the Higher Education Pact clearly starting from 2007. If we have noted at the beginning 
of the chapter that traditional universities constituted the centre of gravity of the German 
higher education system, the Higher Education Pact started to shift the centre of gravity 
towards universities of applied sciences. 
 
Figure 5.6. Relative intake of first year students at universities and universities of applied sciences 
(1997 = 100) 
 
Source: own calculations based on Statistisches Bundesamt 
 
The ‘differential growth’ of the universities of applied sciences sector was primarily but 
not exclusively triggered by the Higher Education Pact. Business also contributed directly 
to this process by offering since the 2000s an ever-increasing number of places in dual 
study programmes – by and large housed at universities of applied sciences. The 
emergence of dual study programmes has been a defining feature of the HE landscape 
over the last decade in particular (Powell et al. 2012, Powell and Solga 2010, Graf 2013, 
2017). According to the Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training (BIBB), 
dual study programmes can be defined as: 
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courses [that] combine a degree programme at a university or a university 
of cooperative education (Berufsakademie) with vocational training 
and/or relevant practical employment. This greater emphasis on practical 
relevance is the key difference between dual and standard degree courses. 
One special feature is the close integration of academic and vocational 
content in the curriculum. This is achieved through contractual ties 
between the cooperation partners, namely the company and the higher 
education provider. (Kupfer and Stertz 2011, 29) 
 
In a rich historical-institutionalist account on the establishment and expansion of dual 
study programmes, Graf (2013) illustrates how these programmes have a long history, 
having been first established in 1972 in one Länder, Baden-Württemberg, upon the 
initiative of a number of large firms predominantly in the manufacturing sector (Graf 
2013, 102). However, until very recently, the programmes remained a niche in the 
German higher education landscape. Indeed, it is not until the early 2000s that dual study 
programmes became available in every Länder and the number of students became 
significant, reaching around 95,000 enrolled students in 2014, after – as recently as 2004 
– there were only 40,000 students enrolled in these programmes (BIBB 2014, 12). Over 
90,000 students are now enrolled across the country in over 1,500 dual study 
programmes – again registering a steep increase from the just 500 programmes available 
in 2004 (BIBB 2014, 10, see also Figure 5.7). Furthermore, these figures are said to be 
conservative as “providers of dual study programs report student numbers on a 
voluntary basis” (BIBB 2011, 23 cited in Graf 2013, 98). The expedited growth of 
students in and offer of dual study programmes have prompted the observation that, 
growing out of a niche, these programmes are currently contributing to shaping 
institutional change in the German HE system (Graf 2014).  
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Figure 5.7. Number of students enrolled in dual study programmes 
 
Source: Ausbildung Plus 
 
The reasons for the expansion of dual study programmes overlap significantly with the 
reasons for the expansion of universities of applied sciences outlined earlier in the 
section. Firstly, dual study programmes have been praised by the business community for 
their ability to train work-ready graduates. The VDI study on engineering education 
concluded that dual study programmes are a “success model” and that “69 percent of the 
business managers consulted indicate that they have gained good to very good new 
recruits through the dual studies programmes” (VDI 2016). Similar conclusions were 
reached in an in-depth study of business experience with dual study programmes, which 
found that “the satisfaction with dual study graduates is very high, and businesses assume 
that qualities such as diligence, durability and teamwork are particularly pronounced in 
dual studies graduates” (Wolter et al. 2014, 30). Furthermore: 
 
[a] clear advantage […] was the immediate employability upon 
graduation. Businesses highly value the much shorter training period of 
dual study graduates in comparison to the graduates of regular degree 
programs, and also list this as one of the reasons they offer dual studies 
programs. Graduates would know immediately the structure of the 
business, culture of the business, as well as the daily routines and ways 
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within the business, and in the individual areas or departments, so that 
they would be immediately operational. (Wolter et al. 2014, 108) 
 
In addition, businesses resorted to dual study programmes in the context of the feared 
skill shortage as they saw these programmes as a way to tie future STEM workers to their 
company early on their career (interviews DE_N2, DE_N4). As in the case of the Higher 
Education Pact, universities of applied sciences emerged as an ideal partner for the 
development of dual study programmes given that “traditional universities are still very 
reluctant [to participate in dual study programmes and] they say they cannot be oriented 
towards the short term needs of the labour market” (interview DE_N2). Hence, a 
relative increase of students in universities of applied sciences – financed primarily by the 
government and to a (much) lesser extent by employers – emerged as the policy option 
that aggregated the modernisation concerns of the government with the need of 
employers for labour-market ready STEM graduates, working as a second, and arguably 
more effective, ‘coalition magnet’. The consequence of this layering process has been to 
promote a degree of re-differentiation in German higher education, following the early 
years of Bologna that rather responded to a logic of (attempted) de-differentiation 
through conversion. Indeed, with the differential growth of universities of applied 
sciences, the teaching function of higher education has been increasingly located in these 
institutions, while universities were less involved in the Higher Education Pact, and in 
the development of dual study programmes. On the other hand, the Excellence Initiative, 
which was developed roughly in parallel with the Higher Education Pact and disbursed 
competitive funding for research activities, was exclusively targeting traditional research 
universities, despite universities of applied sciences demanding to be allowed to take part 
(hlb 2015). Thus, we notice in parallel with an increase of teaching and training activities 
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in universities of applied sciences, a relatively higher public support for research towards 
traditional universities, counteracting, in essence, the earlier de-differentiating trend.  
 
5.5 Conclusion: back to theory and final remarks 
This chapter assessed the extent to and modes by which higher education provision has 
aligned with labour market demands in Germany. The findings of this chapter can be 
broadly summarised as follows. Institutional change has proceeded both by conversion 
and layering. However, patterns of conversion, that essentially meant blurring boundaries 
between universities and universities of applied sciences and demanding that both types 
of institutions increased the provision of employability and practical skills in their 
curricula, fell short of policy-makers’ and businesses’ expectations. Research universities 
were in this respect the crucial actor to understand this development – or, rather, lack 
thereof. Indeed, research universities, and in particular their faculty members, resisted 
government’s and employers’ call to employability, and rather defended their distinct 
traditional status and function within the German higher education system – that is, to 
provide education and conduct research in separation from the demands of external 
stakeholders. They, in other words, performed the ‘antagonist’ role. In the absence of the 
competitive pressures noted in the British case (and that will be noted in the Korean case 
too), universities were able to ‘defend’ (substantially) the status quo, even in the presence 
of (formally) significant reforms.  
The process of layering, on the other hand, was far more incisive, as we have 
hypothesised in chapter 2 with respect to a political context populated by strong veto-
players (cf. Mahoney and Thelen 2009). In the German case, therefore, we see layering as 
the dominant form of institutional change, taking place in two ways. Firstly, and 
primarily, through the Higher Education Pact, the government increased the size of the 
higher education pie by allocating additional resources to fund the expansion of 
181 
 
 
additional study places. However, these resources have been channelled into universities 
of applied sciences vis-à-vis traditional universities, and into those disciplines that were 
high in demand on the labour market, namely STEM subjects. Secondly, businesses 
stepped up the provision of dual study programmes, which also contributed to meeting 
the need for highly skilled, work-ready graduates in the STEM subjects. The strong 
development of high technical skills in STEM subjects supported by specific policies 
stands in stark contrast with the British case. German employers strongly demanded 
STEM skills owing to the strategic part played by advanced manufacturing in the 
economy, while such demand – as we have seen in the previous chapter – was weak in a 
knowledge economy, such as the British one, dominated by high-end services.  
The chapter also offers two broad insights for theories of institutional change of 
higher education systems and of skill formation systems more in general. Firstly, it 
highlights – as in the British case – the relevance of universities as political actors in 
understanding trajectories of continuity and change in higher education. Specifically, 
higher education institutions appear as a crucial (collective) actor whose role in 
preventing or facilitating change in higher education has been greatly underestimated by 
current approaches that seek to explain the trajectory of change of contemporary 
university systems. Secondly, next to the role of universities, government agency appears 
as a key factor shaping high skill formation. Thus, the chapter also highlights the need for 
re-thinking the political economy of skills at times of shifting balance between university 
education and VET: while analyses of the latter have mostly focused on the role of 
producer groups, the expansion of the former brings to the fore the crucial role retained 
by universities and governments. 
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6 South Korea: from the state to the market and back 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an analysis of institutional change in the South Korean higher 
education system. In particular, the chapter seeks to make sense of the following 
empirical observation: the emergence since (circa) 2010 of the vigorously active role of 
the government in stirring universities to align their educational offer with the labour 
market’s demands, suggesting that the government took a coordinating role in the supply 
of high skills (MOSF 2015c, 2014, 2015b, MOE 2016, 2015a, b, Park 2016, The Chung-
Ang Herald 2016, Yoon 2015a). 
This observation is at odds with conventional wisdom developed in recent years 
regarding South Korean higher education (and the South Korean skill formation system 
and political economy more broadly): as South Korea embarked in the mid-1990s upon a 
clear trajectory of liberalisation which encompassed various policy areas, the higher 
education sector has been significantly deregulated and liberalised and the market was 
upheld by successive governments as the main mechanism in the allocation of skills 
(Woo 2002, Green 2015, Kim and Lee 2006, Kwon 2015, Park 2007, Park 2013b). This 
country-specific empirical puzzle underpins the research question through which I 
approach the Korean case study, namely: why did the government intervene so strongly 
with policies aimed at coordinating skill formation in higher education after they created the 
basis for a liberal skill formation system just over a decade before?  
Based on the theory developed in chapter 2, I located Korea in the top-right 
quadrant of the bi-dimensional categorisation. Cases in this quadrant belong to the East-
Asian coordinated capitalism and they are characterised by high competition among 
universities (similarly to the LMEs – of which we have analysed Britain in chapter 4) 
coupled with an economic structure significantly reliant on (advanced) manufacturing 
(similarly to Continental European CMEs – of which we have analysed Germany in 
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chapter 5). Given this set of similarities, the East-Asian cluster is expected to share some 
features of the process of institutional change with both Britain and Germany. Namely, 
the pattern of institutional change is expected to be similar to the British case – with 
universities willing to satisfy the demands of ‘external’ stakeholders, hence leading to 
encompassing – rather than marginal – institutional change. That is, we expect 
universities’ preferences to conform to the ‘protagonist’ or ‘consenter’ role, rather than to 
act as ‘antagonists’. At the same time, however, the economic structure geared towards 
manufacturing is expected to pose a constraint in the type of high skills sought by 
employers and cultivated by governments making STEM skills crucial for economic 
success, following a similar path as the one observed in the German case (see figure 6.1). 
 
Figure 6.1. Locating South Korea in the bi-dimensional categorisation 
 
Source: own calculations based on OECD (2017) and WIOD 
 
Based on the theoretical framework developed in chapter 2, we therefore outline the 
following observable implications as far as South Korea is concerned: 
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• Universities act as protagonists or consenters 
• Institutional change proceeds by conversion/displacement 
 
The evidence mobilised in this chapter broadly supports the hypothesised trajectory of 
change and it does so through a twofold argument. First, it is argued that recent 
developments in Korean higher education are best interpreted as a case of de-liberalising 
reforms, which were prompted by a disequilibrium created by the previously liberalising 
reforms. I therefore note the government re-establishing and seizing for itself an active 
role in the coordination of skill formation, which closely resembles the approach of the 
developmental state that had been progressively abandoned since the 1980s. The crucial 
difference, however, from the early developmental state is to be found in the ‘partner’ 
chosen by the government to coordinate the supply of skills. While, until the 1980s, the 
government enabled skill formation through businesses providing extensive in-firm 
training, the reforms since the mid-2000s point to universities – not firms – as the main 
actors delivering the high skills needed in the labour market.  
Institutional change proceeded by conversion and displacement – each facilitated 
by a specific public policy initiative, namely Leaders in Industry-University Cooperation 
(LINC) and Programme for Industry-Matched Education (PRIME) respectively. Both 
policies provided selective financial incentives to universities that attuned their 
educational offer to labour market needs. In the case of LINC, universities were asked to 
make their curricula more labour-market relevant by introducing practical skills and 
stepping up cooperation with businesses in the design and delivery of curricula; PRIME, 
instead, was bolder in its demands as it asked universities to adjust their annual intake of 
students to match the government’s skill forecasts and therefore ease the skill-matching 
process in the labour market. In essence, universities who were selected to take part in 
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PRIME were asked to downsize their humanities and social science departments and to 
increase enrolments in engineering.  
Secondly, it is argued that the government was able to drive significant change in 
the higher education sector because of the sector’s high ‘malleability’ due to intense 
competition across universities. Indeed, although the policies pursued by the 
government, and in particular PRIME, have been controversial and at times openly 
opposed from within the higher education sector (Yoon 2015a, Huh and Lim 2016), this 
chapter shows that the strong competition among universities – for students and 
government funds – in a highly marketised higher education system facilitated the 
implementation of the government’s policy and enabled encompassing patterns of 
institutional change in the Korean higher education sector. Compared to the other case 
studies, and as hypothesised in the theoretical framework, government policy resembles – 
in its objectives – the German case (i.e. focusing on feeding discipline-specific high skills 
needed in high-tech manufacturing), while universities’ behaviour – and associated 
patterns of institutional change in the higher education sector – resemble the British case 
study (i.e. universities ‘consenting’ to change, leading to encompassing rather than 
marginal institutional change).  
The structure of the chapter is as follows: the next section outlines by means of 
contextual information the traditional features of the Korean skill formation system until 
the mid-1990s, noting in particular the role retained by the state, and how these features 
were fundamentally altered through a liberalisation process initiated most vigorously in 
the mid-1990s (section 6.2); section 6.3 presents the profound problems in terms of skills 
mismatch and shortages that came with a market-based allocation of skills; the analysis 
then moves on to recent policy initiatives arguing that we can discern a ‘return to the 
state’ as skills coordinator (section 6.4); finally, conclusive remarks in light of the 
theoretical framework are provided (section 6.5). 
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6.2 Context: from the state to the market  
The system of skill formation in South Korea is traditionally considered akin to the 
Japanese one (Green 1999b, 64) and therefore part of the cluster of segmentalist skill 
regimes that is typically found in East Asia (Busemeyer and Vossiek 2016, see Busemeyer 
2009a for an elaboration of key features of segmentalist regimes). This model of skill 
formation was premised on the idea that stable employment relations within a single 
company provided the incentives (and underwrite the risk) for investment in firm-
specific skills, i.e. skills that are valuable primarily within a single firm (Estevez-Abe, 
Iversen, and Soskice 2001). In this respect, a key role in the provision of skills has been 
played by large firms in manufacturing sectors, the Chaebol, through extensive workplace 
training (Park 2013b). The relationship between employment protection and firm-specific 
skills is aptly described in Green (1999a) who discusses how “large national 
conglomerates […] dominate the economy, with the major 10 in 1984 accounting for 
67% of sales and the majority of employment” and “although not formally practising 
lifetime employment policies like Japan, they tend to retain their core staff and are 
therefore prepared to invest heavily in training” (Green 1999a, 270). 
A secondary school system premised on the development of general skills, such 
as literacy and numeracy, has traditionally been the functional complement to a skill 
formation regime heavily geared towards firm-specific skills (Green et al. 1999, Green 
1999b). In short, the traditional features of the skill formation system in Korea can be 
identified in “its highly egalitarian compulsory school systems and extensive in-company 
training in large enterprises” (Park 2013b, 293). In this framework, higher skills – i.e. 
those acquired through tertiary education – did not seem crucial to serving the purposes 
of the rapid industrialisation process, which the country was undergoing through the 
1960s and 1970s. Rapid industrialisation called for a broad pool of intermediate-skilled 
technicians, rather than highly educated workers with strong interpersonal and cognitive 
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skills. Indeed, it is not until the 1980s and, most significantly, the mid-1990s that the 
government relaxed  strict regulation on annual enrolments to university (Kim 2002). In 
other words, the government ensured high rates of participation in (vocational) in-firm 
training by ‘suppressing’ participation in higher education through tight regulation of 
universities’ enrolments. This approach resulted in an ‘artificially’ low rate of enrolments 
in higher education as the government kept at bay the ‘education fever’ of Korean 
families. The latter refers to a profoundly-rooted popular demand for increasingly higher 
levels of education that characterises Korean society at large. The origins of education 
fever are to be found in a set of mutually reinforcing factors that range from Confucian 
cultural heritage to Japanese colonial legacy, compounded by reforms implemented in the 
aftermath of World War II, that abolished tracking in primary education and weakened it 
at secondary level (Seth 2005). Keeping education fever under control through tight 
regulation was therefore a crucial element enabling a segmentalist skill formation regime.   
Segmentalist regimes have often been interpreted in employer-centred terms, i.e. 
with (large) firms as pivotal actors in the system, while the state has been considered to 
underwrite businesses’ efforts through an institutional framework which grants high 
employment protection to core workers (cf. Busemeyer 2009a, Thelen and Busemeyer 
2012). However, a closer look at the Korean system reveals the crucial role of the state in 
creating (or, rather, imposing) the conditions for workplace training leading to a firm-
specific skilled workforce, and the relatively more passive role of firms. In particular, a 
crucial policy development that stirred the Korean skill formation systems towards 
significant involvement of industrial conglomerates in skill formation was the 
introduction of a training levy in 1974. The levy ‘forced’ firms with more than 500 
workers – extended in 1976 to firms with 300 or more workers – to train (Park 2013b, 
295 - 297). The introduction of a training levy signals that a genuine commitment to 
training on the side of firms was hardly ever there: the system was mandatory and it 
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worked precisely because of this feature (Park 2013b, 295, Jeong 1995, 239-240). At the 
same time, however, the levy also worked “as a lever to identify training needs for 
companies” (Green et al. 1999, 309) and ensured therefore that the industrialisation 
process was sustained by adequate skill levels (Jeong 1995).  
In sum, the traditional model of skill formation in Korea – particularly prominent 
in the 1970s and the 1980s – saw heavy involvement from both the state and companies. 
However, unlike the collectivist skill regimes of Western Europe, there is limited 
evidence that (large) companies had a genuine commitment to training, which was rather 
enforced upon them by the state (Park 2013b). The latter had a crucial role not only 
through the establishment of the training levy, but also through the formulation of “a 
clear industrial policy” and “the projected requirements in terms of skills in the key 
industries” which “were informing the design and reforms of education and training 
systems” (Ashton et al. 2002, 11-12, see also Green et al. 1999). In other words, we can 
think of the Korean traditional system of skill formation as coordinated by the state and 
delivered by business. Conversely, universities were traditionally at the margins of the 
Korean skill formation system as governments privileged intermediate skills to higher 
skills and actively kept the higher education sector limited in size, putting a brake on the 
education fever of Korean families. 
The state-organised – and company-delivered – system of skill formation started 
to weaken through the 1980s, until a departure from the model was actively promoted 
and fully enacted by the government in the following decade (Park 2013b, 298). Indeed, 
the 1990s witnessed a sweeping series of changes across policy areas, which affected the 
skill formation system, but went much beyond it. As “the conservative government of 
Kim Young-sam (1993–98) pursued a set of liberalization reforms” (Fleckenstein and 
Lee 2017, 217), the relationship between state and businesses changed significantly, 
affecting also the main features of the skill formation system outlined in the previous 
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section. Notable changes included a liberalisation of the labour market, of the equity 
markets, and of the education system in the form of progressively loosening state control 
over these policy areas. A significant deregulation of the labour market undermined “the 
institutional basis of large company training strategies” (Green 1999a, 275): the 
liberalisation of the equity market weakened the tight control that government had on 
business in the preceding decades (when the government was crucial for businesses to 
access credit), therefore diminishing the scope of government to reign in large firms 
(Ashton et al. 2002, 14, Fleckenstein and Lee 2017) while simultaneously “increasing 
shareholder power and demands for short-term profit […]” hence “endangering the 
strategic approach that major companies […] have taken towards R&D and human 
capital development” (Green 1999a, 275). Most likely, these features alone would have 
been enough to weaken significantly the existing model of skill formation. But the 
government also enacted specific reforms of the vocational training and higher education 
systems which underscored a marked move towards a model closely resembling that of 
LMEs (Park 2013b, 300, Ihm 1999, 319) characterised by (i) weak vocational training 
system, (ii) significant expansion of general skill formation in universities and (iii) the 
market as the chief mechanism of allocation of skills (cf. Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and 
Soskice 2001, Hall and Soskice 2001). 
Key education-related reforms in the 1990s were undertaken under the auspices 
of the Presidential Commission on Education Reform (PCER). The PCER marked a 
departure from a state-led model as the government withdrew from the coordination of 
skill formation in favour of market mechanisms, which were established and actively 
promoted. The reforms enacted by the PCER have been variously defined by scholars as 
radically marketising, deregulating and liberalising (cf. Park 2013b, 2010, Kim and Lee 
2006, Woo 2002). The guiding principle of the reforms, as expressed in the PCER’s 
documents, was inspired by an “explicitly […] neoliberal approach, shifting the role of 
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the government from ‘controlling and regulating’ to ‘encouraging and supporting’” 
(PCER 1996, 83 cited in Park 2013b, 299). The move away from state coordination 
towards market coordination was deemed crucial to put in place an education and 
training system that was no longer serving the needs of rapid industrialisation but rather 
those of the emergent knowledge economy (Cheon 2014, Park et al. 2015). The 
weakening of the state-coordinated training system became clear when the application of 
the levy was gradually restricted through the 1980s and 1990s until it was ultimately 
abolished in 1999 through the Workers Vocational Training Promotion Act (Park 
2013b). Throughout the 1980s alone, the share of firms involved in training declined 
spectacularly from 60.7% to 15.5% (Ra and Shim 2009, 46-47). The gradual 
abandonment of the levy and the resulting change in legislation have been interpreted as 
“leading from a mandatory vocational training system to a voluntary enterprise-led 
system” (Park 2013b, 300). In turn, vocational training became less of an instrument for 
initial skill formation within companies, but it was rather redeployed as a social policy 
buffer for the unemployed, whose financing was shouldered increasingly more by the 
state rather than companies (Ihm 1999, 319, Ra and Shim 2009).  
But it is in the higher education realm that the liberalising efforts of the PCER 
emerged most clearly. Indeed, the establishment of the Commission has been seen as a 
“critical turning point” in Korean higher education policy as it laid out the foundations 
for one of the largest (in terms of participation) and most privatised (in terms of 
financing) higher education systems in the world (Green 2015, 4). As part of the 
neoliberal education reforms, the Kim Young-sam government “facilitated the rapid 
growth of higher education” (Park 2013b, 301) relying on market forces. In particular, 
policy-makers at the time believed that “as the economy became more diversified and 
changed more quickly”, the state should have taken a step back from the coordination of 
the supply of skills in favour market forces (Kim 2002, 30-31). The new interpretation of 
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education policy that the government held in the 1990s – with emphasis placed on the 
supply-side as opposed to the previous demand-side focused approach – is further 
elaborated by Park et al. (2015, 9):  
 
The Kim administration intended to transform the nature of the 
education system in Korea, moving from an education system of a 
developing country whose major focus was on creating human resources, 
to a system that includes quality improvement and diversification of 
education that leads the future of the country in the knowledge-based 
global economy.  
 
In this context, the main thrust of the reform was to move from a “government-led” 
approach towards a model that placed the “emphasis on the role of market”: while the 
former was premised on “providing manpower in direct response to the national 
economic development plans”, the latter was “relying on the function of the market” 
(Park et al. 2015, 9). The withdrawal of the state from tight regulation of virtually all 
aspects of higher education in favour of a system based on market demand meant a 
striking change in policies:  
 
The Plan [set out in the PCER] further reduced central control over the 
establishment of private [universities] and student quotas which led to an 
increase in the number of small and medium sized private institutions in 
regional areas, as well as new graduate schools and online universities. 
The previously used ‘permission’ policy was replaced by the ‘minimal 
conditions’ policy for the establishment of new institutions […] These 
policies were remarkably successful in expanding the higher education 
sector […] In 1990, there were 265 [higher education institutions] 
enrolling 1,691,681 students. By 2005, those figures had increased to 419 
[higher education institutions] enrolling 3,548,728 students. (Green 2015, 
4) 
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The lion’s share of new institutions – and the steep increase in student numbers that 
came with them – was accommodated by private universities (Kim and Lee 2006, 581, 
Chae and Hong 2009), which were given extraordinary freedom not only in setting 
‘quantitative’ targets (i.e. how many students to admit) but also in qualitative criteria. For 
example, private universities were allowed “to choose any screening criteria or 
procedures to select students” (Woo 2002, 13-14). The deregulation of the higher 
education sector unleashed the previously suppressed education fever of Korean families 
(Chae and Hong 2009, 342). Indeed, “Korea ranked first among the OECD member 
states on the proportion of private expenditure spent on educational institutions at all 
levels in 2004” (Chae and Hong 2009, 342), testifying to the high importance attached by 
Korean families to educational attainments (Kim, Lee, and Lee 2005, Lee 2005, Lee 
2006). The growth in student numbers and participation rates had indeed been 
spectacular through the 1990s to the point that in “2010, 98% of 25-34 year-old Koreans 
attained  an  upper  secondary  education – the  highest  proportion among  OECD  
countries” (OECD 2012b, 1). The steep rise in educational participation, which has only 
slowed down in recent years due to demographic decline (Yonezawa and Kim 2008), is 
captured by the two following figures, which show the trend in (absolute number of) new 
entrants and gross enrolment rates (GER) in tertiary education, respectively. 
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Figure 6.2. Absolute number of new entrants in 4-year universities in Korea (1990-2015) 
 
Source: KEDI (2015, 38) and MOE (n.d.) 
 
Figure 6.3. Gross enrolment rate in tertiary education in Korea (1990-2013) 
 
Source: UNESCO (2017) 
 
The trajectory of expansion of Korean higher education conformed to the ‘partially 
private – mass enrolment’ model depicted in Ben Ansell’s seminal work on the political 
economy of higher education financing and participation (Ansell 2010). Indeed, in the 
Korean case, ‘partially private’ might be perceived as an understatement, as the private 
share of higher education funding stood at an OECD second-highest of 73% in 2011 
(OECD 2014, 241). The massive expansion of higher education through private sources 
has been seen as inevitable at a time when the parallel expansion of the secondary 
education system attracted most of the public budget for education, leading universities 
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to “having to rely on private sources” (Kim and Lee 2006, 581, see also Chae and Hong 
2009). Yet, the expansion of higher education through (primarily) private institutions 
seeking student fees is not the only dimension that led scholars to describe South Korean 
higher education as heavily marketised: private universities are not the only institutions 
placed at the centre of market mechanisms and student tuition fees are not the only 
source of competition for universities. Indeed, the level of tuition fees differs between 
private and public universities, with the former charging an average of just above USD 
8,000 per year, while the latter charges an average of just above USD 5,000 per year 
(OECD 2011, 2016). Yet, in both cases, the revenues from fees can only cover up to 
approximately 70% of a university’s budget (interview KR_N1), leaving a minor – but 
substantial – part of university funding reliant on government subsidies. The latter, 
however, are also allocated through market-based mechanisms to an extent that can be hardly 
found anywhere else across OECD countries, making Korea an outlier in this respect. 
Indeed the allocation of public funds through competitive mechanisms and ‘evaluation 
based’ processes reached in 2008 a share of 90% of the entire public higher education 
budget (Shin 2012, 63). 
Reliance on markets – both in terms of attracting student fees and government 
funding – reveals a higher education sector where universities heavily compete against 
each other. Such competition is sharpened further by the strong vertical differentiation of 
the system, where institutional reputation is considered as a key factor for students 
choosing one higher education institution over the other, hence leading to heightened 
competition among universities to attract students. Indeed, the Korean system of higher 
education is described as carrying “incredible pressure on high school students to secure 
places at the nation’s best – or most highly regarded – universities, as institutional 
reputation and alumni networks are strong predictors of future job prospects” (Park 
2013a). Thus, similarly to what we observed in the British case, students’ reliance on 
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rankings to inform their choice translates into pressure on universities to climb up 
rankings and become therefore a more appealing option to prospective students. The 
OECD notes in this respect that the vast majority of universities offer degrees across all 
subjects, leading to a very tenuous functional differentiation (that is, horizontal 
differentiation) among institutions but rather highlighting universities’ position in 
rankings as “by far the main distinguishing factor” between them (that is, vertical 
differentiation) (OECD 2009, 140). The multi-faceted competition, which has been even 
increasing in recent years due to a shrinking cohort of new entrants to university and 
therefore a smaller pool of prospective fee-paying students (cf. Yonezawa and Kim 
2008), was sharply captured by one of the interviewees, the Dean of the Engineering 
Faculty at a public university, underscoring how fierce competition has not spared public 
universities: 
 
We [universities] compete: for government funding, for ranking, for 
incoming students…the number of incoming students is going to 
decrease dramatically in the future so recruiting students is one of the big 
issues and we cannot avoid competition. (interview KR_U10) 
 
The expectation of an exacerbated competition for students is also noted by scholarly 
analyses that illustrate how:  
 
as the number of high school graduates starts to decline and as the 
enrolment rate of higher education is already very high, the demand for 
higher education is expected to decline in the near future. This certainly 
will create financial pressure on some universities, as many Korean 
institutions rely on tuition revenue as the major income source. (Kim and 
Lee 2006, 564-565) 
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6.3 The problematic market-based allocation of skills: business dissatisfaction 
between mismatches and shortages 
The reforms undertaken in the mid-1990s have therefore led to a higher education 
system with two key features: firstly, higher education enjoyed huge popularity among 
secondary school-leavers and their families, becoming – in essence – a mass system in just a 
few years; secondly, the combination of high reliance on student fees, competitive 
allocation of government funding and highly vertical differentiation among institutions 
led to a system characterised by intense competition among universities. Yet, these two features, 
while heralded in the early 1990s as key ingredients for a successful transition into the 
knowledge economy did not deliver the results that the government had expected 
(Cheon 2014, 224). As the remainder of this section will discuss in greater detail, 
problems of skills mismatch became evident in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and 
business at the ‘receiving end’ of the skills formation process in the higher education 
system became increasingly dissatisfied with Korean universities. 
Broadly speaking, employers noted two types of misalignment between university 
provision and labour market needs. The first one has to do with the lack of work-
readiness of graduates, without specific reference to their degrees. The second one refers 
to the specific shortage of STEM graduates that are vital for an economy tightly reliant 
on exports from high-tech manufacturing. Evidence abounds on both accounts and cuts 
across large industrial conglomerates and small and medium sized enterprises. Samsung, 
the largest Chaebol, reported in the early 2000s that “annually invested in re-education of 
newly recruited non-experienced employees KRW80 billion(approximately equivalent to 
£40 million)” (Donga, 2003 cited in Park 2007, 420) which has led to a situation whereby 
large companies prefer poaching experienced workers rather than training new recruits as 
suggested by the observation that while “the total employed workers reduced by 4.4% 
between 1997 and 2003, the share of employed young people by large companies (over 
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300 employees) declined by 9.6% in the same period of time” (Park 2007, 420). The 
picture is even more problematic for SMEs, as suggested by a CEO who illustrated how 
“we [SMEs] do not have enough time to re-educate and train university graduates for 
two years. Therefore, in general, personnel recruitment is centred on experienced 
workers” (Park 2007, 421). 
The expensive process associated with lengthy re-training emerges starkly also by 
looking at more structured evidence produced by employers’ organisations. The results 
of a survey conducted by the Federation of Korean Industries (KFI) released in 2004 
found that “it takes on average 23 months of general management work and 30 months 
of technical work for non-experienced workers to be skilled and knowledgeable to the 
extent that a company requires” (Park 2007, 421, see also Witt 2012, 11). A survey 
released in 2006 by the Korea Employers Federation (KEF) came to roughly similar 
results insofar as findings showed “that it takes 20.3 months on average until they are 
placed in ‘real work’ after training” (Park 2007, 421), and concluded that “61.8% [of the 
companies taking part in the survey] were not satisfied with their [i.e. graduates’] 
performance which shows that scores on personal qualities of employees do not 
correspond to their actual job-related skills” (KEF 2006). This issue is also picked up by 
the OECD that highlights in its country note on Korean higher education how “there are 
substantial complaints, particularly from employers, that the skills of graduates do not 
match the skills required in the labour force” (OECD 2009, 36). 
In addition to a mismatch between the skills that employers demand and those 
produced by the university system, it became clear in the first decade after the turn of the 
century that Korea was facing a more specific problem of skill shortages in a strategic 
area of the economy, namely high skills in manufacturing. An analysis by Woo argues 
that: 
 
198 
 
 
Technicians and engineers are also in serious shortage in Korea’s 
backbone industries such as electronics, automobiles, and machinery. 
Such groups of professional manufacturing workers cannot be produced 
in a short period of time. Nurturing them takes a systematic and 
intensive investment like regular schooling at the technical high school or 
university level. In view of Korea’s stage of industrialization now, it is 
likely that the present situation of shortage of technicians and engineers 
would persist or worsen, which implies the danger of serious 
undermining of Korea’s long term competitiveness base. (Woo 2002, 19) 
 
Along the same lines, Yonezawa and Kim (2008) argue that: “in spite of the rising 
number of unemployed among higher education graduates, however, Korea suffers from 
a shortage of quality manpower in production and other engineering fields. The number 
of students applying for science and technology subjects at universities has declined from 
43% in 1997 to 27% in 2001 […]” (Yonezawa and Kim 2008, 206). Again, employer 
surveys return a rather unequivocal picture as summed up by the employers’ association: 
“companies in general lack professionals and technicians irrespective of industry, which 
demonstrates failure of the university education system to meet industrial demands and 
tendencies of high school graduates to avoid science and engineering majors” (KEF 
2005). A report by the OECD painted a similar picture regarding the distribution of 
higher education enrolments: 
 
The most recent data from the Ministry of Education (up to 2006) 
suggests that the situation in science and engineering degrees is rapidly 
worsening […] There has also been a slight decline in the number of 
enrolments in natural sciences. The social sciences and humanities are 
increasingly popular, particularly in the universities, with the number of 
social science enrolments surpassing the number of engineers for the 
first time in 2005. (OECD 2009, 154) 
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The swift expansion of higher education thus led to a paradoxical situation whereby 
policy-makers had to simultaneously face a general over-supply of graduates (and 
corresponding relatively high levels of unemployment among the tertiary educated) and a 
shortage of highly-skilled workers in crucial sectors of the economy such as the high-tech 
sectors of the Korean knowledge economy (KEDI 2006). 
Scholars have identified the deregulation of the higher education sector and the 
parallel shift to a market-based allocation of skills as the main causes for the 
developments of skills mismatches and skill shortage. Even observers who had expressed 
strong support for the deregulation of higher education in the early 2000s came to 
conclusion that “deregulation by itself may not be sufficient enough to ensure intimate 
interplay between higher education sector and business sector” and that “the policies on 
higher education were pursued in a kind of ‘supply-oriented manner’ without enough 
attention given to their linkages with other policies regarding labor market, R&D, and 
industrial development” (Woo 2002, 41). As a result, Kim (2013) illustrates that “the 
rapid expansion of higher education has increased concerns about the quality of 
university graduates and the value of higher education being expressed by different 
stakeholders, especially business leaders and students and parents” (Kim 2013, 240). 
The significant dissatisfaction of employers towards the skills produced in the 
higher education system is captured by the World Competitiveness Survey, which asks 
businesses from across the globe various questions on the state of the economy in their 
country and on the policies needed – from their point of view – to facilitate economic 
competitiveness. One of the questions asks businesses to evaluate whether university 
education meets their needs, and Korea has consistently scored at the low end compared 
to other OECD countries in the late 1990s/early 2000s, as reported in figure 6.4. 
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Figure 6.4. Employers’ response to the statement ‘University education meets the needs of a 
competitive economy’ on a 0-10 scale (average of responses 1999-2004) 
 
Source: own calculations based on IMD World Competitiveness Online 
 
The comparative data from the World Competitiveness Survey is noteworthy because it 
features prominently in government documents and it is mentioned as a source of 
concern that public policies should address if Korea was to stay competitive in the 
knowledge economy (cf. MOEST 2009b, MOEHRD 2005). A 2009 publication released 
by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MOEST), for instance, argues 
that it is imperative for the Korean higher education sector “to better meet the challenges 
of today’s globalized knowledge-based era and the practical needs of students, parents 
and industries” (MOEST 2009b, 1) and as evidence of the unsatisfactory results it is 
reported that “in a 2008 IMD report, Korea ranked 53rd out of 55 countries surveyed in 
terms of university education meeting the needs of a competitive economy” (MOEST 
2009b, 4). Indeed, as will become clear in the next section, the government vigorously 
implemented policies to align higher education offer to labour market needs, with 
particular emphasis from 2010. 
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6.4 Conversion, displacement and (re-) coordination of skill formation in higher 
education 
As illustrated in the previous sections, the Korean skill formation system underwent, 
most prominently in the second half of the 1990s, a fast and profound transformation 
from a segmentalist skill formation system, characterised primarily by large employers 
delivering firm-specific skills through in-company training to a model closely resembling 
a liberal skill formation regime, characterised by weak vocational training, strong 
expansion of higher education and reliance on the market for high skill formation and 
allocation. Yet, it has also been noted how a liberal framework of skill formation 
contributed to a disequilibrium which manifested itself primarily in the form of skill 
mismatches and skill shortages, and more broadly dissatisfaction on the side of firms 
(and government) for the disconnect between higher education and the labour market.  
In this context, the government started to intervene strongly to shape the supply 
of skills produced by the higher education sector. Against the mechanisms of gradual 
institutional change identified in the literature and summarised in table 2.5, the processes 
that took place in Korea are best characterised, initially, as conversion and, subsequently, as 
displacement (cf. Mahoney and Thelen 2009, Streeck and Thelen 2005). Through 
conversion, the government prompted a redeployment of universities’ education to 
match more closely business’ demands. The process of displacement, instead, signalled a 
more fundamental shift in the principle underlying skill formation and in the relationship 
between the state, universities and employers. Indeed, the governments cultivated a “new 
logic of action” (Mahoney and Thelen 2009) within the higher education sector, which 
led to the gradual demise of a pure market-based allocation of high-skills in favour of a 
government-coordinated mechanism of skills allocation. Based on skills forecasts, the 
government demanded that universities prioritise those subjects (namely, STEM) that 
were deemed to be high in demand in the labour market and, conversely, downsize intake 
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in those subjects for which such forecasts suggested weak labour market demand 
(namely, humanities and social sciences).  
Thus, after deregulation and liberalisation were at the core of the reforms 
undertaken by the PCER since the mid-1990s under a Centre-Right government (Rowley 
and Yoo 2013), the Centre-Left government started putting a brake on these processes 
since 2004, when a process of re-regulation gradually started to emerge (Green 2015). 
The Centre-Left government launched two initial policies that aimed at making higher 
education provision more responsive to labour market demands: the initiative New 
University of Regional Innovation (NURI) provided funds for better cooperation 
between universities outside of the Seoul metropolitan area with local companies; next to 
NURI, the programme Nurturing Excellent engineers in Information Technology 
(NEXT) supported the improvement of engineering education with a view to 
heightening its labour market relevance (Rowley and Yoo 2013, 76). Yet, when Centre-
Right governments were back in power between 2008 and 2017, they did not reverse the 
re-regulation trend started under the Centre-Left, but they rather reinforced it. In 2012, 
the government assessed the policy initiatives put in place by the Centre-Left to align 
higher education provision and labour market needs and considered them overall 
successful, although it was also noted that they “partly overlapped and were 
unsystematic” (Rowley and Yoo 2013, 76). In particular, the government noted that until 
2012 the alignment of higher education and labour market relied on a rather fragmented 
policy landscape as illustrated by the Minister of Education, Science and Technology: 
 
Activities regarding industry-university (I-U) cooperation have been 
considered as secondary and peripheral programs conducted only within 
university sites. There are government-subsidized initiatives currently 
being operated for I-U cooperation, but they are applicable to only a 
limited number of departments at selected universities and inadequate 
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for colleges to establish sustainable I-U partnership systems for 
themselves. The LINC Initiative was planned to overcome this 
shortcoming. The goal is to reform college education systems, promote 
the growth of local industries, and link graduation and employment 
through I-U collaboration. In addition, existing I-U cooperation 
initiatives will be integrated into the LINC Initiative and expanded to 
create greater synergies. The LINC initiative will facilitate key programs 
such as hands-on experiments, on-site training, internships […] which 
can nurture the right talents required by industry […] (Lee 2013, 466) 
 
Hence, LINC stands out as the government’s response developed to provide a single 
policy framework in support of the ‘conversion’ of university programmes towards more 
labour market relevance. The process of displacement, instead, occurred within the 
framework of the so-called Programme for Industry-Matched Education (PRIME), 
which was established in 2015 and implemented since 2017. As demographic 
developments made younger cohorts of entrants into higher education smaller and 
smaller, the government was not only concerned with increasing graduates’ job-readiness 
(as addressed through LINC) but it also put in place a swift response to avert the skill 
shortages in crucial fields of the Korean knowledge economy. Under the heading of 
“Reorganizing college courses to meet social demands”, the 2016 Education Plan 
introduced PRIME as a policy aimed at increasing “‘student enrolment […] for courses 
that have high demand (e.g. engineering)” (MOE 2016, 14). Critically, it appears clear 
that when the government document refers to “high demand”, the reference is to 
“employers’ high demand”. Indeed, section 6.4 illustrated the twin trend of increasing 
demand for highly-skilled engineers and other highly-skilled technicians by Korean firms, 
while secondary school-leavers appeared as rather avoiding these subjects. The remainder 
of this section illustrates these two policies and provides an analysis of the associated 
patterns of institutional change. 
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Leaders in Industry-University Cooperation  
LINC has been identified as a “representative government-funded project to promote 
cooperation between industry and academia” (Park et al. 2015, 2). The policy provided 
funding to over 50 universities “to match the educational and research activities […] to 
the demands of industry” (Park et al. 2015, 19).  
The annual funding that the government provided to support the universities’ 
activities has varied year-on-year within the range of (approximately) 180 and 260 billion 
Won, corresponding to (approximately) £125 and £180 million (Park et al. 2015, MOSF 
2016a). Notably, the project enjoyed wide popularity among universities: out of over 160 
Korean universities, more than 90 applied for the project  and 51 were selected in 2012 
as LINC universities16 (MOSF 2016a). To be selected for LINC, universities were subject 
to a two-staged selection process. In the first step, the government assessed “the basic 
competence of the university and their potential for exercising industry-university 
cooperation” (Hanyang University 2014, 2), while in the second phase universities 
submitted “detailed business plans” including “their specific goal and means of attaining 
the objectives” (Hanyang University 2014, 2). The policy design of LINC speaks directly 
to the problems of skills mismatch highlighted in the previous section and the complaints 
raised by employers regarding work-readiness of graduates. These themes emerge clearly 
from government documents highlighting the strategic direction of higher education 
policy just before the launch – and throughout the time of implementation – of LINC. 
The Education Plan of 2010 argued that “for undergraduate students, the ministry will 
provide an industry-tailored curriculum and employment linkage programs at selected 
exemplary universities for industry-academy collaboration” (MOEST 2009a, 30). In 2011, 
the MOEST argued that “more hands-on experience and internships will be made 
                                                
 
16 The number of universities changed slightly year-on-year but always stayed between 50 
and 60. 
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available through closer university-government-industry cooperation and by deploying 
industry workers to the campus” (MOEST 2011, 12-13). These aims were finally turned 
into practice in 2012 when the 51 LINC universities were designated as “leaders in 
industry-university cooperation” and received financial support from the government to 
enact their curricular reforms (MOSF 2012, 7). LINC was therefore seen by the 
government as a crucial response to the critical problem identified by the Ministry as that 
of students being “not equipped to meet the job market demand because they are not 
taught practical skills at school but only theory-based skills” (MOE 2013, 1). 
Indeed, the inclusion of practical skills in curricula features prominently among 
the activities that universities promoted through LINC: internships have been made 
compulsory parts of the curricula; capstone design projects, i.e. cooperative projects 
between groups of students and business partners, have also been made part and parcel 
of the educational experience; and dialogue with business to tailor curricula to their needs 
has been stepped up (Hanyang University 2014, KMU 2011, Hanbat National University 
2016). These activities have been most prominent in STEM-related departments, but 
they were also expanded across departments to cover other areas, such as the social 
sciences (interviews KR_N1, KR_N5, KR_U1, KR_U2, KR_U8, KR_U9). The tailoring 
of the university’s education towards business has also been publicly presented by 
participating universities as a key strength of their curricular offer. This approach can be 
observed across Korean universities: public and private institutions alike, and those with 
both high and low standing in rankings have used LINC as an example of ‘greater value’ 
of their educational offer as the following examples illustrate. A publication by the 
Hanbat National University – a public university outside of the Seoul metropolitan region 
and with average prestige and status (around the 60th place across various rankings) – 
illustrates how through LINC the university has been able to: “trigger university 
education to cope with demands of the rapidly changing industries” as well as “reduce 
206 
 
 
the gap between educational and demands of the industries” and “resolve mismatch of 
employment, strengthening the work experience and skills of students” (Hanbat National 
University 2016, 18). Along the same lines, Hanyang University, a private university in the 
Seoul metropolitan area enjoying high reputation and consistently included among the top 
10 universities in the country (see table 1 below for an overview of the top 20 Korean 
universities), argues that the university will “adjust their education into a more industry 
university cooperation favorable atmosphere by improving and specialising curriculums 
into more practical and experience based classes where students can actually benefit” and 
goes on to suggest that through LINC the university  
 
also plans to meet the demands of regional industries by cultivating 
skilled manpower and alleviating the unemployment of young people at 
the same time. The program’s emphasis is to foster students equipped 
with high-tech knowledge and skills through cooperative means between 
university and industry. (Hanyang University 2014, 1)  
 
A similar approach was described in an interview by the Director of LINC at 
Kookmin University – also a private university in Seoul but not as high in ranking as 
Hanyang (around 25th place across rankings) – who illustrated how through LINC “we 
[Kookmin University] plan to develop practical workforce with convergence and 
integration capability that meets industry’s demand and global workforce with creativity 
and leadership” (KMU 2011, 2). 
 
Programme for Industry-Matched Education 
Yet, while LINC addressed the issue of skill mismatch by asking universities to tailor 
their curricula to include the practical skills that industry demands, it did not tackle the 
parallel problem described in the previous section of skill shortages in STEM disciplines, 
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and in engineering in particular. If anything, the issue of skill shortage, exacerbated by a 
shrinking cohort of university entrants, became an even more pressing item on the 
government’s agenda in 2014. Indeed, in that year, the Ministry of Employment and 
Labour published a report titled “Prospects of Manpower Conditions Classified by 
Majors from 2014 to 2024” that triggered the initiation – next to LINC – of PRIME (cf. 
Park 2016, The Chung-Ang Herald 2016). The Ministry of Labour’s report provided two 
key pieces of information that would inform government policy. Firstly, the report 
pointed out that “ten years from now, the number of graduates who major in 
Engineering will be in short supply by about 260,000 people. On the other hand, the 
number of graduates who major in Liberal Arts, Social Sciences and Arts will be in 
excessive supply by about 530,000 people” (The Chung-Ang Herald 2016, Park 2016). 
Secondly, the report highlighted that, next to the skill shortages, the employment outlook 
of STEM graduates is significantly better than social sciences and humanities. Indeed, 
current statistics report an employment rate around 15% higher for engineering 
graduates compared to graduates in humanities and social sciences (75% compared to 
58% and 61.5% respectively) (KEDI 2015, 41). 
These two findings from the Ministry of Labour and Employment triggered the 
policy discussions that would have led to the initiation of PRIME – a competitive 
allocation of funding that forces universities, if selected for the project, to downsize their 
humanities and social science departments and increase enrolments in STEM subjects, 
and in particular in engineering (Park 2016). In the run-up to the initiation of PRIME, 
both the Ministry of Education (MOE) and the Ministry of Strategy and Finance 
(MOSF) which granted the budget line to the MOE, introduced the notion of 
“restructuring university programmes” (MOSF 2015b) and “restructuring of universities 
to increase competitiveness of higher education” (MOE 2015a, 6) as part of a broader 
strategy to combat youth unemployment (MOSF 2015b) and to stimulate the economic 
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competitiveness of the country along with reforms of the public sector and the financial 
sector (MOSF 2015c). The MOE announced therefore that PRIME would be enacted in 
its Education plan 2015, where it was mentioned that departments “will be consolidated 
to better meet the demands of industries, and those colleges that actively implement 
consolidation will receive further support” (MOE 2015a, 3). The successive plan, in 
2016, under the emphatic heading of “Reorganizing college courses to meet social 
demands” provides details regarding the plan, most importantly that “student enrolment 
will be increased for courses that have high demand (e.g. engineering)” and that the 
“PRIME project will receive 200 billion Korean Won of financial support” (MOE 2016, 
14). The Minister for Education, commenting on PRIME, argued that “the country 
needs to accurately calibrate the needs of the society and provide plans on meeting such 
needs” and that these needs translate, as far as education policy is concerned, to finding a 
way “to reduce the gap between what industry needs and what the universities provide” 
(Yoon 2015b). The underlying principles of PRIME are therefore in line with those of 
LINC, but PRIME takes a significantly more prescriptive approach: 11% of new entrants 
to ‘PRIME institutions’ are expected to be adjusted according to governments’ skills 
forecasts (MOSF 2016b), leading according to government’s estimates to 20,000 
enrolments to be re-organised in the first four years of prime (MOE 2015b, 15). As such, 
PRIME “aims to fulfil the industrial needs such as the demand for science, IT and 
engineering, which has been increasing” (Lee and Byeon 2016, 2). 
  
Institutional change through government policy 
The two policies just outlined – and PRIME in particular – show a marked change of 
direction in skill formation compared to the mid-1990s. Indeed, when the government 
found itself facing stark problems of skills mismatch and skill shortages, the Ministry of 
Education first nudged universities through LINC to establish better connections with 
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the labour market, and then took a much more active role in the coordination of skills 
formation through PRIME. After the strong emphasis on liberalisation and deregulation 
that we noted in the 1990s, the guiding principle in skill formation adopted through 
PRIME resembles much more closely the idea underlying the state-coordinated regime 
outlined at the beginning of the chapter. Indeed, the MOSF argued in 2015 that “in order 
to promote the education sector reform, the government will release the mid-term human resources 
demand outlook in October and have universities adjust the number of students” (MOSF 2015c, 1 
emphasis added). More precisely, the MOSF has pointed out that PRIME will be used to 
“restructure university programs to meet industrial demand and prepare for the future” 
and that this process will be enacted through the release of “5 and 10 year labor force 
supply and demand outlooks by university major, in order for universities to refer to the 
outlooks when restructuring their programs” (MOSF 2015b). Thus, compared to the 
model of coordination outlined at the beginning of the chapter, there appears a 
resurgence of the government in matching skills supply and demand, though with a 
different partner: namely universities, instead of business. While LINC is therefore an 
example of conversion, i.e. universities – through incentives set by the government – 
redeploying their educational offer to new objectives, namely matching labour market 
needs, PRIME is best understood as a case of displacement occurring both at the 
national level of policy-making and at university- level. At the national-level we observe a 
marked movement away from the market as the chief mechanism of allocation of skills 
through a deregulated higher education sector in favour of a re-regulated sector where 
the government coordinates the supply of skills by demanding that universities adjust to 
skills’ forecasts. In other words, the market mechanism introduced in the mid-1990s has 
been gradually displaced in favour of a mechanism where state coordination becomes (or, 
rather, returns to being) more prominent. Indeed, one of the key mechanisms by which 
displacement occurs is through the “rediscovery and activation of dormant or latent 
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institutional resources” (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 31), such as state coordination of skill 
formation in this case. At the university-level, the process of displacement can be seen 
across the PRIME institutions which, quite literally, displaced enrolments, courses and in 
some cases departments to match student intake with the government’s skill forecasts, 
that are in turn driven by considerations around employment rates and labour market 
needs.  
Looking at the distribution of universities selected for both LINC and PRIME, 
we note that also top institutions, as commonly perceived by one of the leading university 
rankings in Korea – the one produced by the JoongAng Daily – have been keen to 
engage with these programmes and restructure their curricula and yearly intakes 
accordingly. More precisely, table 6.1 shows which universities within the top 20 of the 
JoongAng Daily ranking took part in either policies. The presence of several leading 
universities – both private and public – in LINC and PRIME is strong evidence that 
institutional change has been encompassing (rather than marginal), as expected by the 
theoretical framework, i.e. institutional change affected universities across types (both 
public and private) and status (both more and less ‘prestigious’ institutions). This 
observation, as hypothesised, provides a strong parallel with the British case – and it 
contrasts starkly with the German one. It is particularly telling that within the top 10 of a 
highly selective higher education system, five universities have taken part in LINC 
and/or PRIME.  
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Table 6.1. Participating universities in LINC and PRIME among top universities 
University ranking 
1. Seoul National University 
2. Sungkyunkwan University + 
3. Hanyang University (Seoul campus) 
4. Yonsei University (Seoul campus) 
5. Korea University (Anam campus) 
6. Sogang University + 
7. Ewha Women University * 
8. Chung-Ang University + 
9. Hanyang University (ERICA campus) * + 
10. The University of Seoul 
11. Kyung Hee University 
12. Pusan National University + 
13. Inha University + 
14. Hankuk University of Foreign Studies 
15. Kyungpook National University * + 
16. Chonbuk National University 
17. Chungnam National University + 
18. Dongguk University (Seoul campus) + 
19. Chonnam National University 
Source: Korea JoongAng Daily (2015) 
Note: + = selected for LINC; * = selected for PRIME; names in italic denote public universities; all the 
others are private universities. 
 
The availability of more specific data on universities’ participation in LINC provides 
even stronger evidence in support of the encompassing nature of the process of 
institutional change. Tables 6.2 and 6.3 show in particular three features of LINC: firstly, 
if we compare the total number of higher education institutions in the country with the 
total number of institutions that applied for LINC, we note that the policy has been 
hugely popular; secondly, LINC has been even more popular across universities than 
junior colleges (i.e. vocationally-oriented institutions); among the former, over 57% of 
institutions applied, while among the latter the figure drops to just below 52%; thirdly, 
universities have been remarkably more successful at attracting LINC funds, with over 
90% of LINC budget being assigned to universities. 
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Table 6.2. Funding and applicants for LINC 
 
Year 
 
Budget (£17) Successful applicants 
 
Total applicants Total institutions 
All higher education institutions 
2012 125,580,000 81 166 303 
2013 186,990,000 80 -- -- 
2014 178,227,000 86 -- -- 
Universities 
2012 117,300,000 51 92 160 
2013 169,740,000 51 -- -- 
2014 164,772,000 56 -- -- 
Junior Colleges 
2012 8,280,000 30 74 143 
2013 17,250,000 29 -- -- 
2014 13,455,000 30 -- -- 
Source: own calculations based on MoE documents 
 
Table 6.3. The engagement of universities with LINC 
Year LINC budget of universities/total LINC budget 
Universities implementing LINC/higher 
education institutions implementing 
LINC 
2012 93% 63% 
2013 91% 64% 
2014 92% 65% 
Source: own calculations based on MoE documents 
 
The data presented in tables 6.2 and 6.3 speaks strongly to the consenter role of 
universities, which engaged extensively with LINC. This observation contrasts with the 
German pattern of high skill formation where universities have been mostly reluctant (i.e. 
antagonists) when government and employers demanded their deeper engagement with 
skill formation policies, which have in turn been welcomed by vocationally-oriented 
universities of applied sciences. In Korea, the reverse holds true as vocationally-oriented 
                                                
 
17 The figures are indicative as they have been converted into British pounds using the 
exchange rate of 23rd November 2017, but they nonetheless provide an indication of the 
size of the budget. In the local currency, the total budget for LINC for 2012, 2013 and 
2014 has been respectively 182, 271 and 258 billion Won. 
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institutions were nowhere near as successful as (research) universities at attracting the 
public funds attached to the corresponding government policy. 
Why did universities – even at the very top of the ranking – decide to second 
these policies? The question is particularly relevant for both policies but even more so 
for PRIME, given that its strongly prescribing nature stirred much controversy across 
Korean campuses, some of which saw strong protests from students, for instance at 
Ewha Women University and Inha University (Huh and Lim 2016). More broadly, the 
President of the Korea University Student Association (KUSA) took distance from 
PRIME and argued that universities “seem to be adjusting the students to fit to the 
companies” and that such a move would compromise “the essence of the humanities as 
the universities turn into employment factories” (Lee 2016, 3). To understand the keen 
engagement of universities with this policy, experts working on higher education pointed 
unequivocally to the strong competition within the Korean higher education market. A 
former civil servant in the MOE discussed this issue in the following terms:  
 
Why did universities follow PRIME? Money! I am hungry, I need to 
survive. […] Tuition can only cover 70% of total spending [at a 
maximum], for the rest you need to get money from government, or 
donations. […] After tuition the second source of revenue is government 
funding, and that is why universities look into government funding. 
(interview KR_N1) 
 
Similarly, a representative from a think-tank working on education policy explained that 
“tuition is not enough…the government intentionally fixes the level of tuition so that 
universities, given tuition level, cannot run. So they kind of beg for extra money from 
outside. The government is using financial resource [to stir universities]” (interview 
214 
 
 
KR_N3). These views echoed those from within the higher education sector. An 
interviewee from a public university explained that:  
 
about 20 years ago we didn’t have these programmes…they just gave 
general funding to each…however they didn’t increase the money at 
all…then they decided whom to give the money to…specific money (e.g. 
LINC, PRIME) may not be that much but this can change some 
things…it is not stable…at least in our university sometimes this is only 
5%, but when it was highest, about three years ago, it was more than 
20% of the total university budget including student fees…now we’ve 
lost in a few programmes and it’s gone down again because we lost to 
the competition….so this is significant…They [the government] enjoy 
controlling the university, given that it is their money! (interview 
KR_U10) 
 
This explanation – if anything – was reinforced by a representative of a private university 
who argued that: “private universities are responding to that [government policy] because 
of competition” (interview KR_U2). More broadly, interviewees across the board 
highlighted the competitive pressures that universities are subject to in the Korean higher 
education system and how such pressures make universities likely to respond positively 
to governments’ demands, if these are backed by financial rewards (interviews KR_N1, 
KR_N5, KR_U1, KR_U2, KR_U10, KR_U11). These interview findings are supported 
by scholarly assessments of the Korean higher education system pointing out that the 
reforms undertaken in the 1990s created a legacy in the higher education system which 
made it “highly amenable to market-based reform policies” (Kim and Lee 2006, 581). 
Thus, in a context of high competition for public and private funds, universities have 
little choice but to follow the demands set out by external stakeholders, if these are 
conducive – directly or indirectly – to achieving gains in the multi-faceted competition 
for funds, students and – more broadly – prestige.  
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Indeed, the views of these stakeholders regarding the high responsiveness of 
universities to external demands in a context of high competition for funds is clear when 
we consider the value of PRIME to individual institutions:  
 
The chosen nine universities in the big type will get 15 billion Won each. 
In 2015, 11 out of 20 universities reduced their budget and those 20 
universities’ budget averages were about 26.4 billion Won. In this 
situation, the support funds from the PRIME Project amount to more 
than half of the budgets of most of the universities. In the case of 
Sookmyung Women’s University, their budget was about 17 billion Won 
last year. They get more than two thirds of their a year [sic] budget by 
being elected as one of the PRIME Project universities. Huh Seongsil, 
the member of “University for Everyone,” an organization of university 
students, said, “Schools have no choice but to embrace the project 
guidelines because they are in need of greater funding”. (Lee and Byeon 
2016, 19-20, see also Park 2016 on the finance-related motives of 
universities joining PRIME) 
 
Competition for funds is certainly a crucial driver of universities’ behaviour. Next to it 
however, stakeholders explained how reputational gains also arise from greater 
government funding. Again, this analysis was shared by stakeholders in the higher 
education system who explained how universities use government funds as a way of self-
promoting their educational offer, so being more appealing to prospective students and 
therefore having a conjoint effect of attracting increasing private revenues thanks – and 
in addition – to public subsidies (interviews KR_U1, KR_N3). As an interviewee put it: 
“it is also good PR material for universities if they get funding from these projects. Some 
universities had a hard time recruiting their students and for universities like that getting 
the government funding is a very significant PR issue” (interview KR_N3, also interviews 
KR_2, KR_N4). The strategic reasoning (and behaviour) that was observed across 
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Korean universities is therefore highly compatible with the incentives set imposed on 
universities by a highly competitive higher education sector and illustrated also by the 
British case in section 4.2. Conversely, it stands in stark contrast with the empirical 
observations collected in Germany, where competition among universities did not appear 
to be a significant lever of change. However, the Korean and German cases displayed 
close similarities with respect to the objectives of government policy: responding to the 
skill shortages and mismatches endangering their respective advanced manufacturing 
sectors, the Korean and German governments intervened in the supply of high skills by 
promoting STEM skills and engineering in particular through public policies such as 
PRIME and the Higher Education Pact. 
 
6.5 Conclusion: back to theory and final remarks 
This chapter provided an analysis of high skill formation in Korea by tracking recent 
reforms in the higher education sector. These reforms have been interpreted as a case of 
de-liberalisation prompted by the government after a disequilibrium in the form of skill 
mismatch and skill shortage emerged from the liberalising reforms undertaken in the 
mid-1990s. Indeed, as the government actively promoted a liberalisation of the higher 
education system and a market-based allocation of high skills, a set of skills that were 
crucial for the advanced-manufacturing base of the emergent Korean knowledge 
economy – namely: STEM skills – was undersupplied. This concern led governments 
from the mid-2000s onwards to change the approach to high skill formation. The same 
market mechanisms heralded in the 1990s as a key ingredient for the knowledge 
economy were increasingly marginalised by the government in favour of government-
coordinated mechanisms for the supply of high skills. This process of re-regulation of 
high skill formation reached its peak with the implementation of PRIME, through which 
universities had to adjust the distribution by discipline of incoming students according to 
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the government’s forecast of skills needed in the labour market. The chapter also showed 
that the high level of competition among universities within the Korean higher education 
system made them particularly malleable in responding to government policy and 
institutional change has therefore been comprehensive, taking the form of conversion 
and displacement.  
The process of government-led adjustment resembled in its underlying logic the 
traditional Korean model of skill formation as described in section 6.2, with the major 
difference that government forecasts did not determine in-firm skill formation as in the 
traditional model in the 1970s but rather shaped the supply of high skills provided by the 
higher education sector. In this sense, and in line with the German chapter, the argument 
developed through the Korean case also provides broader insights to understand how 
skill formation systems in CMEs are changing at times of higher education expansion 
and the increased importance of high skills to success in the knowledge economy. In 
particular, it is highlighted how the defection of businesses from the institutional 
arrangement typical of the industrialisation period and the strong preference for a 
university education on the side of secondary school-leavers and their families do not 
lead automatically to a convergence towards a liberal model of skill formation. Rather, we 
have noted in both the German and the Korean cases how the state can take a crucial 
role in (re-) coordinating high skill formation in the knowledge economy. However, 
government policy is also significantly mediated by the incentives that universities 
themselves have in adjusting to the demands of external stakeholders. Along this 
dimension, the Korean case has proved to be one of ‘encompassing’ change that 
resembles more closely the British case, rather than the German example of change ‘at 
the margin’. Competition (or lack thereof) among universities has been identified as a 
crucial mechanism that allowed the detection of encompassing (or marginal) patterns of 
institutional change. More broadly, the Korean chapter highlighted the non-linear 
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trajectory of liberalisation processes. In the Korean case, encompassing liberalisation 
took place across policy areas in the mid-1990s followed, a decade later, by instances of 
re-regulation undertaken by the government to manage disequilibria created by the 
previous liberalising efforts. 
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7 Conclusions 
This final chapter brings together and summarises the findings of the research (section 
7.1); discusses its contributions and limitations and outlines implications for future 
research (section 7.2); finally I argue, as has been discussed at the very beginning of this 
thesis, that aligning higher education provision and labour market needs has become a 
crucial concern for policy-makers, and the policy implications of the research are 
presented (section 7.3). 
 
7.1 Summary of findings against alternative theories 
Empirically, the thesis built on a set of diverse cases (section 3.1 illustrated the rationale 
for case selection) through which three existing theories (outlined in chapter 1) and one 
alternative theory (illustrated in chapter 2) were tested to understand the alignment 
between higher education systems and knowledge-based labour markets and the 
associated patterns of institutional change (see also section 2.5 for a preliminary 
comparison of the observable implications derived from each theory). In this section, we 
first summarise the findings from each case study and we then discuss these findings in 
the light of the rival theories. 
 
Britain 
The first case study focused on Britain, which represents a broader set of cases with 
highly marketised higher education systems and a knowledge economy heavily geared 
towards high-end services (e.g. finance; consultancy). This case falls within the broader 
universe of LMEs. In Britain we have observed two main macro-developments. Firstly, 
the increasing marketisation of higher education (initiated under a centre-left government 
and heightened by a centre-right government) set in motion a number of pressures on 
universities to align their offer from labour market needs. Such pressures came primarily 
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from two mechanisms typical of highly marketised higher education systems: rankings 
and student fees. Universities increasingly looked into skill formation measures as a way 
to perform well in rankings – which are partly driven by the employment outcomes of 
graduates – and thereby be more attractive to prospective (fee-paying) students. But 
students themselves also put pressure on universities to improve their curricula with 
respect to skill formation measures. Interviewees across universities reported this 
demand from students, which was interpreted by universities’ senior staff as students’ 
concern to ensure a return on an increasingly costly investment. It is emblematic that the 
NUS, the largest student organisation, formally put pressure on universities in this 
respect through joint policy work with the largest employers’ association (CBI and NUS 
2011).  
Aware of the competitive pressures and of students’ demands, universities sought 
to engage with businesses to increase the provision of the skills needed in the labour 
market. Unsurprisingly, given the nature of a labour market heavily geared towards high-
end services, the demands of the business community were centred on general skills 
(problem solving; IT literacy; team-work). The effect of the demand side of the economy 
on making general skills more widely and explicitly taught at universities is clear when 
considering the development in a discipline like engineering. Interviewees illustrated how 
engineering no longer has the traditional tight link with employment in the engineering 
profession. As engineering graduates increasingly find employment in high-end services, 
universities engaged more with employers in these sectors, which led to an increase of 
general skills in the curriculum vis-à-vis discipline-specific technical skills.  
The relationship between demand side of the economy and high skill formation 
leads us to the second macro-development observed in Britain, namely the rather 
unsuccessful implementation of policies aimed at creating specific technical skills, 
particularly in the STEM subjects, that both centre-left and centre-right governments 
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promoted through Foundation Degrees and Higher Apprenticeships respectively. The 
weak demand for technical skills, however, led to weak engagement of employers with 
these policy initiatives (FDF 2009, Russell Group 2015), which ultimately remained at the 
margin of the British system of high skill formation. The predominance of high-end 
services in the British knowledge economies was therefore central to understanding the 
inclusion of general skills in university curricula in Britain, while policy initiatives aimed 
at specific technical skill development were far less successful.  
Where did universities stand in this process? Despite some differences between 
faculty and management as to whether and to what extent universities should meet 
business needs when setting out their educational offer (recall figure 4.2), universities 
were key actors in implementing the ‘skills agenda’ even beyond government’s and 
employers’ demands. Interviewees and descriptive statistics provide strong evidence that 
links the increasing competition in the higher education sector with the strategic decision 
of universities to increase the labour market relevance of their educational offer as a way 
to remain attractive – or to increase their attractiveness – towards prospective students 
and to gain reputation in rankings. These initiatives were mostly led by university 
management, who seized increasing power within universities vis-à-vis faculty and were 
therefore in the position to push the skills agenda forward. 
 
Germany 
As we move from Britain to Germany, key variables take opposite values. Germany 
represents a case of a knowledge economy strategically reliant on advanced 
manufacturing and with a higher education sector characterised by limited competition 
between universities. Countries sharing these two features belong to the Continental 
(and, partly, Nordic) European cluster. How did the alignment of higher education and 
knowledge-based labour markets proceed in Germany? The empirical material allowed 
222 
 
 
me to discern two phases. The first one started in the late 1990s with the Bologna 
process, while the second one started in 2007 with the Higher Education Pact. In the 
first phase, policy-makers and businesses seized the opportunity offered by Bologna to 
increase their voice in the university system. Indeed, by the late 1990s, the German 
higher education system was perceived as hard to reform, inward looking and 
irresponsive to the demands of those stakeholders external to the system. In particular, 
research universities were accused of neglecting labour market needs when setting out 
their educational offer. Universities of applied sciences, on the other hand, were 
perceived as more responsive and dynamic but any attempt to expand them was vetoed 
by politically powerful research universities (Toens 2009).  
Given the previous failed attempts to expand universities of applied sciences, 
policy-makers and businesses used the opportunity provided by Bologna – which 
emphasised skills and employability in university curricula – to make traditional 
universities more responsive to labour market needs. This effort took place in the 
context of overhauling degree structures and conforming them to the tiered structure 
promoted at European level under the auspices of the Bologna process. Yet, it met the 
firm opposition of universities – and, most prominently, of their faculties – that opposed 
what they perceived as a ‘downgrading’ of university education to mere training. 
Furthermore, they feared that research universities’ degrees would become increasingly 
similar to those offered by universities of applied science, implying a loss of status of 
traditional universities vis-à-vis universities of applied sciences. Because of this 
opposition, curricular reforms in the context of Bologna did not lead to substantial 
changes, leaving policy-makers and businesses rather dissatisfied (BMBF 2007, BDA 
2003, 2006b, Gillmann 2006). 
Yet, while the ‘conversion’ of universities’ degrees towards more labour market 
relevance was hampered by the opposition ‘on the ground’ of academic faculties, more 
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students than ever enrolled in German universities. Net entry rates to university went up 
from 36% to 51% in only five years between 2007 and 2011 (Hüther and Krücken 2014).  
Policy-makers and businesses alike feared that the massive expansion in the context of an 
irresponsive higher education sector would endanger the skill-base of the export-oriented 
German economy, in particular with respect to the perceived vital need of STEM 
graduates equipped with practical skills (BDA 2008). The Higher Education Pact, 
implemented from 2007, offered the opportunity to side-step universities’ opposition to 
expand universities of applied sciences. The increase of students above and beyond 
previous forecasts allowed the government to pursue a policy specifically designed to 
create additional study places to meet increasing demand. Given that through the Pact the 
government increased the size of the higher education pie, the room for political 
manoeuvre was larger compared to previous attempts aimed at redistributing financial 
resources within the system, which is by and large a zero-sum game, and that, as such, 
had been veto-played by universities. Through the Pact, the government created 
additional study places specifically targeting the expansion of universities of applied 
sciences and STEM subjects (BMBF 2014, 2009) and therefore meeting the skills needs 
of a knowledge economy that is highly reliant on advanced manufacturing.  
Businesses not only lobbied strongly in favour of the policies implemented 
through the Pact, but they also gave a direct contribution to the expansion of STEM 
skills in universities of applied sciences through the financing of an increasing number of 
dual study programmes. These are work-based learning programmes in which students 
share their time between a university (usually a university of applied sciences) and a 
company, towards the completion of an undergraduate degree (often in STEM subjects), 
while also strengthening their professional skills through on-the-job training. Employers 
establish these programmes through direct collaboration with universities of applied 
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sciences and select candidates for dual study programmes while also partially financing 
them through a stipend that students receive for the duration of the programme.  
Stark differences between the German and British case stand out: the most 
obvious is the opposite behaviour of universities and employers across the two cases. 
While universities were a ‘driving force’ of the skills agenda in high-competition Britain, 
their stance was one of open opposition in low-competition Germany. Employers – on 
the other hand – were more passive in the British context while they played a more active 
role in the German case, in particular through consistent lobbying for more STEM skills 
and by offering degrees in STEM subjects themselves by cooperating with universities of 
applied science, which testifies to the crucial importance of STEM skills for knowledge 
economies that rely strategically on advanced manufacturing.  
 
South Korea 
We complete the summary of findings moving on to the Korean case, which is 
methodologically crucial to assess the generalisability of findings given that it shares 
similarities and differences across the two key variables of interest with the cases of 
Britain and Germany. More specifically, the higher education sector in many ways 
resembles the high competition setting that we have found in Britain, while the structure 
of the Korean knowledge economy offers a parallel with Germany’s above-average 
reliance on advanced manufacturing. The combination of high-competition in the higher 
education sector and high reliance on advanced manufacturing speaks to a set of East 
Asian advanced capitalist countries, most notably Japan. What kind of pattern did we 
find in Korea? Compared to the rather linear development that we have found in Britain, 
the Korean case displays significant variation over time, similarly to the German case. 
The first phase started in the mid-1990s when the PCER mandated a clear shift from 
state control of higher education in favour of a deregulated system heavily reliant on 
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market-mechanisms for the supply of high skills (Park 2013b). In just a few years, a 
higher education system whose size was traditionally tightly controlled and regulated by 
the government became essentially universal with gross enrolment rates nearing 100%.  
 Private universities flourished and private funding quickly came to make up the 
lion’s share of total higher education funding with universities particularly dependent 
upon student tuition fees for their survival. Market mechanisms were further oiled by the 
introduction of competitive allocation of public funds for 90% of the total public budget 
of universities. The strong liberalisation of the higher education sector was heralded by 
governments in the mid-1990s as a crucial ingredient for a successful transition of Korea 
to the knowledge economy as governments believed that markets provided the most 
effective mechanism of skills allocation. Yet, problems of skill shortage and mismatch 
had already arisen by the early 2000s. In particular, according to several accounts 
(including those of employers and government but also of researchers) university 
education was not preparing students for the world of work leading to lengthy in-firm re-
training programmes (KEF 2005, 2006). Furthermore, the distribution of students across 
disciplines showed that STEM disciplines tended to be avoided by students, making 
governments and employers fear a shortage of workers possessing those skills that were 
perceived as vital for the Korean knowledge economy based on advance manufacturing.  
Responding to skills shortages and mismatches, governments promoted two 
policies, LINC and PRIME, that aimed to align higher education provision with labour 
market needs (MOEST 2009b, MOSF 2014, 2015a). Through LINC, the government 
supported curricular changes that emphasised practical skills and cooperation with 
businesses in the design and delivery of curricula. PRIME was bolder in its demands as it 
asked universities to adjust their annual intake of students to match the government’s 
skill forecasts and therefore ease the skill-matching process in the labour market. In 
essence, universities that were selected to take part in PRIME were asked to downsize 
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their humanities and social science departments and to increase enrolments in STEM – 
engineering in particular. Thus, comparing the Korean case with the previous ones, we 
note a striking parallel with the German Higher Education Pact. Both PRIME in Korea 
and the Higher Education Pact in Germany responded to a perceived threat of skill 
shortages in the STEM subjects that would endanger a crucial component of the national 
knowledge economy – that is, the advanced manufacturing sector. 
But how did Korean universities behave compared to the other cases? When the 
government initiated LINC and PRIME, the response from the university sector was 
enthusiastic since a large share of universities (including several at the top of the 
rankings) applied for these initiatives. Interviewees illustrated how such reaction has to 
be ascribed to the competitive pressures of the higher education sector that made 
universities significantly malleable towards the demand of external stakeholders, and 
made them engage with government policy to secure (public) funding, but also to gain 
prestige by participating in these projects and therefore enhancing their capacity to be 
attractive to prospective fee-paying students. Compared to the German case, where 
universities pushed back on governments’ and employers’ demands leading to 
institutional change being located in a specific sub-set of the higher education sector (i.e. 
universities of applied sciences), the Korean case displays a more encompassing pattern 
of institutional change. This reflects – as in the British case – the accommodating 
position that universities are incentivised to take towards the demands of external 
stakeholders when competitive pressures are high. 
 
How do alternative theories fare against the empirical evidence? 
In this section I will discuss the findings in the light of the existing theories sketched out 
in chapter 1 and the alternative theory developed in chapter 2. Starting from the existing 
theories, we observe that structuralist explanations have limited explanatory power. 
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Indeed, the chief observable implication of this theory is the establishment of a 
vocational sub-set of institutions catering for labour market needs. The main mechanism 
underlying this development is expected to be the growing functional pressures placed 
on the higher education system by the continuous expansion of university enrolments. 
Framing this expectation in the institutional change jargon, higher education systems are 
expected to change through the layering of a sub-set of institutions next to the existing 
ones. Contrasting this theory with the empirical evidence presented in chapters 4 to 6 
and summarised earlier in this section, we note that the only case study that is consistent 
in its outcome with a structuralist explanation is the German one. As far as the British 
and Korean cases are concerned, we do not observe significant layering processes. Quite 
the contrary, we have seen that institutions across the entire higher education sector have 
engaged with skill formation initiatives. Even in the case of Germany, a structuralist 
explanation – although consistent in terms of outcomes – needs to be qualified. In 
particular, structuralist explanations gloss over issues around power and agency of actors, 
reducing institutional change to a set of functional pressures setting in motion a pattern 
of change in an essentially apolitical context.  
The case study illustrated how the layering of STEM skills, which took place 
most prominently from 2007 onwards through a government-led process of differential 
growth of universities of applied sciences and a business-led process of expansion of dual 
study programmes, was partly driven by the accumulation of “negative feedbacks” 
(Jacobs and Weaver 2015) from the previous decade, when research universities blocked 
on the ground the implementation of curricular reforms. Thus, structuralist explanations 
have difficulties accounting for patterns of high skill formation across advanced capitalist 
countries, not only because its predicted outcomes are only partly confirmed by the 
empirical data, but also because – even where outcomes are consistent – the underlying 
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process appears to be more complex and more ‘political’ than structuralist explanations 
assume. 
Turning to ideational explanations, we find a somewhat better match between 
theory and empirics. In particular, the British case is in its outcomes consistent with the 
idea of a neoliberal transformation of higher education whereby governments provide an 
incentive set for universities to open up to business and to satisfy their demands. The 
Korean case too in its first phase fits squarely with an ideational explanation as 
governments created the conditions for a heavily-marketised higher education system 
which was believed to provide the most efficient allocation of high skills. Yet, this 
explanation has some difficulties in accounting for some of the trends across time and 
space that were highlighted by the case studies. Two issues stand out in particular. Firstly, 
ideational explanations ignore the mediating role that actors within the higher education 
sector might have in pushing back on governments’ agendas. In particular, we have seen 
how a historically-inherited low competition setting in the German case, coupled with a 
system without an obvious (implicit or explicit) hierarchy among universities, allowed 
universities to jointly oppose neoliberal reforms, such as the ‘employability’ agenda 
promoted by government and employers in the late 1990s. On the other hand, a 
historically-inherited highly competitive environment and vertical differentiation among 
universities in Britain and Korea undermined the scope for collective action among 
universities, making them malleable towards governments’ and employers’ demands as 
they sought to gain reputation and resources vis-à-vis their ‘competitors’.  
Secondly, the Korean case shows that the demand side of the economy is a 
critical element to consider when theorising trajectories of high skill formation. The 
ideational literature remains silent on this issue, but the Korean case shows how 
governments might have to partially reverse previous neoliberal/liberalising reforms and 
rather promote reforms that aim at the re-regulation of the higher education sector. The 
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potential skill mismatches and skill shortages that a pure market-based allocation of high 
skills might produce emerged as crucial elements informing government policy and 
corresponding patterns of reform and institutional change. Thus, the ideational literature 
– while capturing a trend that is undoubtedly occurring, namely: governments 
increasingly framing higher education as ‘economic policy’ – cannot explain variation 
across countries in the degree to which these reforms occur (e.g. Germany vis-à-vis the 
UK and Korea) nor cases of policy reversals (such as in Korea). 
Turning to the CPE/VoC literature, we reiterate at the outset the empirical 
observation that was already spelled out in chapter 1, namely that the expansion of higher 
education over the last two decades is not an LME-exclusive development. Rather, higher 
education expansion has been occurring across countries and it has proceeded equally 
fast – if not faster – in CMEs. The case of Korea, where university enrolment rates 
became essentially universal, and Germany, where they spiralled above and beyond 
government forecasts from 2007 onwards, illustrate the point. Hence, from a theoretical 
point of view, the original VoC distinction, which has been also employed in more recent 
research (Hassel and Palier 2017, Anderson and Hassel 2013), between CMEs relying on 
vocation training and LMEs relying on higher education, holds increasingly less 
explanatory power for understanding different models of skill formation. Empirically, we 
have noted that by and large the British case conforms to a standard VoC scenario: as we 
would have expected in an LME, the chief arena of skill formation is a large higher 
education system delivering general skills through market mechanisms. Yet, it should also 
be noted that the key actors driving this development seem to be universities, and not 
employers – as we would have predicted from a pure VoC perspective. But to the extent 
that CMEs are expected to rely on vocational training and suppress the development of 
higher education, a standard VoC/CPE explanation does not offer a convincing account 
of the pattern observed in Germany and Korea.  
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Building on one of VoC’s key insights – i.e. the complementarity between skill 
formation systems and production regimes – but placing higher education at the centre 
of skill formation systems also in CMEs as they transition into knowledge-based growth, 
we move on to assess how the proposed theory (‘varieties of high skill formation’) fared 
against the empirical evidence presented in this thesis. Compared to the other theories, 
we observe closer correspondence of empirical evidence and theoretical expectations. In 
the UK case, we found a pattern of general skill formation, as expected in a knowledge 
economy that is predominantly reliant on high-end services. Universities have been 
found to second the pattern of increasing alignment between higher education provision 
and labour market needs, primarily driven by the competitive pressures of the higher 
education market.   
Moving to the German case, we found a pattern of alignment between higher 
education provision and labour market needs that is opposite to the British case. In 
Germany, we found governments and employers orchestrating the expansion of higher 
education to supply a well-defined set of high skills, namely STEM skills that were 
perceived as vital in a knowledge economy that relies strategically on advanced 
manufacturing. Further differences with the British case appear when considering the 
role of universities: largely insulated from competitive pressures by comparative 
standards, traditional universities did not second governments’ and employers’ demands 
of closer alignment between labour market needs and higher education provision and 
conformed to the hypothesised ‘antagonist’ role as they ‘pushed’ the skills agenda onto 
universities of applied sciences. In Germany, institutional change proceeded mostly by 
layering and differential growth, which governments and employers triggered through the 
Higher Education Pact and the establishment of Dual Study Programmes. 
The Korean case reveals yet another pattern: as hypothesised, universities’ 
behaviour was similar to that of their British counterparts as they seconded government 
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initiatives, which they perceived as a strategy to gain funds (directly and indirectly) in a 
fiercely competitive market. But – similarly to the German case – the policies promoted 
by the government were specifically set towards increasing the supply of STEM skills, 
which in the Korean context were considered pivotal given the strong reliance of the 
country on advanced manufacturing.  
Thus, the proposed theory of ‘varieties of high skill formation’ seems to have 
more explanatory power than the existing theories. By highlighting the institutional 
context of universities’ agency, the proposed theory was able to predict in which 
countries universities would second or oppose government and business demands 
highlighting how variation in university behaviour would have led to marginal (as in 
Germany) or encompassing (as in Britain and Korea) institutional change. On the other 
hand, by hypothesising a complementarity between the type of knowledge economy 
(whether reliant on high-end services or manufacturing) and the type of high skills 
needed (whether ‘just’ high skills or high STEM skills), the proposed theory was able to 
predict the different degree of involvement of governments and businesses in directly 
shaping the supply of high skills. Such involvement was stronger and more prescriptive 
in those countries – Germany and Korea – that necessarily need STEM skills for their 
knowledge economies to thrive. It was – on the other hand – less prescriptive in the 
British case, as strategic sectors of the knowledge economy tend to be indifferent to the 
‘type’ of high skills, as long as general skills are present.  
With its twin focus on the supply and demand side of the higher 
education/labour market alignment, the proposed theory provides therefore a useful 
heuristic to understand the trajectories of high skill formation in knowledge economies 
and the associated patterns of institutional change in higher education systems. Tables 
7.1 and 7.2 provide a summary of the explanatory power of different theories by 
comparing first in some detail the observable implications of the proposed theory with 
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the empirical evidence presented in chapters 4 to 6 (table 7.1), and then by showing in 
which case studies the implications derived from each theory have been confirmed or 
disproved by the empirical material (table 7.2). 
 
Table 7.1. Comparing empirical evidence and observable implications of the proposed theory 
Context Predicted observable 
implications 
Empirical evidence 
• High competition among 
universities 
• Knowledge economy based 
on high-end services 
• Case example: Britain 
• Governments cultivate 
supply of general high skills 
• Universities as protagonists 
or consenters 
• Institutional change by 
conversion/displacement 
• Predominance of general 
skills 
• Universities act as 
protagonists 
• Institutional change 
primarily by conversion 
• Low competition among 
universities 
• Knowledge economy based 
on advanced manufacturing 
• Case example: Germany 
• Governments cultivate 
supply of specific and 
general high skills 
• Universities as antagonists 
• Institutional change by 
layering/drift 
• Targeted focus on STEM 
skills 
• Universities act as 
antagonists 
• Institutional change 
primarily by layering 
• High competition among 
universities 
• Knowledge economy based 
on advanced manufacturing 
• Case example: Korea 
• Governments cultivate 
supply of specific and 
general high skills 
• Universities as protagonists 
or consenters 
• Institutional change by 
conversion/displacement 
• Targeted focus on STEM 
skills 
• Universities act as 
consenters 
• Institutional change by 
conversion and 
displacement 
Source: own elaboration 
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Table 7.2. Alternative theories and empirical evidence 
   Empirics support 
theory? 
Theory Observable implications Underlying mechanism UK DE KR 
Existing theories    
Structuralist Horizontal differentiation of 
higher education systems 
Vocationally-oriented higher 
education located in separate 
tier/institutions 
Convergence via 
layering/differential growth 
Expansion of university 
enrolments prompts 
governments to create an 
additional vocationally-
oriented tier 
X ü  X 
Ideational Transformation of higher 
education systems subsumed to 
market needs 
Universities serving the needs 
of labour markets 
Convergence via 
conversion/displacement 
Governments/international 
organisations reform 
higher education sector 
according to ‘marketising’ 
principles 
ü  X (ü) 
CPE/VoC Higher education developing in 
LMEs 
Higher education suppressed in 
CMEs, which continue to rely 
on vocational training instead 
Divergence via continued 
reliance on higher education in 
LMEs and on vocational 
training in CMEs 
Governments respond to 
employer preferences, who 
support expansion of 
higher education in LMEs 
but not in CMEs ü  X X 
Proposed theory    
Varieties of 
high skill 
formation 
All universities systems adjust 
to knowledge economy, but 
providing different skillsets 
depending on type of 
knowledge economy 
Institutional change 
encompassing/marginal 
depending on incentive-set 
faced by universities 
Governments reform 
higher education according 
to skills needs of national 
knowledge economy and 
institutional change is 
mediated by higher 
education sector 
ü  ü  ü  
Source: own elaboration 
7.2 Contributions, limitations and implications for future research  
 
This section places the research in the context of broader academic debates outlining its 
contributions, main limitations and avenues of future research that the thesis might lead 
to. In terms of contributions, the research mostly engaged with the literature on 
institutional change in higher education and skill formation systems and with the broader 
comparative political economy literature focusing on the institutional arrangements 
underpinning advanced capitalist countries’ production regimes and public policies.  
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Starting from the implications for the higher education literature, the empirical 
material collected points at the importance of universities’ preferences and agency in 
mediating the outcomes of higher education reforms. We have theorised and 
subsequently observed through the case studies that universities’ behaviour towards 
government policy was systematically different across countries and that differences in 
their preferences and agency was shaped by the incentive-set that they faced across 
different higher education systems. By focusing on this level of analysis and explicitly 
theorising why and when we might expect universities to take an accommodating stance 
towards reforms, oppose them or drive them, we might be able to make sense of the 
somewhat disappointing findings of much of the comparative literature on higher 
education that stresses how ‘continuities and changes co-exist’ (Musselin 2011, Regini 
2011b) without being able to grasp the reasons for such ‘uneven convergence’. 
Importantly, the literature on higher education has – somewhat surprisingly – devoted 
little attention to the role of universities as ‘agents of change’ in higher education policy. 
Indeed, universities have been generally depicted rather passively at the receiving end of 
reforms. The evidence presented in this thesis suggests taking universities as political 
agents systematically into account in future analysis of institutional change in higher 
education.    
Moving on to the broader literature on skill formation, the German and Korean 
cases illuminated a pattern of skill formation in higher education that the comparative 
political economy literature has by and large overlooked as it focused – as far as CMEs 
are concerned – almost exclusively on vocational training. In identifying such patterns of 
high skill formation, a different set of dynamics to those assumed by the political 
economy literature emerged. Next to the agency of universities that was already pointed 
out, it should also be highlighted here how the move from vocational training to higher 
education as the primary locus of skill formation does not appear to be a ‘simple’ 
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convergence towards a liberal model of education and training as is implied in some 
analyses (cf. Lauder, Brown, and Ashton 2008). Rather, the pattern uncovered in both 
Germany and Korea points towards a case of non-market coordination where the 
government seized a key role in shaping the supply of high skills targeting specifically 
those high skills that were considered vital for the national knowledge economy.  
The Higher Education Pact in Germany and PRIME in Korea emerge as a major 
case in point here, and they suggest that the rise of knowledge economies in CMEs, with 
its interrelated focus on skill formation in the university sector, calls for a political 
economy of skills that discovers the state as a central coordination actor, thus going beyond the 
binary distinction between the persistence of strategic non-market coordination among 
firms on one hand (Hall and Soskice 2001, Hall and Gingerich 2009) and an inevitable 
convergence towards market coordination on the other (Streeck 2009). More broadly, 
this finding suggests that forms of non-market coordination might persist in CMEs but 
that such persistence is not necessarily based on pre-existing institutional 
complementarities and lock-in effects. Rather, non-market coordination emerged 
through a process of creative adaptation of coordination to fundamentally new policy 
areas – such as higher education, which has been traditionally at the margins of CMEs’ 
policy mix – highlighting how CMEs can thrive with very liberal-like institutions that 
have been adapted to their needs. The findings suggest therefore that cross-country 
diversity can persist through change – not exclusively through continuity.   
A final implication of the research refers to the notion of institutional 
complementarities. This notion has become central to the comparative political economy 
literature mostly thanks to the VoC scholarship, which put institutional 
complementarities at the core of its firm-centric view of the political economy. As 
already outlined in chapter 1, the basic idea of institutional complementarities refers to 
the presence of one institution increasing the returns of a second institution (Hall and 
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Soskice 2001). In the case studies discussed in this thesis, I documented the emergence 
of institutional complementarities between the high skills supplied by the university 
system on one hand (general vs. STEM) and the dominant knowledge-based regime on 
the other (high-end services vs. advanced manufacturing).  
But how do institutional complementarities come about? Boyer (2005) argued 
that insufficient attention has been paid to the mechanisms that may lead to the 
emergence, reproduction and change of institutional complementarities. In particular, he 
warned that institutional complementarities may be an ex-post rationalisation of a 
number of developments that may not be necessarily responding to a strict rational-
choice framework based around the firm, as proposed by the VoC literature (see also 
Jackson and Deeg 2012, Deeg 2007, Amable 2016). In this respect, the findings of this 
thesis suggest that institutional complementarities might be best understood as the 
outcome of a “powering and puzzling” process (Heclo 1974, 305). In terms of ‘powering’ 
we outlined how the institutional context shapes the (power) relationship between 
governments, employers and universities, showing for instance that universities in high-
competition settings are likely to have their potential for collective action against 
government policy curtailed compared to universities in low-competition setting. In 
terms of ‘puzzling’, we noted several instances of governments promoting policies that – 
although corresponding to their first order preferences – were hardly successful and, as 
such, they were changed. The strongest case in point in this respect comes from the 
Korean example: a firm belief in market-based allocation of high skills soon revealed 
itself as highly inefficient for a knowledge economy relying on advanced manufacturing. 
Successive governments – of all political stripes – therefore addressed this issue by 
restricting market mechanisms and (re-) introducing forms of state coordination of the 
supply of high skills. Thus, the thesis supports the analytical value of the notion of 
institutional complementarities but it also suggests that the emergence of institutional 
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complementarities may be the outcome of a less linear and less rational process than 
assumed in the VoC approach. Rather, it suggests that the outcome is strongly mediated 
by actors’ power and by their learning processes and corresponding updating of 
preferences. 
Turning to the limitations of the present research, three stand out in particular. 
Firstly, the three actors that have been primarily taken into consideration in the research 
are universities, employers and governments. Chapter 2 set out the theoretical case as to 
why these three actors are particularly important. Yet, one issue that has not been 
addressed systematically is that of government partisanship. As we have noted throughout 
the chapters that skill formation in higher education involves in certain cases 
governments siding with employers – and against universities – to induce them to engage 
more in skill formation, should we expect governments of different stripes to behave 
differently in this respect? The role of partisanship has been convincingly shown to 
matter in terms of access to and funding of higher education (Ansell 2010, Busemeyer 
2015, Garritzmann 2016) and we might therefore wonder whether similar logics extend 
to the issue of skill formation. In section 1.2, it has been argued that partisanship is not 
expected to matter in terms of high skill formation. Indeed, while it has been 
demonstrated that – by catering to different social groups – Left and Right have different 
preferences regarding access to and funding of higher education (Ansell 2010, 2008, 
Garritzmann 2016, Busemeyer 2009b), there does not seem to be an obvious reason as to 
why either the Left or the Right should not want higher education systems to be aligned 
with labour market needs, in an era when bipartisan consensus has emerged around skills 
as a crucial ingredient for success in the knowledge economy. Moreover, the case studies 
also control for variation in partisan composition of governments, and they show – 
admittedly in a cursory way – that variation in government composition did not lead to 
significant differences in policy choices. In the period taken into consideration in all three 
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countries there were Centre-Left and Centre-Right cabinets, and we did not find a clear 
pattern of different preferences between Left and Right on this issue. Notwithstanding 
that there are no strong theoretical or empirical reasons to assign a crucial role to 
partisanship, it is conceivable that Left and Right have distinct historical relationships and 
linkages with different (organised) groups within the higher education sector (e.g. student 
unions; academics unions) and future research could therefore explore these links 
systematically. 
Secondly, migration is a potentially important issue that has not been addressed. 
Indeed, it could be argued that the national (higher) education system is only one of 
several routes that policy-makers might take to address skill needs or plug skill shortages. 
Others include for instance ‘importing’ those skills from abroad by attracting (highly) 
skilled workers who have been trained in a different country. This strategy has been 
found to be central to the development of the Irish growth model where the “internet-
tech sector is built on the back of inward migration of high-skilled labour from other EU 
countries” (Regan and Brazys 2017, 2). Yet, it would appear that the Irish economic 
strategy, with its reliance on attracting foreign direct investments, is a rather unique 
growth model (Regan and Brazys 2017, Brazys and Regan 2017), thus the extent to which 
inward-migration of skilled workers might be considered a pillar of skill formation in 
other countries too remains limited and the cases analysed certainly suggest that high skill 
formation was primarily framed as (domestic) education policy. At any rate, reliance on 
inward migration and forming domestic skilled workers are not mutually exclusive policy 
options, thus future research might explore how these two routes are combined and 
interact across countries. 
 A third limitation concerns the generalisability of findings. How much can be 
inferred from three case studies? The research design – being theoretically informed – 
employed a two-fold strategy to ensure that findings could be generalisable. First, it 
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adopted a ‘diverse’ cases approach and secondly countries could be also paired up in 
most different/most similar designs along the two key analytical dimensions that were 
identified. These two strategies strengthen the general plausibility of the empirical 
findings (Seawright and Gerring 2008). In addition, the descriptive statistics presented in 
chapter 2 provide evidence that the implied relationships between variables hold across a 
larger sample of countries. Yet, looking at the universe of cases (see figure 3.1), we note 
that some countries (e.g. Sweden) take a rather hybrid position across quadrants, hence 
for these countries theoretical expectations might not be as clear-cut and some 
theoretical nuance – together with specific empirical scrutiny – might be needed. In 
addition, the Southern European countries (plus France) were excluded from the 
discussion since the chief focus of the research was the alignment between higher 
education systems and the knowledge-based labour market. Since Southern European 
countries (plus France) have been shown to have adopted a strategy of “competitive 
impoverishment” rather than having convincingly pursued policies to move up the global 
value chain (Hassel and Palier 2017), these countries were excluded from the theoretical 
discussion and they were not scrutinised empirically. While not a chief focus of the 
present research, it would nonetheless be an interesting empirical question to assess how 
the relationship between higher education and the labour market developed in those 
countries that have been struggling to fully embrace a knowledge-based growth path. 
To conclude this sub-section, I will outline the implications for future research. The 
first avenue of research goes back to the important coordinating role of the state in 
shaping the supply of high skills, which it is suggested should be given full appreciation 
beyond the case of high skill formation. Indeed, the transition to the knowledge 
economy is altering the socio-economic make-up of advanced capitalist countries: policy 
areas and institutional arrangements that used to be crucial, e.g. the industrial relations 
arena or vocational training, have become relatively less important in the knowledge 
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economy (Iversen and Soskice 2015); conversely, policy areas that used to be marginal, 
e.g. higher education, have become central in the transition to a knowledge-based growth 
regime (Hall 2015). Critically, the ‘emergent’ sub-spheres of the political economy might 
be characterised by limited scope for employer-led coordination, for instance because 
employers might have been historically at the margins of a given policy area (as in the 
case of higher education). What types of coordination mechanisms should we then 
expect to emerge in these areas? The evidence provided by the German and Korean 
cases shows that where the scope for strategic coordination is low, ‘liberalisation’ does 
not automatically emerge as the default option. However, this dynamic is difficult to 
grasp if the only available analytical tool is the distinction between persistence of strategic 
non-market coordination among firms on one hand (Hall and Soskice 2001, Hall and 
Gingerich 2009) and inevitable convergence towards market coordination on the other 
(Streeck 2009, Baccaro and Howell 2017) – or a ‘mixed’ picture in which strongholds of  
“traditional coordination” co-exist with “liberalised” areas (Jackson and Sorge 2012, 
Palier and Thelen 2010). The pattern of state coordination illuminated by the case of high 
skill formation offers a way out of the ‘traditional’ dichotomy that the comparative 
political economy literature has often presented us with. Importantly, this is not the only 
area where we notice this development. The introduction of the minimum wage in 
Germany offers some similarities insofar as the state emerged as the crucial actor in that 
area too (Mabbett 2016). Thus, avenues for future research open up with respect to a 
systematic theorisation of the institutional, political and socio-economic conditions that 
might lead to the emergence of state coordination in the transition to the knowledge 
economy. While the literature has argued in the past for a ‘re-discovery’ of the state in the 
analysis of advanced capitalist countries (Schmidt 2008b), it is still unclear under which 
socio-economic and socio-political conditions state coordination is expected to emerge, 
in particular in those countries where state agency has been traditionally placed in the 
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background, overshadowed instead by a focus on strategic coordination among social 
partners (Streeck 1997b). 
A second stream of future research concerns a broader analysis of the 
institutional complementarities that have emerged across countries in the transition to 
the knowledge economy (Thelen forthcoming, Hassel and Palier 2017). This thesis has 
only focused on one particular set of complementarities, namely those between high skill 
formation and knowledge-based growth regimes. But how do other public policies 
sustain countries’ attempts to move up the global value chain? In particular, next to skill 
formation, we might hypothesise an important role for industrial policy, innovation 
policy, R&D, as well as social policies. With respect to the latter, it would be particularly 
intriguing to assess the changing relationship between skills and (un-) employment 
protection (Iversen and Soskice 2001, Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice 2001). Indeed, 
as discussed in section 2.1, in the transition from vocational training to higher education, 
an ever-increasing share of the population is being equipped with general skills, which 
might lead to an erosion of public support for generous (un-) employment protection. 
On the other hand, we have also seen how a set of skills (such as STEM skills) are 
increasingly important for employers, in particular in those countries relying on advanced 
manufacturing. This might mean that employers in these sectors have a growing concern 
in securing and retaining highly-skilled STEM workers, which might determine in parallel 
to a decline of universal public welfare, a further expansion of company-based welfare 
leading to increasing segmentation of welfare provision within countries across 
industry/skill lines (Wiß 2015). The politics and political economy dynamics behind the 
establishment of complementarities across institutional spheres in the transition to the 
knowledge economy appears as a research agenda worth pursuing in the future. 
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7.3 Implications for policy-making 
This thesis started off by noting the increasing salience among policy-makers of the 
alignment between higher education and knowledge-based labour markets. How might 
this research inform policy-makers’ choices in this respect? By means of a conclusion I 
will outline two main policy implications that stand out from the theoretical discussion 
and the empirical evidence across case studies. Firstly, the higher education literature has 
noted that the horizontal differentiation of higher education systems that took place in 
several countries in the 1960s and 1970s gave way to an increasing vertical differentiation 
(Goglio and Regini 2017). In other words, governments have been incentivising 
processes of diversification within the higher education system that are no longer based 
on a functional differentiation among (groups of) universities (e.g. those teaching-
oriented vis-à-vis those that are research-oriented); rather they promoted vertical higher 
education systems whereby (individual) universities are expected to find a way to stand 
out vis-à-vis the ‘competition’. European processes (such as the Bologna Process) also 
contributed to blurring the functional boundaries within the tertiary education sector 
(Witte, Van der Wende, and Huisman 2008). Yet, this research shows the persistent 
merits of a functional differentiation of the higher education sector. The German case in 
particular showed that universities of applied sciences have – if anything – increased their 
appeal to employers through their close connections with the labour market. 
Importantly, such connections are actively supported by faculty and management in these 
institutions because they see cooperation with employers and skill formation as central to 
their mission. Thus, instead of demanding a labour market conversion of the higher 
education sector ‘across the board’ with the inter-related tensions that it would create in 
‘research-oriented’ institutions, governments might consider a re-discovery of functional 
differentiation of tertiary education as an effective – and politically feasible – strategy to 
align higher education and knowledge-based labour markets. 
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Secondly, the research shows that supply-side-only policies are unlikely to be 
sufficient for a successful transition into the knowledge economy. Indeed, the research 
showed that a broad upskilling trend – which governments often promote by setting 
targets for the share of each age cohort that should enrol in university – runs into severe 
problems if it does not match the demand side of the economy. Furthermore, the 
research confirmed that labour market signals are not enough to channel students into 
those disciplines that are high in demand on the labour market calling for explicit policies 
aiming to match supply and demand. The Korean example was striking in this respect: 
de-regulation and expansion of higher education was by and large associated with skill 
mismatches and shortages that the government had to rectify by introducing re-
regulating measures. In Britain, we saw the reverse occurring with Foundation Degrees 
and Higher Apprenticeships, where both policy initiatives were hampered by weak 
employers’ demand. These findings resonate well with recent research conducted on the 
UK in comparative perspective, which shows precisely that supply-side policy has proven 
insufficient and that the demand-side of the labour market should be (back) at the top of 
policy-makers’ agenda, including “identifying and targeting inclusive growth sectors” and 
“fostering demand-led skills development” (Pike et al. 2017, 5, see also Mazzucato 2016, 
Mazzucato 2015b, a).  
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Appendix 1. List of interviews 
 
United Kingdom 
 
Interview code Affiliation Date 
UK_N1 University Association 08.12.2016 
UK_N2 University Association 17.12.2015 
UK_N3 Employer Association 22.04.2015 
UK_N4 Employer Association 17.04.2015 
UK_N5 Employer Association 31.03.2015 
UK_N6 Think-tank 03.12.2015 
UK_N7 Government 17.12.2015 
UK_U1 University (pre-1992) 13.05.2016 
UK_U2 University (pre-1992) 21.03.2016 
UK_U3 University (pre-1992) 22.07.2016 
UK_U4 University (pre-1992) 22.07.2016 
UK_U5 University (pre-1992) 07.03.2016 
UK_U6 University (pre-1992) 15.03.2016 
UK_U7 University (pre-1992) 16.03.2016 
UK_U8 University (post-1992) 22.03.2016 
UK_U9 University (post-1992) 13.05.2016 
UK_U10 University (post-1992) 26.04.2016 
UK_U11 University (post-1992) 26.04.2016 
UK_U12 University (post-1992) 26.02.2016 
UK_U13 University (post-1992) 26.02.2016 
 
 
Germany  
 
Interview code Affiliation Date 
DE_N1 University Association 05.04.2016 
DE_N2 University Association 11.08.2016 
DE_N3 Employer Association 05.04.2016 
DE_N4 Employer Association 17.06.2016 
DE_N5 Employer Association 27.10.2016 
DE_N6 Government 10.05.2016 
DE_N7 Government 26.05.2016 
DE_N8 Think-tank 22.04.2016 
DE_U1 University of Applied Sciences 27.04.2016 
DE_U2 University of Applied Sciences 27.04.2016 
DE_U3 University of Applied Sciences 04.05.2016 
DE_U4 University of Applied Sciences 02.05.2016 
DE_U5 University of Applied Sciences 31.05.2016 
DE_U6 University of Applied Sciences 19.04.2016 
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DE_U7 University 15.04.2016 
DE_U8 University 22.04.2016 
DE_U9 University 30.05.2016 
DE_U10 University 19.05.2016 
DE_U11 University 19.05.2016 
DE_U12 University 08.06.2016 
 
 
South Korea 
 
Interview code Affiliation Date 
KR_N1 Government 09.09.2016 
KR_N2 University Association 21.09.2016 
KR_N3 Think-tank 20.09.2016 
KR_N4 Think-tank 20.09.2016 
KR_N5 University; Advisor to government 20.09.2016 
KR_U1 University (private) 20.09.2016 
KR_U2 University (private) 20.09.2016 
KR_U4 University (public) 07.09.2016 
KR_U5 University (public) 07.09.2016 
KR_U6 University (public) 13.09.2016 
KR_U7 University (public) 13.09.2016 
KR_U8 University (private) 13.09.2016 
KR_U9 University (private) 13.09.2016 
KR_U10 University (public) 08.09.2016 
KR_U11 University (public) 08.09.2016 
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Appendix 2. Interview topic guide template 
 
Interviews in higher education institutions 
 
Setting the context of the institution 
 
1. Could you say a few words on your role within the institution as well as previous 
role in this or other (HE) institutions since, roughly, the early 1990s? 
2. Over the last 20 years, what would you identify as the major changes or 
developments that took place within your institution [or department], in 
particular with respect to teaching / education?  
a. Why did these changes take place? 
3. Which stakeholders? 
4. Has this always been the case or can you identify and recent change? And why? 
 
 
Main elements of skills agenda within institution 
 
5. [Introduce skills agenda and clarify what exactly I am talking about] How are 
professional / vocational skills taught in your institution?  
6. What do you identify as the main driver for the rise of the skills agenda? 
7. Why does your institution engage in the skills agenda? 
8. What policy developments [at national or local level] have provided specific 
incentive for your institution to engage in skill formation? 
 
 
Organisational and institutional elements of skills agenda 
 
9. Could you describe the debate within your institution regarding the employability 
agenda and the provision of more vocational skills? 
10. Which stakeholders influenced the decision-making process and in what ways? 
11. Can you identify any turning points in the management of the university? 
12. How does the cooperation with employers in professional / vocational skills 
occur?  
13. Do you mostly cooperate with large or small employers in professional / 
vocational skills formation? Why? 
14. Do you cooperate with employers in particular economic sectors only? 
15. Which financial arrangements underpin your cooperation?  
16. If you were to make changes to the skills agenda, how would that impact your 
student recruitment? 
17. If you were to operate under a different funding regime, how would you change 
your activities around skills? 
18. Has fluctuating students’ number been a concern for your university and, if so, 
how has this been dealt with? 
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Interviews with representatives of governments and associations 
 
Policy context 
 
1. What have been the main initiatives since the 1990s to align higher education and 
the labour market? 
2. Which ones do you think were most successful and why? 
3. How have these initiatives changed the HE offer in your country? 
4. Why have these initiative developed?   
 
Actors 
 
5. Who was the main driver behind these initiatives? In particular, what was the role 
of governments, employers and universities? 
6. Within the HE sector, who supported these initiatives and who opposed them? 
7. Have different universities supported/opposed the initiative in different ways?  
8. Within the employers’ camp, who is interested in engaging with HEIs in terms of 
skill formation? E.g. services sector vs manufacturing/small vs large employers?  
9. To what extent do employers cooperate in this respect? E.g. by forming consortia 
of companies or by having intermediary bodies arranging this? 
10. How successfully do employers engage with HEIs?  
11. What do you think is the impact of skill formation in HE within the broader skill 
formation system (e.g. vocational training)? 
12. What do you think should change on the employers’ side in order to step up 
cooperation? 
13. And what on the HE side? 
 
Academia – labour market relationships 
 
14. How would you define the relationship between academia and labour market? 
Conflictual / cooperative?  
15. How has this changed over the years? 
16. How do HE policy (e.g. funding) and broader socio-economic trends (e.g. 
expansion of HE, knowledge economy) influence academia – labour market 
relationships? 
17. Where would you locate the power in the HE system of your country? E.g. state 
/ government, university management, professors? 
18. How does this distribution of power facilitate or hinders cooperation between 
HE sector and labour market actors? 
19. Do you think that HE – labour market relationship is generally well received 
within academia? By whom in particular? 
 
Outcome and outlook compared with other countries 
 
20. Are you generally satisfied with the way HEIs and industry cooperate in your 
country in terms of skill formation? 
21. Are shortcomings due to employers, HEIs or government policies? 
22. Do you think that this works better in other countries, and why? 
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Appendix 3. Interviewees information and consent sheet 
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